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This thesis has two aims. One is to motivate the claim that challenging what I call a “sameness 
of evidence thesis” is a particularly promising approach to external world scepticism. The 
other is to sharpen an underexplored issue that arises when challenging the sameness of 
evidence thesis. The second aim is the primary aim of the thesis.  
Pursuing the first aim, I start by examining a predominant formulation of external world 
scepticism known as the “closure argument” for knowledge. I examine three main strategies 
for responding to external world scepticism and highlight their major challenges (DeRose 
1995; Dretske 1979; Nozick 1981; Sosa 1999). The goal is not to demonstrate that these 
challenges cannot be met, but rather to highlight a deeper issue that arises when responding to 
the closure problem for knowledge. In particular, I take the discussion to motivate looking at 
what I will call “scepticism about evidential justification” (Feldman 2000; Kornblith 2001; 
Pritchard forthcoming). The general argument in favour of a shift to scepticism about evidential 
justification is based on considerations about what an adequate response to external world 
scepticism should hope to achieve. I argue that one condition of adequacy is being able to 
account for radical forms of scepticism that challenge not only that our beliefs enjoy the 
epistemic status of knowledge (however that status is conceived) but also that our ordinary 
empirical beliefs are justified, or that we are reasonable in holding them. There are different 
varieties of scepticism about evidential justification. I focus in some detail on the anti-sceptical 
strategies of Pryor (2000; 2004) and Wright (2004) as examples of strategies that engage with 
scepticism about evidential justification. But I argue that one form of evidential scepticism 
known as the “underdetermination argument”—which Pryor and Wright do not directly 
engage with—is of particular importance.  
The main assumption in the underdetermination argument I focus on is about the nature of 
evidence. More specifically, the underdetermination argument presupposes that one’s evidence 
is the same in so-called “bad” and “good” cases in which an agent forms an empirical belief. 
This is the “sameness of evidence thesis.” Pursuing the main aim of the thesis, I introduce two 
forms an anti-sceptical strategy that involves challenging the sameness of evidence thesis. The 
two forms I consider differ in their commitments concerning a condition of accessibility on 
our evidence. Pritchard (2006; 2007; 2012; forthcoming) maintains that one’s evidence is 





sharpen is that while accepting the condition of accessibility leads to serious challenges in 
rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis, rejecting it leads to counterintuitive consequences if 
we grant that there is a normative principle that requires us to proportion our beliefs to the 
evidence.  
A central part of the thesis involves examining these counterintuitive consequences and 
showing what accounting for them requires. This is an underexplored project in the context of 
external world scepticism. I look at three different approaches to spelling out the 
counterintuitive consequences. My preferred account turns on a distinction between three 
different kinds of responsibility (Shoemaker 2011). I claim that there is a notion of 
responsibility – “attributability” – that is centrally connected to normative judgments. I argue 
for a “condition of accessibility” on attributability. Taken together, these two claims comprise 
an account of what is problematic about rejecting an access condition on our evidence. I then 
claim that there are two ways forward. One is to accept the condition of accessibility on our 
evidence that my account implies; the other is to challenge my claims about the connection 
between attributability and normative judgments, or the accessibility condition on 
attributability, or both.   
Although I claim that the prospects look better for taking the second option when it comes to 
rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis, drawing on recent work from Gibbons (2006; 2013) 
and Daniel Greco (2013), I argue that the first option is still a live possibility. The main aim in 
this part of the thesis is not to decide what the best way of rejecting the sameness of evidence 
thesis is, but rather to examine the challenges that arise when we reject it in one way or 
another. The question of what sort of access we have to our normative requirements is the 
focus of an increasingly sophisticated discussion in contemporary epistemology. An important 
upshot of this thesis is that it brings the problem of external world scepticism directly within 
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Epistemic Responsibility and Radical Scepticism: Introduction 
0.1 Introduction 
The primary aim of this thesis is to sharpen an issue that arises when responding to a central 
argument for external world scepticism. The central argument I focus on is called the 
“underdetermination argument”. There are many sceptical arguments about our knowledge of 
the external world. Part of this thesis examines the relationships between some predominant 
arguments and explains why some are more interesting than others. I will argue that the 
underdetermination argument is a particularly important and interesting argument. The main 
assumption in the underdetermination argument that this thesis focuses on is about the nature 
of evidence; more specifically, the underdetermination argument presupposes that one’s 
evidence is the same in so-called “bad” and “good” cases in which an agent forms an empirical 
belief. I call this the “sameness of evidence thesis”. I aim to sharpen an issue that arises when 
challenging the sameness of evidence thesis.  
It seems true that people ought to proportion their beliefs to the evidence. For example, if 
you’ve got perfectly good evidence that there is an apple on the table, it’s natural to say that 
your beliefs about whether there is an apple on the table in some sense ought to reflect the fact 
that you’ve got such good evidence. It’s a complex matter how to spell out the details of such a 
claim, but in this thesis I’m interested in a very general idea. I’m interested in the idea that this 
claim reflects a normative principle about the appropriateness of forming beliefs under certain 
circumstances (and I explain more about what I mean by that below). I think that any adequate 
challenge to the sameness of evidence thesis must also account for the idea that people are 
normatively required to proportion their beliefs to the evidence.1   
There is a tension in rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis and accounting for this 
normative principle. The tension arises out of a strong temptation to be an externalist about 
evidence in rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis. Externalism about evidence has 
consequences for conditions of access that come with being normatively required to Ø. I claim 
that there is a “natural reaction” to these consequences (I borrow this phrase from Gibbons 
(2013)). I aim to articulate in some detail what this reaction amounts to. I also aim to explain 
                                                            
1 That there is some such normative evidential principle is something that I assume in this thesis, along with the 





why the externalist’s consequences are so hard to avoid. A prominent strategy for rejecting the 
sameness of evidence thesis which would avoid the externalist’s consequences is to endorse a 
condition of “reflective accessibility” on our evidence (Pritchard 2006; 2007; 2012; forthcoming). 
A key challenge in rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis while endorsing a condition of 
reflective accessibility on our evidence is being able to explain how our evidence could be 
different in phenomenologically indistinguishable good and bad cases. I call this the 
“explanatory challenge”. It can easily look like the only way to meet the explanatory challenge 
is by endorsing evidential externalism, or at least by significantly weakening the condition of 
access on our evidence (perhaps so much so that the motivation for preserving whatever 
condition of access that remains is undermined). This is why it is important to explore the 
counterintuitive consequences of evidential externalism. My aim is to argue that an important 
desideratum for an anti-sceptical strategy that rejects the sameness of evidence thesis is to 
account for the natural reaction to the consequences of evidential externalism.  
There are of course many ways of responding to scepticism and I explore a variety of 
proposals in this thesis. My discussion of the various anti-sceptical strategies I consider aims to 
motivate the idea that challenging the sameness of evidence thesis is a particularly interesting 
and promising approach. In any case, I would like to emphasise that my aim is not to solve the 
problem of external world scepticism. Rather this thesis is about sharpening what I think is a 
somewhat new, or at least underexplored issue that arises when we try to solve the problem. 
The question of what sort of access we have to our normative requirements is the focus of an 
increasingly sophisticated discussion in contemporary epistemology. An interesting upshot of 
this discussion is that the sceptical problem can be seen as falling within the scope of that 
debate. Perhaps if we can see the problem in this light, those epistemologists who know much 
more about this issue than I do will have some fruitful things to say about the problem. Before 
getting started, the remainder of this introduction addresses some preliminaries and then 
provides a chapter by chapter outline of how things will proceed. 
0.2 Two Kinds of Internalism/Externalism 
When I use the terms “internalism” and “externalism” I mean internalism and externalism 
about evidence and justification (unless I say otherwise). I endorse a distinction between two 
ways of spelling out the difference between internalism and externalism. One turns on 





mean by “internalism”. This is the view that is commonly known as “access internalism” 
(Pryor 2001). Access internalism claims that one has a special kind of access to the facts about 
whether they are justified. One way of putting this is to say that, according to access 
internalism, if one is justified in believing that p then one is in a position to know that one is 
justified in believing that p. The idea of “being in a position to know” is admittedly vague. I 
will largely rely on an intuitive understanding of the idea. But in the context of his own 
discussion of accessibility, Williamson offers a helpful articulation of what it is to be in a 
position to know: 
To be in a position to know, it is neither necessary to know p nor sufficient to be 
physically or psychologically capable of knowing p. No obstacle must block one’s path 
to knowing p. If one is in a position to know p, and one has done what one is in a 
position to do to decide whether p is true, then one does know p. The fact is open to 
view, unhidden, even if one does not yet see it (Williamson 2000, p.95). 
An important distinction will arise in Chapter 3 between “strong” and “weak” ways of spelling 
this kind of special access out. Schematically, “strong” access says that one is in a position to 
know that condition C obtains when condition C obtains and that one is in a position to know 
that condition C does not obtain when it does not obtain. “Weak” access says merely that one 
is in a position to know that condition C obtains when condition C obtains. My default notion 
of the access condition in this thesis will be the strong version of access (this is because, as I 
discuss in Chapter 3, it’s not clear why we would endorse the asymmetry involved in denying 
“strong” but holding on to “weak”). But as I said, the distinction will come up in Chapter 3.  
A different way of thinking about internalism and externalism—a way that will be important in 
Chapter 5—turns on considerations about the supervenience base of the determinants of 
justification. That is, internalism in this sense says that the determinants of justification 
supervene on facts that are in some sense internal to the agent—usually understood as 
reflectively accessible or introspectible facts.  I’ll call internalism of this sort “supervenience 
internalism”. It’s important to note that while these two ways of thinking about internalism 
may look very similar, they are different. Supervenience internalism is plausibly motivated by 
access internalism in the sense that, if we are always in a position to know whether we are 
justified in believing that p, then it seems like the determinants of justification must supervene 
on facts that we are plausibly in a position to know about whenever they obtain. But one does 





maintain that the supervenience base of justification supervenes on the internal, or the mental, 
or the reflectively accessible or introspectible, but deny that we are always in a position to 
know that we are justified in believing that p (Conee and Feldman 2004; Pryor 2001). That 
said, one might find it difficult to understand the motivation for such a view once the 
condition of special access to justification is denied. In any case, it’s also possible to endorse a 
condition of special access but deny that the determinants of justification supervene on the 
internal, or the mental, or the reflectively accessible. In Chapter 5 I’ll consider two approaches 
in the literature that maintain a special condition of access on justification, but deny an internal 
supervenience base.  
0.3 Normative Requirements  
The notion of “normative requirements” (and equally “normative judgments”) is difficult to 
clearly and informatively explain. The most important place in which I appeal to the idea of a 
normative requirement (and a normative judgment) is the discussion of evidential externalism 
(Chapters 3, 4, and 5). Because Williamson—my paradigm evidential externalist—himself 
appeals to the notion of normative requirements, and because I argue that according to 
everything that Williamson grants about this notion, his view about evidence is problematic, in 
one sense I think it is open to me to say that I mean what Williamson means when he talks 
about normativity. But of course it’s important to say a bit more than that.  
What I mean by normative requirements (and judgments) can be captured in deontological 
terms. When someone is normatively required to Ø, I take this to mean that they are obligated, 
or permitted, or have a duty or some similar such notion to Ø. This obligation or duty or 
permission is inescapable in Foot’s sense (Foot 1972). It is not conditioned on one’s desires or 
goals.2 A normative judgment is just the judgment that an agent, or attitude, or action is subject 
to a normative requirement. In Chapter 4 I’ll draw an important connection between 
normative requirements and a particular kind of responsibility that I call “attributability”. I 
think one way of spelling out what I mean when I say that a person is normatively required to 
                                                            
2 It’s plausible that there’s more to the normative than inescapability. In Foot’s sense, norms of etiquette are 
inescapable, but norms of etiquette are not plausibly normative. Some capture the feature of normativity I’m 
getting at by saying that normative judgments are categorical. The categorical is a sub-species of the inescapable. 
Inescapable judgements apply to you regardless of your desires or goals, but you may rationally believe that they 
apply and believe that they do not give you any reason to Ø. Categorical judgements, on the other hand, not only 
apply to you regardless of your desires or goals, but you cannot also rationally believe that they apply to you and 





Ø is that the person is responsible for Ø-ing in a particular kind of way (which I’ll explain). 
Judgments about responsibility are intuitive. We hold each other responsible all the time. 
That’s one reason why I think it’s helpful to draw this connection. But I’ll be saying a lot more 
about this connection in Chapter 4, in particular in the context of a problem I think it creates 
for Williamson’s view about evidence. 
I should also note that when I use the term “norm” I follow Srinivasan’s understanding of this 
term: “A norm is a universal generalisation about how one ought to conduct one’s practical or 
doxastic affairs, involving a normative state N and a triggering condition C, of the form “N 
if/and/only if C” (Srinivasan unpublished, p.6).  I understand “triggering condition” as meaning 
something like the condition under which a given normative requirement applies.  
0.4 Evidence, Justification, and Knowledge 
There are many different ways of thinking about the relations—or lack thereof—between 
evidence, justification, and knowledge. Whether or not evidence is necessary for justification 
and whether or not justification is necessary for knowledge, one thing I will argue in this thesis 
is that it looks very much like the sceptic has to assume both of these things to get her 
problem off the ground (although, as I explain in Chapter One, many think that the sceptic’s 
claims about justification, as opposed to claims about knowledge, are in fact the most 
interesting sceptical claims). That the sceptic depends on these connections may not be 
immediately obvious. One task of Chapter 1 is to argue that this is the case. Insofar as the 
sceptical problem looks interesting, intuitive, and compelling, I think these are important 
claims. But this understanding of the relationship between evidence, justification and 
knowledge is also independently plausible.  
In any case, the idea is not claim that this is the only or even the best way of understanding the 
relationship between evidence, justification, and knowledge. Rather, the idea is to grant the 
prima facie plausibility of these connections and engage with the sceptic on that basis. A 
guiding idea behind this thesis is that we learn lessons about the assumptions at work in the 
sceptical problem by looking at various responses to the problem, and seeing what seems to 
work and what does not. These assumptions are taken on board to the extent that the project 
aims to show what is required of an anti-sceptical strategy that engages as closely as possible 





0.5 Chapter Outline 
The following is a detailed summary of how the thesis will proceed. In Chapter 1 I examine the 
best way to formulate of the problem of our knowledge of the external world. Much recent 
interest in the problem is due to a formulation known as the “closure problem” for knowledge. 
I examine some important responses to the closure problem and some of their challenges. My 
aim is not to demonstrate that these challenges cannot be met. Rather, my aim is to expose a 
deeper issue that I think arises when responding to the closure-based problem for knowledge. 
In particular, I take the discussion to motivate looking at what I will call “scepticism about 
evidential justification”. There are different varieties of scepticism about evidential justification 
and I will introduce as an example the form that I think is of particular importance, namely the 
underdetermination argument. But the general argument in favour of a shift to scepticism 
about evidential justification is based on considerations about what an adequate response to 
external world scepticism should hope to achieve. I argue that one condition of adequacy is 
being able to account for radical forms of scepticism which challenge not only that our beliefs 
enjoy the epistemic status of knowledge (however that status is conceived) but also that our 
ordinary empirical beliefs are justified or that we are reasonable in holding them.  
In Chapter 2 I examine two predominant anti-sceptical strategies that engage with scepticism 
about evidential justification. In particular, these strategies engage with a sceptical argument 
that makes central use of a claim that we need antecedent justification to believe that some 
radical sceptical scenario does not obtain in order to have justification to believe ordinary 
empirical propositions. Wright’s “entitlement” strategy (2004) and Pryor’s “immediate 
justification” strategy (2000; 2004) make opposing claims about the antecedent epistemic 
support we require for certain presuppositions of our ordinary empirical beliefs in order to be 
justified in holding those beliefs. Wright claims that we require antecedent support for the 
relevant presuppositions, but that the sort of support we have is a kind of non-evidential 
warrant that he calls “entitlement”. He claims that this background of non-evidential warrant 
explains how we are justified in believing ordinary empirical propositions. Pryor denies that we 
require antecedent support for the relevant presuppositions of our ordinary empirical beliefs, 
but claims rather that we can have a kind of non-evidential “immediate justification” to believe 
certain ordinary empirical propositions.  I argue that a closer examination of how Wright’s 





makes his view look closer to Pryor’s view than we might have originally thought. I claim that 
this motivates looking at Pryor’s view. But I argue that the problems faced by Pryor’s view—in 
particular the “problem of easy knowledge”—leads us back in the direction of Wright. In short 
I argue that the route of Wright in Pryor is a kind of cycle. I claim that in light of this, and in 
light of further considerations about the relationship between the sceptical argument they 
engage with and the underdetermination argument, we should turn our attention to the 
underdetermination argument, and more specifically the sameness of evidence thesis. 
In Chapter 3 I turn to two broad possible ways of rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis, 
due to Pritchard (2006; 2007; 2012; forthcoming) and Williamson (2000; 2009). These strategies 
differ in their commitments to a condition of accessibility on our evidence. In particular, 
Pritchard maintains that our evidence is “reflectively accessible” and argues nevertheless that in 
the good case we have evidence in the form of factive mental states, while in the bad case we do 
not. Thus, our evidence in the good and bad cases is different (though the good and bad cases 
are phenomenologically indistinguishable), and so the sameness of evidence thesis is false. This 
motivates a rejection of a key premise in the underdetermination argument. I argue that 
Pritchard faces an explanatory challenge in rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis. This is 
the challenge of explaining how our evidence could be different in the good and bad cases 
while being phenomenologically indistinguishable, even though our evidence is reflectively 
accessible. I argue that a move that Pritchard may want to make in this context—endorsing 
merely a “weak” accessibility condition—undermines a central motivation for his view. 
Moreover, it seems to entail the very consequences that I will go on to discuss in the context 
of evidential externalism. A view that would have a comparatively easy time explaining how 
our evidence is different in the good and bad cases, even though the good and bad cases are 
phenomenologically indistinguishable, simply gives up on a condition of accessibility (both 
“weak” and “strong”). We can sometimes fail to be in a position to know what our evidence is. 
This is evidential externalism. I focus on Williamson as a paradigm form of evidential 
externalism. While this view has an easier time rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis, I 
argue that it has an important counterintuitive consequence. The consequence arises when we 
consider the normative principle that we ought to proportion our beliefs to the evidence. 
Williamson’s view entails that we can be normatively required to Ø even though we are not in 





intuitive reaction to this idea (which Williamson himself grants) I claim that it is not easy to 
spell out what this reaction amounts to.  
In Chapter Four I look at three different approaches to spelling out what I call the “natural 
reaction” to Williamson’s view about evidence. I call the first approach the “guidance-
deliberation” worry. I claim that this is not a good way of spelling out the natural reaction 
because it does not seem to entail that there is a problem with the sort of access to our 
evidence that Williamson allows we do have. The second approach turns on the idea that there 
is an essential connection between what Srinivasan (unpublished) calls the “deontological 
perspective”—the perspective from which we make judgments of whether an agent is 
obligated or required or has a duty to Ø – and the “hypological perspective” – the perspective 
from which we judge whether an agent is blameworthy for Ø-ing. According to this approach, 
judgments of blameworthiness entail a condition of accessibility on the conditions under 
which an agent is blameworthy, and since the hypological and deontological perspectives are 
essentially linked, Williamson’s view does not account for the kind of accessibility we ought to 
have to normative requirements concerning our evidence. I argue that this approach is not a 
promising way to go because it simply does not seem plausible that there is such an essential 
connection between these two perspectives. The final approach I consider is closely related but 
turns on a distinction between different kinds of responsibility (Shoemaker 2011). I note that 
there is a notion of responsibility – “attributability” – which comes apart from judgements of 
blameworthiness, but which may be centrally connected to normative judgments and imply a 
condition of access that conflicts with Williamson’s view about evidence. In particular, the 
upshot of the foregoing is the claim that we should always be in a position to know what our 
evidence is. The main aim of Chapter Four is to provide a better understanding of what the 
natural reaction amounts to and what accounting for it would involve.   
In Chapter 5 I consider some options moving forward. The chapter begins by looking briefly 
at Williamson’s claim that an internalist access condition on our evidence is a “quaint relic of 
Cartesian epistemology” and rests on the mistaken assumption that there is such a thing as a 
“cognitive home”—a distinctive realm in which nothing is hidden and in which our judgments 
about what to do and what to think are always safe from the possibility of non-culpable error 
(Williamson 2000). The idea that we have a cognitive home is not a popular commitment in 





home seems to amount to a commitment to accessibilist supervenience internalism. This 
introduces a potential in-principle reason to think that endorsing an internalist access condition 
and rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis is impossible. I explore the theoretical options 
for arguing that the idea that we are always in a position to know what our evidence is does not 
commit us to accessibilist supervenience internalism. I draw on work from Gibbons (2006; 
2013) and D. Greco (2013). At this stage I note that I am still no further along in 
understanding what the best way to reject the sameness of evidence thesis is. In light of the 
difficulties raised so far for such a strategy, I conclude the chapter by taking a step back and 
considering whether the strategy is worth pursuing after all. I argue that it is. I conclude the 



















Chapter 1: Formulating External World Scepticism 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Much recent interest in external world scepticism is due to its formulation as a closure problem 
for knowledge. The problem exploits an intuitive relationship between our apparent lack of 
knowledge of the falsity of radical sceptical hypotheses, such as that one is a handless brain in a 
vat (BIV), and our knowledge of ordinary empirical propositions, such as that we have hands. 
In this chapter I examine some important responses to the closure problem and some of their 
challenges. My aim is not to demonstrate that these challenges cannot be met. Rather, my aim 
is to expose a deeper issue that I think arises when responding to the closure-based problem 
for knowledge. In particular, I take the discussion to motivate looking at what I’ll call 
scepticism about evidential justification, a form of scepticism that embodies the issues left over 
once we’ve gone through the standard ways of approaching the closure-based problem for 
knowledge. I use the underdetermination argument as a paradigm example.  
 
1.2 The Closure Argument 
 
The closure-based sceptical argument goes as follows. 
 
1) If S knows that he has hands then S knows he is not a handless BIV. 
2) S doesn’t know he is not a handless BIV. 
3) Therefore, S doesn’t know he has hands. 
 
The argument is meant to establish a radical conclusion given that we can replace “S has 
hands” with just about any proposition about the external world, knowledge of which is 
supposedly incompatible with a lack of knowledge that one is not an envatted brain. The 
argument is often referred to as a paradox. It begins with apparently true premises and 
establishes, by an apparently valid rule of inference, an apparently false conclusion. Along with 
its highly implausible conclusion, the simplicity and seemingly mundane plausibility of the 
premises of this argument is precisely what is interesting about it. With closure-based 
scepticism, the notion that we can solve the sceptical problem simply by adjusting whatever 





outmoded quest for Cartesian certainty—has given way to a more threatening concern. As 
DeRose puts it, the above sceptical argument (which he calls the “argument from ignorance” 
(AI)) “initially seems to threaten the truth of our ordinary claims—it threatens to boldly show 
that we’ve been wrong all along in thinking and saying that we know this and that. For it 
doesn’t seem as if it’s just in some ‘high’ or ‘philosophical’ sense that AI’s premises are true: 
they seem true in the ordinary sense of ‘know’” (DeRose 1995, p.5). If the premises of the 
sceptical argument appear true by ordinary standards, dealing with the closure-based problem 
becomes an exercise in understanding the nature of our conception of knowledge, not merely 
an uninteresting or optional “philosophical” conception of knowledge. To better see the 
supposedly paradoxical nature of the sceptical argument, let’s look a bit more carefully at its 
premises.  
Premise (1) is said to trade on a highly intuitive and plausible epistemic principle, the closure 
principle. It’s not entirely clear how this principle should be formulated. For example, consider 
the following implausible principle: 
(CK1) If S knows p, and p entails q, then S knows q. 
Surely the sceptic is not demanding that we must know all propositions that are logically 
entailed by what we know. Indeed, we fail to believe most of the logical consequences of what 
we know (and we sometimes believe the negations of some of those consequences). Perhaps 
the sceptic merely requires that we know all propositions which we know to be entailed by what 
we know. A corresponding closure principle would go roughly like this: 
(CK2) For all S, p, q, if S knows that p, and S knows that p entails q, then S knows that q. 
There are countless examples from everyday life in which this closure principle (CK2) appears 
to be at play. For one, imagine a detective who reasons: “I know that the butler was in the 
garden at the time of the crime, and I know that if the butler was in the garden at that time 
then the butler was not at the scene of the crime (the kitchen); so I know that the butler was 
not at the scene of the crime”. The sceptic appears licensed to make her inference in precisely 
the same sort of way that the detective is licensed to make his. If I know that I have hands, and 





handless BIV. If not, the sceptic wants to know what distinguishes this inference from the 
detective’s. 
However, it is a matter of some controversy whether (CK2) really is as plausible as I’ve 
suggested. For example, it doesn’t account for the possibility that one could know p and know 
that p entails q, but know q on totally different grounds than their knowledge that p and that p 
entails q. It may be that an even weaker but closely related formulation of closure is the really 
intuitive one: 
(CK3) If S knows p, and p entails q, and S competently deduces q from p on the basis of 
knowing that p entails q, then S knows q.  
This principle seems to capture what’s really intuitive about the relevant idea in the 
neighbourhood, which is that we can extend our knowledge by competent deductions.3 And 
we can understand (1) as intuitively motivated by this principle. When it comes to strategies 
that deny closure in an effort to undercut the motivation for (1) (which I turn to shortly), it is 
important that such strategies are capable of rejecting the principle that’s really at play in the 
sceptical problem, as opposed to a closely related but ultimately irrelevant principle. That said, 
regardless of whether the strategies I consider below challenge the relevant principle, my 
discussion of these strategies aims to show that even by their own understanding of what the 
relevant principle is, they face serious issues. 
Premise (2) of the closure-based argument is “S does not know that he is not a BIV”. The 
sceptic of course needs this claim in order to deny, via closure, that S has all sorts of everyday 
knowledge. But what, if anything, makes this claim plausible? Interestingly, much of the 
literature seems to take premise (2) as primitively plausible (Brueckner 2010, p.367). Or at least, 
as DeRose has noted, explanations as to why we lack knowledge of the denials of sceptical 
hypotheses are given in a “circle of all-too-closely related terms of epistemic appraisal” 
(DeRose 1995, p.16). For example, Dretske claims that you don’t know you’re not a BIV 
                                                            
3 According to Schiffer, “[A] strand to our concept of knowledge deems one to know what one deduces with 
certainty from premises one knows” (Schiffer 1996, p.330). There are still a variety of further issues surrounding 
the proper formulation of the closure principle, but these would take us too far afield for my present purposes. 
See Hawthorne (2005, p.29) and Williamson (2000m, p.119). Hawthorne argues that we must add that the agent 
retains their knowledge that p over the competent deduction, since the agent could obtain counterevidence to p 






because you can’t “rule out” that you’re not a BIV. To the contrary, DeRose suggests that this 
explanation is more informative in the reverse—namely, that the notion of being unable to rule 
out that p might be explained by the fact that you don’t know that p. I will return to this 
question in more detail below. For now I’ll simply note that one way of putting the basic idea 
is along the following lines. Sceptical scenarios are chosen for sceptical purposes precisely 
because they are scenarios we’d take ourselves not to be in, even if we were in them. It can 
easily seem like anything one might say or do to challenge the thought that they are in a 
sceptical scenario is something they could equally well do even if the sceptical scenario obtained.4  
Regardless, whether (2) is true or not, many commentators seek to neutralize its ability to 
threaten our everyday knowledge. Indeed, many closure-denying anti-sceptical strategists are 
motivated by a conviction that (2) cannot be denied. I turn now to outline the basics of an 
anti-sceptical strategy that denies premise (1).   
1.3 Dretske and the Denial of Closure  
The seminal formulation of this strategy is Dretske’s (1970) “Epistemic Operators”. The basic 
idea behind Dretske’s view is illustrated nicely by his famous zebra example. Imagine that you 
are at the zoo looking at some striped animals in a pen marked “zebras”. You have plenty of 
reason to believe that the animals are zebras: you know what zebras look like and you can see 
the animals, not to mention a sign marked “zebras”, clearly in front of you. It seems clear that 
you know the animals are zebras. But now imagine you are with a friend obsessed with 
conspiracy theories who insists that the animals are actually mules, cleverly disguised by the 
zoo keepers to look just like zebras. It would seem you don’t know, just by looking, that the 
animals aren’t cleverly disguised mules. After all, they’ve been disguised to look just like zebras 
and to expose such a hoax would seem to require special checks. “Have you checked with the 
zoo authorities? Did you examine the animals closely enough to detect such a fraud?” (Dretske 
1970, p.1016). But you do know that the fact that the animals are zebras entails that the animals 
are not cleverly disguised mules. 
                                                            





According to Dretske the example illustrates an everyday case in which the closure principle 
fails.5 “What I am suggesting is that we simply admit that we do not know that some of these 
contrasting ‘skeptical alternatives’ are not the case, but refuse to admit that we do not know 
what we originally said we knew” (Dretske 1970, p.1016). So, says Dretske, the closure 
principle is false. Perhaps, then, we can reject the sceptic’s appeal to closure in establishing the 
sceptical conclusion. The sceptic’s argument might be another instance of the failure of 
closure. Of course the sceptic may simply respond to such an example by claiming that, 
contrary to what we might have thought, in the zebra case, once the cleverly disguised mule 
possibility is raised, one doesn’t know that the animal is a zebra. And this is precisely because 
closure holds. The sceptic can argue that Dretske must assume the failure of closure from the 
outset in order to draw out the first intuition of the thought experiment. So what argument does 
Dretske offer to show that closure does not hold for knowledge? (Dretske 1970, p.1017). 
Dretske aims to show that the epistemic operator ‘knows that’ “penetrates” only to relevant 
“contrast consequences” (what this means will become clear as we go along). 6 Dretske argues 
by analogy, noting three other operators similar in key respects to ‘knows that’ and which do 
not penetrate to (known) contrast consequences.7  Because they are analogous in certain key 
respects, Dretske says, we should be happy to settle with the idea that epistemic operators 
don’t always penetrate to contrast consequences either. Dretske points out that even if his 
argument from analogy is a weak one, these analogous operators are useful for explaining why 
‘knows that’ is not closed under known entailment.  
Dretske’s explanation for why these operators don’t penetrate to certain contrast consequences 
involves the notion of “relevant alternatives”. In a nutshell, Dretske says that the operators 
                                                            
5 In order to argue that (CK3) fails, Dretske has to argue that this is a case in which S knows that the animal is a 
zebra, knows that the animal’s being a zebra entails that it is not a cleverly disguised mule, competently deduces 
that the animal is not a cleverly disguised mule on the basis of knowing this entailment, and yet fails to know that 
the animal is not a cleverly disguised mule.  
6 The term “penetrates” refers to an operator’s ability to reach certain logical consequences of the proposition 
upon which it operates. Dretske notes different types of logical consequences, most important of which are 
“presuppositional” and “contrast” consequences. The latter are most important for our purposes since the 
sceptical scenarios are contrasting consequences of our ordinary knowledge claims. For example, “I am not a 
BIV” is a contrasting consequence of “I have hands”. To translate from Dretske’s terminology, when he claims 
that the epistemic operator ‘knows that’ does not penetrate to all contrasting consequences, he is saying that 
knowledge is not closed under known entailment.  
7 These operators do penetrate to certain other logical consequences, unlike a class of operators that Dretske 
refers to as “non-penetrating”—an example is ‘strange that’. It could be strange that there is a pink bird in the tree 
over there, you could know that this entails that there is a tree over there, and yet it is not at all strange that there 
is a tree over there. Non-penetrating operators also fail, as Dretske shows the epistemic operators do, to penetrate 





penetrate only to those contrast consequences that are part of the relevant set of alternatives 
which served to define the content of the entailing proposition being operated on in the first 
place. As Dretske puts it: 
To know that x is A is to know that x is A within a framework of relevant 
alternatives, B, C and D. This set of contrasts together with the fact that x is A, serve 
to define what it is that is known when one knows that x is A. One cannot change 
this set of contrasts without changing what a person is said to know when he is said 
to know that x is A. We have subtle ways of shifting these contrasts and hence, 
changing what a person is said to know without changing the sentence that we use to express 
what he knows (Dretske 1970, p.1022). 
Consider the operator ‘explains that’ in the following example. When a waiter comes around 
with the dessert menu, Brenda says she’s not having any dessert. Dretske points out that, 
within a context of explanation (and likewise within a context of epistemic evaluation) “no fact 
is an island”. That is to say: “within the context of explanation and within the context of our 
other operators, the proposition on which we operate must be understood as embedded within 
a matrix of relevant alternatives” (Dretske 1970, p.1022). To continue the example, perhaps we 
could explain the fact about Brenda by noting that she’s on a diet. This explanation makes 
sense against the background of a set of relevant alternatives—for example, that Brenda didn’t 
order dessert and eat it. But consider the fact that we know that Brenda’s declining dessert entails, 
say, that she didn’t order dessert and throw it at the waiter. We can’t explain why she didn’t do that 
by bringing to light the fact that she’s on a diet. So our operator ‘explains that’ doesn’t 
penetrate to a known contrast consequence. But Dretske calls this contrast an irrelevant 
alternative: that is, it’s an alternative the introduction of which would change “what it is that is 
being explained and, therefore, what counts as an explanation, even though (as it were) the 
same fact is being explained” (Dretske 1970, p.1021). For this reason we shouldn’t expect the 
operator to penetrate to such a contrast consequence. Precisely the contrast consequences 
which do not serve to define the parameters of the original explanation are the “irrelevant” 
ones. 
The crucial point is that epistemic operators, too, should be understood as operating upon 
propositions which are defined within a matrix of relevant alternatives. Introduce a contrast 
consequence which alters the matrix, and what S ‘knows that’ becomes something altogether 
different. Stine summarizes the point nicely: “If being a mule painted to look like a zebra 





John knows that the animal is a zebra from what one meant originally and that something else 
may well be false” (Stine 1976, p.255). There seems to be no reason why we ought to know the 
denials of contrast consequences which would alter what it is that we can be said to know in 
the first place. According to Dretske, we can simply presuppose irrelevant alternatives. We do 
not have to rule them out in order to know that p. 
Besides this sketchy illustration of his point, Dretske also suggests in a footnote that if one of 
the operators under discussion happens itself to be a necessary condition on knowledge then 
that operator’s failure to penetrate in certain cases will necessarily mean that ‘knows that’ fails 
to penetrate in the same cases.8 This would considerably strengthen the argument that Dretske 
has sketched. I turn, then, to Nozick’s argument that two necessary conditions on knowledge 
are not closed under known entailment. Interestingly, as we’ll see towards the end of the next 
section, it’s not clear that a refined version of Nozick’s approach supports a denial of closure. 
Indeed, it might be seen as paving the way for a denial of premise (2).  
1.4 Nozick and The Denial of Closure 
Nozick argues that two necessary conditions on knowledge are not closed under known 
entailment, and concludes that knowledge itself is not closed (Nozick 1981, p.206). According 
to Nozick’s necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, a true belief that p counts as knowledge 
when (and only when) S’s belief tracks the truth of p. What this means amounts to two further 
conditions: i) S wouldn’t believe p if p were false, and ii) S would believe p if p were true. 
Nozick claims that these conditions account for the intuitive idea that our beliefs that count as 
knowledge are counterfactually responsive to the facts (Nozick 1981, p.211).9 The main 
condition he focuses on is i), which is known as “counterfactual sensitivity.”10 
We noted briefly above that the BIV scenario can be described precisely as one in which 
something like i) is not met. We said that even if you were a BIV you would believe you 
weren’t one. But, according to Nozick, condition i) holds for such mundane propositions as 
that I have hands. For if “I have hands” were false—if, say, I were to lose my hands in a car 
                                                            
8“I think that those who are inclined to give a causal account of knowledge should be particularly interested in the 
operator ‘R →...’ since, presumably, it will be involved in many instances of knowledge...”(Dretske 1970, p.1019 
fn.4).  
9 Nozick modifies his modal conditions in an important way in response to objections. I return to the modified 
forms shortly below.  





accident—I wouldn’t still believe that I have hands. And once again, I know that my having 
hands entails that I’m not a BIV. Nozick goes on to say, given that i) is a necessary condition 
of knowledge, it follows that I can know proposition p which I know to entail proposition q, 
and yet fail to know that q.11  
Nozick claims that the sceptic won’t want to deny that condition i) is necessary for knowledge, 
given that he supports premise (2) precisely by invoking condition i) (according to Nozick). If 
this is true, then it seems to present the sceptic with a dilemma: either sensitivity is a necessary 
condition on knowledge, which problematizes the sceptic’s appeal to premise (1); or sensitivity 
is not a necessary condition of knowledge, which problematizes the sceptic’s appeal to (2). In 
other words, Nozick argues that the sceptic cannot have it both ways when comes to 
counterfactual sensitivity (Nozick 1981, p.209). Nozick takes himself to have established the 
right anti-sceptical conclusion. Although we don’t know we’re not BIVs, this has no impact on 
the fact that we know all sorts of everyday propositions which happily satisfy the conditions of 
his analysis of knowledge. But the proposal as it stands faces serious difficulties. 
For one thing, the sensitivity condition arguably needs refining, as Nozick himself 
acknowledges. Consider the following case. A grandmother can reliably tell by looking at her 
grandson when he comes to visit whether he is healthy and well. If it were ever the case that 
the grandson was really not well, other members of the family would tell a white lie and assure 
the grandmother that the grandson is indeed healthy and well to avoid making the 
grandmother upset. It seems then, that when the grandson comes to visit and the grandmother 
forms the belief that her grandson is well, this belief is not sensitive. That is, were the grandson 
not well (in a close possible world) she would believe that he was. Yet it seems implausible to 
conclude that the grandmother does not know that her grandson is well. So the case is a 
challenge for the claim that sensitivity is necessary for knowledge (Nozick 1984, p.179).  
Nozick deals with the case by modifying his conditions on knowledge. He modifies them as 
follows: S knows that p iff p is true, S believes, via method or way of coming to believe M, that 
p, and: i)* If p weren’t true and S were to use M to arrive at a belief whether (or not) p, then S 
wouldn’t believe, via M, that p; and ii)* If p were true and S were to use M to arrive at a belief 
whether (or not) p, then S would believe, via M, that p. The basic idea is that the modal profile 
                                                            
11 Again, to challenge (CK3), Nozick must argue that one can know p, know that p entails q, competently deduce 





of S’s belief that p must be evaluated in possible worlds in which the method by (or basis 
upon) which S forms the belief that p in the actual world is held fixed. The only possible 
worlds that are relevant to the assessment of whether S knows that p are worlds in which S 
forms the belief that p by the same method as in the actual world (Black 2002, p. 9). With 
these modifications, Nozick can get the right results in the grandmother case. After all, the 
case involves different methods in an important way. In the possible world in which she forms 
the false belief that her grandson is well, it’s on the basis of testimony. However, the belief we 
evaluate for sensitivity is formed on the basis of visual perception. And it seems plausible that, 
holding this belief-forming method fixed across possible worlds, the grandmother’s belief is 
sensitive. Thus, it remains open to Nozick to claim that she knows that her grandson is well.  
Relativising to methods opens up an important worry for Nozick. It’s questionable whether 
Nozick can motivate a denial of the closure principle given this modification of his modal 
principles. It is no longer clear that the closure principle fails when we hold belief-forming 
methods fixed. For example, we might insist that one’s belief that they are not a BIV is 
sensitive according to the modified form of sensitivity. To be sure, in a BIV world one would 
form a false belief that one is not a BIV. But it seems one would do so by means of a different 
belief-forming method. In the actual world, it’s plausible that one forms the belief that they are 
not a BIV on the basis of visually perceiving, say, that they have hands, and inferring that they 
are not a BIV. In the closest world in which one is a BIV, however, intuitively one doesn’t 
form empirical beliefs on the basis of visual perception. Rather, one forms them via sensory 
experiences controlled by the scientists in charge. If S’s belief that they are not a BIV is 
sensitive, then there is no need to deny closure. This is because both S’s belief that she has 
hands, and S’s belief that she is not a BIV meet the modified conditions on knowledge. This 
has a potentially important upshot for responding to scepticism beyond the implications for 
closure denial, and I will return to this point below.  
Of course, it is open to Nozick to respond in the following way. He can insist that the belief-
forming method does not differ between the actual world and the closest possible BIV worlds. 
Indeed, Nozick has a view about how to properly individuate belief-forming methods 
according to which BIVs and ordinary perceivers can be understood as forming beliefs with 
the same method. His view is that what’s crucial for individuation of methods is the “final 





ordinary perception that they have hands to that of a BIV’s, the final upshot in each case is the 
phenomenal experience as of p being the case. He claims that because of this these two 
methods count as the same (Nozick 1981, p.184).12 
There are a number of things to say in response to this suggestion and I don’t want to get 
caught up in the details here. I will note, however, that it seems odd for Nozick to individuate 
methods by this purely internal condition of phenomenal experience. First of all, it seems to be 
at odds with his externalist approach to knowledge (I discuss the externalist element of modal 
theories of knowledge below). As Pritchard points out:  
If one is happy to endorse externalism, however, and note that this is not an 
uncontroversial move to make, then it is not obvious why one should accept that the 
defining mark of a method should be something that is reflectively accessible i.e., the 
nature of one’s experiences. Why couldn’t one’s method be determined by facts 
which were not reflectively accessible to one as well? (Pritchard 2008, p.10).  
Regardless of whether one has epistemic externalist leanings or not, it’s plausible to assume 
that the belief forming method of visual perception involves such components as:  
[...] the lenses of the eyes focussing … light on the retinas, where a pattern of retinal 
cell stimulation occurs that sends electro-chemical impulses along the optic nerve to 
the visual cortex, where a pattern of brain cell stimulation occurs with the upshot that 
the subject has a visual experience (McLaughlin 1996, p.200).13  
In any case, as Black notes, distinguishing what counts as visual perception in this way as 
opposed to Nozick’s way allows us to avoid counterintuitive consequences, such as counting 
our dreams as instances of visual perception (imagine a dream in which the “final upshot” of 
the belief forming method is experientially indistinguishable from the final upshot of an 
experience had via one’s visual perception in waking life), or cases in which a person who’s 
been blind from birth has the experience as of something purple flashing before their eyes 
(Black 2002, p. 12). As I said, I don’t want to get into the details of this complex issue here.14 
                                                            
12“Usually, a [belief-forming] method will have a final upshot in experience on which the belief is based, such as a 
visual experience, and then (a) no method without this upshot is the same method, and (b) any method 
experientially the same, the same ‘from the inside’, will count as the same method. Basing our beliefs on 
experiences, you and I and the person floating in the tank are using …the same method” (Nozick 1981, p.184-
185). 
13 As quoted in Black (2002, p.13). 
14 See Nozick (1984), p.233 for a challenge to externalist individuation of methods. For a subtle discussion of 
Nozick’s arguments, see Williams (1991), p.336-346. See also Becker (2012) who argues both that methods should 
not be individuated externally, and that there is a way of interpreting Nozick’s claims about methods which is 





My point is to note that it’s far from clear that Nozick’s view of knowledge licenses, and still 
less requires, a denial of closure. Indeed, we might think that these considerations suggest that 
there is hope for an anti-sceptical strategy that challenges premise (2).  
1.5 Premise Two  
A prominent way of responding to closure-based scepticism is known as “neo-Mooreanism”. 
Neo-Mooreanism is inspired by G.E. Moore’s “common sense” anti-sceptical strategy in 
“Proof of an External World” (1939). Moore’s argument can be formulated in the following 
way:15 
4) I know I have hands. 
5) If I know I have hands, then I know I’m not a handless BIV. 
6) Therefore, I am not a handless BIV. 
 
Moore effectively relies on (as opposed to challenges) the closure principle. He argues that it’s 
utterly clear and obvious that he knows that he has hands. Moreover, he knows that this 
knowledge entails that he is not a BIV. Therefore, he concludes, he knows that he is not a 
BIV. In other words, Moore turns the closure-based sceptical argument on its head. An 
important thing to note about this response is that Moore doesn’t do much else in dealing with 
the sceptic (Coliva 2010; McGinn 1989; Stroud 1984). In a sense this strategy amounts to 
admonishing the idea that one does not know that they have hands. I don’t think it’s difficult 
to sympathise with Moore on this point. However, this “straight man” response seems pretty 
implausible to many, and for a variety of different reasons (McGinn 1989; Stroud 1984; 
Williams 1991; Wright 2002). But here is one general issue. We’ve seen that the sceptical 
problem can be understood as a triad of independently intuitive and plausible but jointly 
inconsistent claims. Simply employing commonsense in Moore’s way at best seems to lead to 
an impasse with the sceptic. As it is often remarked in this context, one philosopher’s modus 
ponens is another philosopher’s modus tollens. And it’s not clear what reason we have to go 
either way for all Moore has said. In any case, neo-Mooreans acknowledge that the worry 
about an impasse needs to be accounted for. In order to avoid an impasse, neo-Mooreans 
supplement their view in two crucial ways: a) they provide an explanation of how it is that we 
                                                            






know the denials of sceptical hypotheses, and b) they provide a diagnosis of why it seems 
compelling that we do not have such knowledge.16  
 
The reflections from last section suggest it might be possible to approach a) and b) with a 
basis-relative notion of sensitivity.17 But the details of that proposal are controversial—in 
particular, there are issues about how to individuate methods. So I’ll look instead to a 
prominent neo-Moorean who approaches a) and b) in a closely related but different way. Sosa 
appeals to a “safety” condition on knowledge to explain how we can know the falsity of 
sceptical hypotheses (Sosa 1999). Safety is another modal condition.18 The basic idea behind 
safety is that our beliefs that count as knowledge could not have easily been false. One way of 
putting the idea is that we cannot have “lucky” knowledge. For example, consider the Gettier 
cases. Roughly, they present a problem for justified true belief accounts of knowledge by being 
cases of true justified belief that in some sense result from “luck”. These are familiar points, 
but Gettier cases can be used to illustrate the intuitive idea that knowledge excludes luck.19 
Here is how Sosa puts safety: 
Call a belief by S that p “safe” iff: S would believe that p only if it were so that p. 
(Alternatively, a belief by S that p is “safe” iff: S would not believe that p without it 
being the case that p; or, better, iff: as a matter of fact, though perhaps not as a 
matter of strict necessity, not easily would S believe that p without it being the case 
that p.) (Sosa 1999, p.142). 
This principle is itself the subject of a good deal of controversy and stands in need of further 
refinement (for one thing, it will have to be relativised to a belief forming method to avoid 
counterexamples such as the grandmother case). But the basic idea for our purposes is that S’s 
belief that p has the right modal profile for knowledge as long as it would be true within a 
certain non-remote range of possible worlds in which S believes that p (again, holding the 
method of belief formation in the actual world fixed). Crucially, according this condition, we 
                                                            
16 Actually, Pritchard (2007) identifies six shortcomings with Moore’s argument. He thus identifies six 
corresponding desiderata for a compelling neo-Moorean position. I will only focus on three of these desiderata: 
the “no supporting epistemology objection”, the “no diagnosis objection”, and the “evidential scepticism 
objection”. This latter objection will take us into a fairly involved discussion about another sceptical argument.  
17 Again, see Pritchard (2008), Black (2002), and Williams (1991). 
18 Sosa claims that safety can be independently motivated as being preferable to sensitivity. He outlines three 
compelling counterexamples to sensitivity in Sosa (1999). Two examples are the problem of necessary truths and 
the garbage chute case. Further discussion would take us too far afield here. 
19 There are complex issues that must be dealt with in explaining the relevant sort of “luck” that is supposed to be 
incompatible with knowledge (Pritchard 2005c, 2012b; Steglich-Petersen 2010). These details would take present 





know both that we have hands and that we are not BIVs. So there does not seem to be any 
need to deny closure. Moreover, while it’s true that this principle must also be basis relative, it 
is not merely in virtue of relativising to a basis that the idea that we have knowledge of the 
falsity of sceptical hypotheses is motivated. That is, we know we’re not BIVs simply because 
the BIV scenario is putatively something that obtains in an outrageously far-off world.20  
With the safety condition independently motivated, Sosa can vindicate our sympathy with 
Moore’s “straight man” response to the closure-based sceptical problem. He can explain in a 
theoretically motivated way how knowledge of the falsity of sceptical hypotheses is possible. 
Sosa also has a diagnosis of the felt-oddness of the idea that such knowledge is possible (recall 
b) from above). He notes that sensitivity and safety are easily confused. One may at first think 
that sensitivity is compelling, and come to believe that (2) is true on that basis. However, what 
one really finds compelling, Sosa says, is a safety condition: “Safety and sensitivity, being 
mutual contrapositives, are easily confused, so it is easy to confuse the correct requirement of 
safety (for knowledge and its correct attribution) with a requirement of sensitivity. It is easy to 
overlook that subjunctive conditionals do not contrapose” (Sosa 1999, p.148). Because safety 
does not support (2), people are mistaken—but understandably— when they think that (2) is 
true.  
How plausible is Sosa’s neo-Moorean strategy? First of all, I think this last line of thought is 
problematic. Although the two formulations of conditions on knowledge are easily confused, it’s 
not at all clear that the intuitive thought behind each condition is easily confused. It’s often 
said that what motivates both principles is the idea that our beliefs could not easily be false. 
But I think this glosses over an important difference in what’s compelling about the principles. 
For instance, the intuitive thought behind the sensitivity condition is that our beliefs should be 
counterfactually responsive to the facts. It’s intuitive that if I would believe p in the nearest 
possible world in which it isn’t the case, then I don’t know p. This is one way to say that a 
belief could easily have been false. Meanwhile, although safety captures the idea of 
counterfactual sensitivity as well, it goes beyond it. For example, when it comes to our 
knowledge that we are not BIVs, this is not due to counterfactual sensitivity. Rather, it’s due to 
                                                            
20 Meanwhile, when it comes to sensitivity, we do not get the result that we know we’re not BIVs independently 
of relativisation to methods. This is because the sensitivity principle is formulated in such a way that possible 
worlds in which one is a BIV are taken to be relevant to our assessment of one’s belief that they are not a BIV. In 
those worlds, one would continue to (falsely) believe that one is not a BIV. Indeed, this is precisely why the 





the de facto modal distance of BIV worlds and the stubbornness of our beliefs that we’re not 
BIVs (Pritchard 2008, p.13). Indeed, when it comes to motivating safety, it’s plausible that 
what is at work is an intuition about risk, or something along those lines. Safety seems 
plausible because it’s plausible that our beliefs that intuitively count as knowledge are ones that 
are not risky to have. We don’t need to worry about what we’d believe in such far off worlds as 
BIV worlds because we’re not at risk of being in those worlds. This is perhaps another way of 
understanding what it means to say that beliefs that count as knowledge wouldn’t easily be 
false, but it’s one that goes beyond the notion of counterfactual responsiveness. In addition to 
all this, it’s not clear that sensitivity is the best explanation of the intuitiveness of (2) in the first 
place. But once again, I’ll return to that point below.  
 
The central issue with Sosa’s neo-Moorean strategy, however, is that it seems so implausible to 
many to say that we can know the falsity of sceptical hypotheses. As we’ve seen, those who 
take the line of denying closure do so under the conviction that it’s a desideratum on our 
theory of knowledge that we respect—what they take to be—the platitude that we could never 
have this kind of knowledge. Nozick is vocal on this: “The skeptic’s possibilities make us 
uneasy because, as we deeply realize, we do not know they don’t obtain; it is not surprising that 
attempts to show we do know these things leave us suspicious, strike us even as bad faith” 
(Nozick 1981, p. 201). I don’t want to say anything one way or the other on this at the 
moment (I return to the issue below, as well as to the broader issue of responding to 
scepticism with an externalist theory of knowledge—which, as I’ll explain, is what Sosa does 
here). I think there is an intuitive  enough worry in the background at this point—whatever 
motivates it—to warrant pressing on to a final way of approaching the closure-based 
argument, one that does not require us to claim that we can support an outright denial of (2), 
nor that we need to reject closure.21 
  
1.6 DeRose and Semantic Contextualism 
 
DeRose offers an anti-sceptical strategy which, if successful, would eliminate the need to deny 
(1) or (2) outright. He borrows Nozick’s notion of counterfactual sensitivity and puts it to 
                                                            
21 Perhaps one thing that motivates the idea that we could not possibly know the falsity of sceptical hypotheses in 
the way Sosa has explained we can, is the thought that our beliefs about not being BIVs are not counterfactually 
sensitive. The thought would be that it seems our knowledge of the falsity of sceptical hypotheses is due too 





work in a semantic contextualist theory of knowledge attributions. According to DeRose, the 
sentence “S knows that P”, strictly speaking, only expresses a complete proposition relative to 
standard N. This is because ‘knows that’ is a context sensitive term that only has a truth value 
relative to the standards at play in a given context.22 As Schiffer (1996) explains, according to 
the contextualist theory, the complete closure-based sceptical argument should look something 
like this (the term ‘Tough’ here refers to a high-standards context): 
 
7) If S knows that he has hands relative to Tough then S knows he is not a handless 
BIV relative to Tough. 
8) S doesn’t know he is not a handless BIV relative to Tough. 
9) Therefore, S doesn’t know that he has hands relative to Tough. 
 
According to Schiffer (and DeRose), this argument does not seem paradoxical.23 The anti-
sceptical thrust of the contextualist theory is that the sceptical “paradox” turns out to be a 
sound, but uninteresting argument about knowledge according to a particularly high-standards 
context of evaluation. The argument says nothing about what we know in ordinary contexts—
although, we mistakenly think it does.  
 
To fill in the theory, the contextualist needs to explain at least two crucial things: how do the 
standards of a given context get raised (and lowered)? And why didn’t we see the argument in 
this non-paradoxical way in the first place? To answer the first question, DeRose employs the 
notion of sensitivity along with the notion of “strength of epistemic position” to develop his 
“Rule of Sensitivity”, a mechanism which he says determines what standards are at play when 
                                                            
22 There are of course many contextual views in the literature and I can’t begin to address them all. I focus on 
DeRose because his view is a seminal semantic contextualist view, and his view has the paradigm features of 
contextualism that are relevant for present purposes (other views usually grouped together with DeRose-style 
contextualism include Cohen (2002) and Lewis (1996)). One particularly important distinction needs to be made 
between semantic contextualists like DeRose, and the contextualist views of Annis (1978), Neta (2003), and 
Williams (1991). There are of course a variety of differences between these last three contextualist views 
themselves, but one important difference they share concerning semantic contextualism is that they do not 
individuate contexts in terms of higher or lower epistemic standards, but rather in terms of standards that are 
different in kind. I return to an important point about the semantic contextualist’s appeal to high epistemic 
standards below.  
23 Note that this formulation would only so easily be attributed to a “scepticism-friendly” version of 
contextualism. DeRose notes that it is a complicated issue to settle whether, and when, the sceptic does 
successfully raise standards in conversation (DeRose 2006, p.333). Discussion of this point is not relevant to our 





we evaluate whether “S knows that p” is true. DeRose’s notion of “strength of epistemic 
position” goes like this: 
 
[...] being in a strong epistemic position with respect to P is to have a belief as to 
whether P is true match the fact of the matter as to whether P is true, not only in 
the actual world, but also at the worlds sufficiently close to the actual world...The 
further away one gets from the actual world, while still having it be the case that 
one’s belief matches the fact at worlds that far away and closer, the stronger a 
position one is in with respect to P (DeRose 1995, p.34).  
 
Take for example my belief, p, that I have hands. I am in a strong epistemic position with 
respect to p because in nearby as well as not-so nearby possible worlds my belief would match 
the facts. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which I would falsely believe that I have 
hands. Of course, one familiar scenario is that in which I am a handless BIV. In the possible 
world in which I am a BIV my belief that I have hands wouldn’t match the facts. But this is a 
very distant possible world; so, while my belief here wouldn’t match the facts, I am still in a 
strong epistemic position with respect to it. Consider also my belief, q, that I am not a BIV. 
This belief, too, is one that will match the facts in close possible worlds since it is only in very 
far off worlds that I would falsely believe it—i.e. worlds in which I am a BIV. So according to 
DeRose I am in a strong epistemic position with respect to this belief, too. Just how strong an 
epistemic position one must be in with respect to p in order to count as knowing p is a 
context-dependent matter. This is where DeRose’s “Rule of Sensitivity” comes into play: 
 
When it is asserted that some subject S knows (or does not know) some proposition 
P, the standards for knowledge (the standards for how good an epistemic position 
one must be in to count as knowing) tend to be raised, if need be, to such a level as 
to require S’s belief in that particular P to be sensitive for it to count as knowledge 
(DeRose 1995, p.35).  
DeRose notes that the distinctive feature of sceptical hypotheses is that you would need to be 
in an extremely strong epistemic position for your beliefs about them to be sensitive. The 
relevant possible worlds that come under consideration when assessing sensitivity are 
extremely far off. According to the Rule of Sensitivity, when an assertion or denial of a 
sceptical hypothesis is made, then, this tends to raise the standards for knowledge so that the 





would match the facts in a world in which you are a BIV—which is to say, your belief 
wouldn’t match the facts.  
 
The interesting thing here is that sensitivity and strength of epistemic position can come apart. 
In some contexts, a belief may count as known on strength of epistemic position, even if it 
isn’t a sensitive belief. By avoiding the claim that sensitivity is necessary for knowledge, 
DeRose can claim that most of the time we do know that we’re not BIVs. He does so by appeal 
to the strength of our epistemic position with respect to such beliefs. Only in contexts in 
which the BIV or other sceptical scenarios have been raised do we need to be in such an 
extremely strong epistemic position that beliefs, even in ordinary propositions, would no 
longer match the facts. Thus, DeRose thinks he can preserve our intuitions about sensitivity, 
and thus, he claims, the plausibility of (2) in the closure-based sceptical argument; yet he also 
thinks he can preserve our intuitions about (1) along with our intuitions about the denial of the 
sceptic’s conclusion.  
 
In particular, DeRose can preserve closure by noting that the modal distance at which my 
belief that I have hands would fail to match the facts is also the modal distance at which I 
would falsely believe that I am not a BIV. In all those worlds in which I’m not a BIV, I wouldn’t 
falsely believe that I am not one. Not until we consider the very distant possible world in 
which I am a BIV would I falsely believe that I am not one. As DeRose puts it, my epistemic 
position with respect to my belief that I’m not a BIV is at least as strong as my belief that I 
have hands. In BIV worlds, my belief that I have hands would also fail to match the facts. 
DeRose can thus maintain that closure is true, regardless of the standards at play. 
 
What about the second task involved in filling in a contextualist anti-sceptical strategy 
mentioned above? The contextualist needs to explain why we didn’t notice that the sceptical 
paradox isn’t a paradox after all. The fastest way to do this is to claim that it’s easy to miss the 
context-sensitivity of “S knows that p”. As Schiffer puts it, closure-based scepticism “strikes us 
as presenting a profound paradox merely because we're ignorant of what it's really saying, and 
this because we don't appreciate the indexical nature of knowledge sentences” (Schiffer 1996, 
p.325). DeRose doesn’t seem to offer a positive theory that would explain such semantic 





contextualist in particular to provide such an error theory. According to DeRose, any theory of 
knowledge, whether invariantist or contextualist, is going to have to attribute semantic 
blindness to ordinary speakers. DeRose cites as an empirical fact that about half of ordinary 
speakers say “yes” and half say “no” to the question of whether the sceptic’s denial of S’s 
knowledge that he has hands contradicts with an “ordinary” assertion that S knows he has 
hands. If an invariantist theory is true, then all of those epistemic agents claiming “no” 
(presumably because they at least implicitly take ‘knows that’ to be contextually determined) 
are semantically blind to the invariant nature of ‘knows’. DeRose maintains that there just is a 
good deal of semantic blindness when it comes to the hard questions about knowledge that 
contextualism raises (DeRose 2006, p.322). Critics of contextualism on this score are 
numerous (Hofweber 1999; Rysiew 2001; Chrisman 2007).24 The details of these criticisms 
would take us too far afield.   
 
Perhaps the most prominent objection to semantic contextualism is that it mistakenly assumes 
that external world scepticism requires an appeal to especially strong or high epistemic 
standards. According to the semantic contextualist, the sceptical context is explicitly stated as 
being one that demands high standards for correct knowledge-attributions. However, the 
objection goes, we need not think of scepticism as invoking exceptionally high epistemic 
standards. It is worth examining this objection in some detail. 
 
1.7 Scepticism and Standards  
Opponents of contextualism often point out that the really interesting form of external world 
scepticism denies that there are important epistemological distinctions to be made concerning 
our empirical beliefs, regardless of whether we are in “high-standards” or “low-standards” 
contexts for knowledge-attributions.25 Consider Kornblith: 
                                                            
24 “...contextualism requires the posit of a deep and hard to explain semantic blindness to anyone [who] resists 
contextualism about ‘knows’ or is perplexed by [the closure-based argument].This makes the contextualist 
response to skeptical paradoxes such as [the closure-based argument] seem unacceptably ad hoc, so call this the ad 
hoc semantics problem” (Chrisman 2007, p.233).  
25 Kornblith (2000) makes the point forcefully. The point is also made in Williams (2001). See also Feldman (1999 
and Neta (2003). There are a variety of arguments we might appeal to, and as we’ll see, my preferred approach is 
the underdetermination argument. Feldman (1999), on the other hand, claims that there is an argument for 
“justification-scepticism” which relies on the plausible idea that ordinary "low" standards for justification preclude 
reliance on circular arguments (p.22). One thing to note about Feldman’s argument is that regardless of whether 





The reason I don’t know anything about the external world, according to the skeptic, 
is not that I have a small degree of justification for my beliefs when knowledge 
requires a larger degree of justification. Rather, the skeptic claims that I have no 
degree of justification whatever for my claims about the external world. None. Let us 
call this view Full-Blooded Scepticism (Kornblith 2000, p.25). 
Kornblith’s “Full-Blooded Sceptic” denies that we have any justification for ordinary empirical 
beliefs such as that we have hands. While DeRose has argued that in high-standards contexts 
knowledge attributions are false, he has not said anything about whether we have justification 
to believe that we have hands, or whether we have evidence that we have hands in those 
contexts. Moreover, the closure problem for knowledge gives us no reason to think not. 
Kornblith argues that DeRose simply grants that we can have justification for ordinary 
empirical beliefs in both high- and low-standards contexts. He claims that DeRose’s response 
to the sceptical problem is therefore uninteresting (from an epistemological perspective): 
Since [DeRose’s] skeptic agrees that we can make meaningful and important 
distinctions about how well justified we are in various claims, and agrees with us 
about which claims we should believe and act upon, nothing much turns on it. It is 
like dealing with the Vermonter who insists that he won’t say that it is cold outside 
unless it is at least 25 degrees below zero Farenheit. If he recognizes that there are 
important distinctions to be made in temperatures above minus 25, and that these 
distinctions have a bearing on how one should interact with the world, then the only 
difference between him and us is a bit of charming linguistic eccentricity (Kornblith 
2000, p.26). 
So what kind of sceptical argument does Kornblith have in mind? One example is the 
underdetermination argument:  
1*) If my evidence does not favour that I have hands over that I am a BIV 
(being stimulated to believe that I have hands), then my evidence does 
not justify that I have hands. 
2*) My evidence does not favour that I have hands over that I am a BIV 
(being stimulated to believe that I have hands). 
3*) My evidence does not justify that I have hands. 
4*) Therefore, I do not have justification to believe that I have hands. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
requires being able to defend one’s belief with non-circular arguments. Indeed, there’s a plausible distinction to be 
made between what Williamson calls “inferential” justification (justification in the form of providing arguments in 
support of one’s belief) and “normative” justification, which has to do simply with whether it’s “OK” to believe 
that p (Williamson 2009).Williamson, and others (Pryor 2005) would argue that inferential justification is neither 





5*) Therefore, I do not know that I have hands. 
Insofar as we can run this argument equally well for just about any ordinary empirical 
proposition, the radical conclusion of this argument is that we don’t have any justification to 
believe any ordinary empirical propositions. Why is this a particularly interesting form of Full-
Blooded Scepticism? Like the closure argument, the argument is said to be paradoxical. That is, 
it consists of a series of highly intuitive premises and establishes by way of a valid rule of 
inference a highly counterintuitive conclusion. The underdetermination argument works by 
appealing to commitments that are reflected in our ordinary epistemic practices. It then 
employs particular instances of these commitments to derive the conclusion that we do not 
have any justification to believe that we have hands. Let’s consider the motivation for the 
premises. 
Premise (1*) is motivated by an underdetermination principle (UP). That principle can be 
stated: 
(UP) For all S, p, q, if S’s evidence for believing p does not favour p over some 
hypothesis q which S knows to be incompatible with p, then S’s evidence does 
not justify S in believing p 
The idea is that in order for some body of evidence, E, to provide justification for a 
proposition, p, it is plausible to maintain that E should favour p over alternatives that are 
known to be incompatible with p. What does “favouring” mean? Briesen (paraphrasing 
Brueckner (1994)) understands “favouring” in the following way: “If my evidence favours p 
over q, then p has some epistemic credit which q lacks. In other words: If my evidence favours 
p over q, then it is more reasonable for me to believe p than q” (Briesen 2010, p.4). Pritchard 
prefers simply to speak of favouring in terms of a body of evidence making one proposition 
more likely to be true for an agent than another proposition. I think there’s a family resemblance 
in these basic ways of spelling out the notion of favouring. And I think the notion is intuitive 
enough that we can rely on this rough understanding in what follows. But to make things more 
concrete, consider the following example: 
If...my evidence for believing that I am currently in the town’s Odeon cinema does 
not favour this proposition over the competing scenario (which I know is 





because I have just woken up from a drunken sleep with only a dazed recollection of 
the chain of events that led to my being in a cinema, then it is hard to see how that 
evidence could possibly support a justification for my belief that I am at present in 
the Odeon cinema (Pritchard 2005, p.40). 
Premise (2*) appeals to the idea that one’s evidence would be the same whether one was a BIV 
or not. We can call this the “sameness of evidence thesis”. The very notion of a BIV scenario 
is designed to draw out the intuitiveness of this thesis. If we find the possibility of a BIV 
scenario epistemically threatening, a good explanation of this is that it’s because it seems 
obvious that in such a scenario we would have the same evidence and thus that our evidence 
doesn’t favour the proposition that one is a BIV over the proposition that one is not. As we’ll 
see in Chapter 3, this idea is often associated with a “highest common factor” conception of 
evidence, on which our evidence always and everywhere consists in what is common to good 
and bad cases. There are deep and interesting questions about what motivates such a 
conception, and it will be helpful to examine these more carefully in the context of Pritchard’s 
view, where he motivates an alternative view precisely by challenging the idea that this sort of 
conception is all that intuitive after all. 
With (UP) and the favouring claim motivated in this way, it’s a short step to premise 3*), the 
claim that one’s evidence does not justify that one has hands. With the further assumption that 
if one’s evidence does not justify that one has hands then one does not have justification to 
believe that they have hands, the sceptic arrives at the conclusion that one does not have 
justification to believe that they have hands (and thus, as noted, that one does not have 
justification to believe just about any ordinary empirical proposition). From there, insofar as 
we think that justification is necessary for knowledge, the Full-Blooded Sceptic concludes that 
we do not know we have hands.  
The Full-Blooded Sceptic’s assumptions about the connections between evidence and 
justification, and justification and knowledge are of course controversial. Indeed, as Kornblith 
points out, DeRose has his own epistemological story about our knowledge of the external 
world. This involves a central role for the sensitivity condition and the notion of “strength of 
epistemic position”.26 It is open to DeRose to insist that our ordinary beliefs are often in good 
epistemic standing because they have the right modal profile. He can respond to the 
underdetermination argument by claiming that evidential justification is not necessary for 
                                                            





knowledge. However, as Kornblith notes, this feature of the view alone is not a contextualist 
feature. It is an externalist feature. As such, whether or not it is correct is irrelevant to the 
question of whether semantic contextualism is correct (Kornblith 2000, p.27). Indeed, any one 
of the anti-sceptical strategies considered above can appeal to the sensitivity or safety condition 
on knowledge and note that meeting these conditions does not imply that one has evidential 
justification for one’s belief that p.27 To be sure, while safety or sensitivity are endorsed by 
many as necessary conditions on knowledge, a further question remains about what, if anything, 
must be added to these conditions for knowledge. But Sosa’s neo-Moorean response to the 
sceptic, for example, explains how we can know the falsity of sceptical hypotheses merely in 
terms of the safety condition. Whether or not he thinks safety is sufficient for knowledge, he 
appears to claim that safety is sufficient for our knowledge of the falsity of sceptical 
hypotheses.28 All of this said, it’s important to consider exactly how far denying the evidential 
sceptic’s views about evidential justification and knowledge gets us in an anti-sceptical strategy. 
As I’ll explain, I don’t think it gets us very far.  
1.8 Responding to Scepticism about Evidential Justification  
Regardless of whether evidential justification is necessary for knowledge, it’s doubtful that 
even the externalist would deny that we sometimes have evidential justification for our 
empirical beliefs (and have knowledge on this basis). It seems, then, that when it comes to an 
argument like the underdetermination argument, the externalist has two options. Either she 
can continue to talk about knowledge while remaining silent on the issue of knowledge that 
comes from (is based on) evidential justification (thus remaining silent on the argument in 
question); or she can maintain that evidential justification is never relevant to our knowledge of 
ordinary empirical propositions. Both of these options would be good to avoid in responding 
to such a sceptical problem if possible. This is because, taking the first option, we’d be talking 
past an interesting and important sceptical issue. Taking the second option, we’d be endorsing 
a radical revision of our concept of knowledge (surely we at least sometimes know things in 
virtue of evidential justification). Pritchard frames this idea nicely:  
                                                            
27 As Bergmann (2008) notes, externalist responses to scepticism may involve any combination of appeals to 
reliabilism (Goldman 1979, 1986; Alston 1985), cognitive virtues (Sosa 1991; Greco 1999, 2000), modal 
conditions (Sosa 1999; Nozick 1981), or proper function (Plantinga 1993; Bergmann 2004, 2006: ch. 5). 
28 In more recent work, Sosa (2007) “bifurcates” knowledge. He divides knowledge into “animal knowledge” and 
“reflective knowledge”. To put it very roughly, only reflective knowledge requires that the agent have some kind 
of perspective on the conditions she meets as a knower. Discussion of Sosa’s more recent epistemology would 





In any case, while the general shape of such a response to radical scepticism is 
appealing, the devil (as so often in philosophy) lies in the detail. For although the 
epistemic externalist is keen to break the logical link between knowledge and rational 
support, such that one can have the former without the latter, they surely do not wish 
to disengage our everyday knowledge from rational support altogether. Or, at least, 
the sceptic can force a dilemma here. On the first horn of the dilemma is the charge 
that the epistemic externalist is ultimately offering no response at all to the sceptical 
problem. On the second horn is the charge that the epistemic externalist is presenting 
us with an epistemological proposal which is so revisionist, so discontinuous with our 
ordinary epistemic practices, that not even the most ardent proponent of epistemic 
externalism would find it palatable (Pritchard forthcoming, Ch.1, p.12). 
Notice that when it comes to the closure argument for knowledge, it may be open to someone 
like Sosa to allow that we have evidential justification to believe that we have hands, but deny 
that this is a necessary condition on knowledge, and therefore support our knowledge of the 
falsity of sceptical hypotheses with a safety condition. Such a move is not available with the 
underdetermination argument. And that is because the underdetermination argument directly 
threatens our evidential justification to believe that we have hands by claiming that this 
evidence must favour that we have hands over that we are not BIVs (if it is to provide 
epistemic support at all). Thus, if we want to hold on to evidential justification, we must either 
show that we have this favouring evidence or resist the idea that we require it. This is precisely 
a matter of responding to the underdetermination argument.29  
 
But it’s important to note that the underdetermination argument is just one form of Full-
Blooded Scepticism. Pritchard himself makes his point about the dilemma the externalist faces 
in responding to evidential scepticism by reformulating the closure argument directly in terms 
of “rationally supported knowledge” (Pritchard forthcoming). But the idea is essentially the same. 
Even if the externalist anti-sceptic is willing to allow that we have rationally supported 
knowledge when it comes to ordinary empirical propositions, as soon as this rationally 
supported knowledge is connected in the relevant way to a requirement of rationally supported 
                                                            
29 In my Boult (2013), I defend Brueckner’s claim that a refutation of the underdetermination argument would 
entail a refutation of the closure argument, but not vice versa. The main claim I defend is that the 
underdetermination sceptic’s appeal to an underdetermination principle is needed in order to motivate premise (2) 
of the closure argument. My defence consisted in responding to an objection due to Cohen (1998). I take Cohen 
to present a particularly elegant alternative way of motivating premise (2) of the closure argument which appeals 
to an explanatory principle. I argued that Cohen’s explanatory principle does not provide a natural motivation for 
premise (2) of the closure argument. One upshot of that discussion is that, in addition to being a form of Full-
Blooded Scepticism and taking priority over the closure argument for knowledge in that sense, we might see the 
underdetermination argument as taking priority in another sense. Namely, if Brueckner is right, a refutation of the 
underdetermination argument would entail a refutation of the closure argument but not vice versa. I won’t defend 





knowledge of the falsity of sceptical hypotheses (in Pritchard’s case via a closure principle for 
rationally supported knowledge), the externalist anti-sceptic must either show how we have 
that rationally supported knowledge (a matter of dealing with what I’m calling evidential 
scepticism), or face Pritchard’s dilemma.  
 
I’d like to note that these points about externalism and scepticism are not the same as the 
familiar point that externalist responses to scepticism are in some sense “philosophically 
unsatisfying”. Bergmann notes there are a variety of different ways to spell out the idea that an 
externalist response to scepticism is philosophically unsatisfying.30 A popular claim is that an 
externalist response is a mere conditional response. Here is Stroud:  
[the externalist epistemologist]...is at best in the position of someone who has 
good reason to believe his theory if that theory is in fact true, but has no such 
reason to believe it if some other theory is true instead. He can see what he would 
have good reason to believe if the theory he believes were true, but he cannot see 
or understand himself as knowing or having good reason to believe what his 
theory says (Stroud 1989, p.46). 
Here we might read Stroud as equating “philosophical satisfactoriness” with a kind of 
philosophical understanding. He is claiming that the so-called conditional nature of externalist 
epistemology (such as an epistemology that treats true belief meeting the safety condition as 
sufficient for knowledge) is inadequate to the task of a first-personal quest for understanding 
how it is that our knowledge of the world around us is possible (Stroud 1989). 
I don’t intend to endorse Stroud’s line of thought, nor any of Bergmann’s other ways of 
spelling out the notion of “philosophical satisfactoriness”.31 Rather my claim is that denying 
the evidential sceptic’s conditions on knowledge doesn’t get us very far. Insofar as it’s highly 
intuitive that we at least sometimes have knowledge that is supported by evidential 
justification, simply going externalist forces a dilemma. Again, either we must radically revise 
our concept of knowledge, or talk past an interesting and important sceptical argument. If all 
                                                            
30 More specifically, he says that there are four ways (Bergmann 2008, p.14). These are: i) externalism is a mere 
conditional response; ii) externalism permits an epistemically circular response to the sceptic; iii) the externalist is 
herself uncomfortable with going externalist on higher-order beliefs, and this is suspicious; iv) anything goes if the 
externalist is right – for example, what stops a believer in the Great Pumpkin from legitimately appealing to 
externalist considerations? Getting into the details of Bergmann’s four ways would take us too far afield. It’s 
important to note that Bergmann claims each of these considerations is equally a problem for internalists, and also 
that there are satisfactory externalist replies to each of these considerations (Bergmann 2008). 





of this is right, we should remain focused on Full-Blooded Scepticism. We should remain 
focused on sceptical arguments that challenge our evidential justification to believe ordinary 
empirical propositions.  
1.9 Conclusion 
The chapter started by examining three main ways of responding to the closure problem for 
knowledge. I looked at a variety of issues for each strategy. As I said, the aim has not been to 
demonstrate that these issues cannot be overcome. Rather, the aim has been to highlight a 
deeper issue. While the closure argument for knowledge is certainly interesting in the sense 
that it at least seems to appeal to our ordinary epistemic commitments in drawing out 
paradoxical results, it’s not clear that it’s interesting in the sense of being entirely radical 
(although of course the idea that we don’t know we have hands is certainly radical enough for 
many). I’ve argued in favour of a shift in focus to scepticism about evidential justification. This 
is because a central desideratum in responding to the external world sceptic is to understand 
how we can rightly take ourselves to at least some of the time have evidential justification in 





















Chapter 2: Entitlement and Immediate Justification 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines two anti-sceptical strategies that engage with evidential scepticism. In 
particular, these strategies engage with a sceptical argument that makes central use of a claim 
that we need antecedent justification to believe that we’re not BIVs in order to have 
justification to believe ordinary empirical propositions. Wright (2004) concedes that we lack 
evidence for the falsity of sceptical hypotheses, but that we have a different kind of warrant— 
“entitlement”—to trust that they are false and this supports our evidential justification for 
ordinary empirical beliefs. Pryor (2000; 2004) claims that we simply don’t need antecedent 
support for the denials of sceptical hypotheses in order to have justification to believe ordinary 
empirical propositions. We have “immediate justification” for certain ordinary empirical beliefs 
(and moreover, this can in turn give us justification to believe the falsity of sceptical 
hypotheses). I will argue that the route of Wright and Pryor looks like a kind of cycle. I don’t 
claim that there is no way out of the cycle. But I claim that once we combine these difficulties, 
along with considerations about the relationship between the sceptical argument Wright and 
Pryor engage with and the underdetermination argument from last chapter, we should turn our 
attention to the underdetermination argument, and more specifically the sameness of evidence 
thesis. 
2.2 Wright and Pryor on Scepticism   
I begin with an important point about Wright vis-à-vis what I’ve called the basic externalist 
response to scepticism. This will help us further understand how Wright sees himself as 
engaging with scepticism in a deeper way than any of the strategies considered in Chapter One. 
In a discussion of the externalism/internalism distinction and the satisfactoriness of externalist 
responses to scepticism,32 Wright analyses the shortcomings of externalism in the following 
way: 
 
                                                            
32 Wright understands the internalism/externalism distinction in terms of access. He’s talking about access 





Fully to address this reservation would need a complex and extensive discussion. But 
one immediate observation is that what is put in doubt by sceptical argument is—of 
course—not our possession of any knowledge or justified belief—not if 
knowledgeability, or justification, are conceived as constituted in aspects of the 
external situation in which we come to a belief. (How indeed could armchair 
ruminations show anything about that?). What is put in doubt is rather our right to 
claim knowledge and justified belief. It is this which the project of making out 
entitlements tries to address and which, on what seems to me to be a correct 
assumption, externalism is impotent to address (2004, p.210). 
The “correct assumption” Wright mentions here is the idea that there is a bifurcation of 
“epistemic values”, analogous to the bifurcation of “objective” and “subjective” evaluations in 
the moral domain. What Wright has in mind is the familiar division of evaluations of an 
attitude or action in terms of its consequences, or actual outcomes, and evaluating an attitude 
or action in terms of its provenance —i.e. the question of whether it is the result of 
conscientious or responsible deliberation, for example. Wright’s point seems to be that while 
externalism tells a compelling story about the rules governing the first sort of evaluation, when 
it comes to scepticism, what we are  really interested in is whether we “respect the cannons of 
intellectual integrity”, i.e. the rules governing the second sort of evaluation.  
Wright claims that the sceptical problem is not merely about whether we, as a matter of fact, 
enjoy a certain kind of cognitive contact with reality (indeed, he thinks that is not a question of 
interest to philosophy). It is a problem about whether we can legitimately say that we do, with 
respect to the most ordinary of our beliefs. And according to Wright, that seems to be a matter 
of whether, on careful reflection, we are aware of, or have a grasp of, or in some sense have 
access to whatever it is that supports or justifies these beliefs. At any rate, he claims that 
meeting this challenge is the most interesting sceptical problem. Here is Wright connecting the 
desire for the right to claim to know to “intellectual integrity”:  
The right to claim knowledge, as challenged by scepticism, is something to be 
understood in terms of—and to be settled by—canons of intellectual integrity. The 
paradoxes of scepticism are paradoxes for the attempt at a systematic respect of those 
canons. They cannot be addressed by a position which allows that in the end 
thoroughgoing intellectual integrity is unobtainable, that all we can hope for is 






Thus, we can see why Wright aims to respond to evidential scepticism: he sees the most 
interesting form of sceptical paradox as one that challenges our right to claim knowledge; and 
the right to claim knowledge is tied to having reflectively available support for one’s beliefs. 
But what form of evidential scepticism is Wright interested in? Wright claims that the best and 
most interesting sceptical paradoxes proceed by identifying a “cornerstone” proposition and 
claiming that we have no warrant for it.33  He uses the term “cornerstone” to refer to 
propositions that we must have warrant to believe if we are to have warrant to believe large 
classes of certain everyday propositions (Wright 2004, p. 167). That we are not presently BIVs 
being deceived to believe that we have hands is what Wright calls a “cornerstone of cognitive 
competence”. The sceptic proceeds by claiming that since we don’t have warrant for this 
cornerstone we don’t have any warrant for everyday empirical propositions.  
Pryor agrees with this set up. Pryor essentially defines the sceptical problem in terms of an 
appeal to a “sceptical principle of justification” (SPJ), which says:  
(SPJ) If you’re to have justification for believing p on the basis of certain experiences 
or grounds E, then for every q which is ‘bad’ relative to E and p, you have to have 
antecedent justification for believing q to be false—justification which doesn’t rest on 
or presuppose any E-based justification you have for believing p.  
        (Pryor 2000, p.531)  
It’s clear that a lot hangs on what “bad” means, and I’ll discuss that below. But we can see that 
this principle captures the basic idea in Wright’s way of understanding the problem. That is, it 
captures the idea that the sceptic proceeds by claiming that if we are to have justification to 
believe ordinary empirical propositions, we must already have justification to believe certain 
presuppositions—namely “cornerstones.” So we’ve seen how both Wright and Pryor 
understand scepticism. Let’s examine how they respond.  
 
 
                                                            
33 Wright’s notion of “warrant” covers both evidential justification and “entitlement.” Presumably, given Wright’s 
comments about externalism, warrant is the property a belief has when it meets the “canons of intellectual 





2.3 Entitlement of Cognitive Project 
Wright concedes that we don’t have evidential justification for cornerstones. But he argues that 
it does not follow from this that we lack warrant in general concerning cornerstones. He 
argues that certain cornerstone propositions enjoy a kind of non-evidentially based warrant 
that he calls entitlement. As we will see below (and as the section above would suggest), 
Wright is not making a familiar move to some form or another of externalist epistemology. 
Given that he is not an externalist about warrant, what does he have in mind?  
Wright’s most compelling defence of entitlement is his argument for “entitlement of cognitive 
project” (Wright 2004, pp.188-197).34 Entitlement of cognitive project is a kind of non-
evidential warrant for a particular propositional attitude towards certain presuppositions of our 
“cognitive projects” (more on the type of propositional attitude in a minute). By “cognitive 
project”, Wright means something like inquiry, or perhaps more specifically the process of 
acquiring justification for believing a particular proposition by the appropriate exercise of 
certain cognitive capacities, such as perception, introspection, memory, or reasoning (he does 
not define “cognitive project”). Here is Wright’s definition of a presupposition:  
P is a presupposition of a particular cognitive project if to doubt P (in advance) would 
rationally commit one to doubting the significance or competence of the project 
(Wright 2004, p.191). 
For example, that the world did not spring into existence five minutes ago replete with 
evidence of a distant past is a presupposition of my historical inquiry about whether Julius 
Caesar was really assassinated. This is because, if I were to doubt the former, this would 
rationally commit me to doubting the significance or competence of my historical inquiry. For 
reasons we’ll see in a moment, even though Wright concedes we could not possibly support 
                                                            
34Wright also sketches arguments in favour of “strategic entitlement”, “entitlement of rational deliberation”, and 
“entitlements of substance”. Strategic entitlement bears a close resemblance to the notion of a “dominant 
strategy” in game theory (the paradigm example of an argument for this sort of entitlement is Reichenbach’s 
defence of induction (Wright 2004, p.178; Reichenbach 1938)). Entitlement of rational deliberation derives from 
the constitutive requirements of rational action as opposed to inquiry. As Wright puts it, “The generic thought is 
that since rational agency is nothing we can opt out of, we are entitled to place trust in whatever (we have no 
evidence against and which) needs to be true if rational decision-making is to be feasible and effective” (Wright 
2004, p.198). Entitlements of substance differ from each of the above insofar as the above are all methodological 
entitlements, whereas entitlements of substance are ontological. They concern our entitlement to accept the existence 
of, for example, the external world. Wright only offers a highly guarded provisional defence of a very limited form 






belief in the denial of this proposition with evidence, we are entitled to take a particular kind of 
propositional attitude towards it.  
 
The key move behind Wright’s strategy is his approach to the idea that all inquiry comes with 
presuppositions. He claims that this is a necessary truth. In undertaking a given inquiry, one 
cannot but take certain things for granted on pain of the given inquiry ceasing altogether. While 
this may seem like a sceptical thought, Wright flips the seemingly sceptical import on its head: 
If there is no such thing as a process of warrant acquisition for each of whose specific 
presuppositions warrant has already been earned, it should not be reckoned to be part 
of the proper concept of an acquired warrant that it somehow aspire to this—
incoherent—ideal.” (p.24) 
The idea is that if it’s simply impossible to acquire a presuppositionless warrant, then failure to 
acquire a presuppositionless warrant is not a shortcoming. The ideal is incoherent in the first 
place. The lesson to draw, Wright says, is that warranted belief must be understood as possible 
within an epistemological picture on which presuppositions are ineliminable. Wright makes the 
point as follows: 
...[W]arrant is acquired whenever investigation is undertaken in a fully responsible 
manner, and what the paradox [i.e. his point above that, necessarily, there is no 
presuppositionless inquiry] shows is that full epistemic responsibility cannot, per 
impossibile, involve an investigation of every presupposition whose falsity would defeat 
the claim to have acquired a warrant (2004, p.191). 
It is important to emphasise that the kind of support Wright has in mind is what he calls 
rational support. By this I take Wright to indicate that he is not making an externalist move. He 
makes a point of articulating his view in terms of responsible believing (in line with the points 
discussed in the previous section), where what he means by this is tied to access internalism.35 
Wright’s key claim in making sense of this is that some of our presuppositions enjoy a kind of 
“unearned,” or non-evidential support, but it is support one can access by means of a priori 
reflection. This is entitlement of cognitive project. 
 
                                                            
35 ...[E]ntitlements, it appears, in contrast with any broadly externalist conception of warrant, are essentially 
recognisable by means of traditionally internalist resources—a priori reflection and self-knowledge—and are 
generally independent of the character of our actual cognitive situation in the wider world—indeed, are designed 





Not just any presupposition is a candidate for entitlement. Wright claims that a presupposition 
P is an entitlement of cognitive project for S if and only if it meets two criteria: 
 
i) S has no sufficient reason to doubt P.36 
 
ii) Further investigation into P would only lead to more presuppositions in turn of no 
more secure a prior standing; the attempt to justify P would only lead to a regress 
of evidential justification. In short, rational investigation into P would merely lead 
to cognitive paralysis as opposed to further epistemic rigour.37 
 
Cornerstones fit precisely this bill. For example, that my eyesight is functioning properly 
enough to locate my keys is an entitlement of cognitive project as I search for my car keys this 
morning. Image that there is nothing unusual in the way things appear to me this morning. I 
have no reason to doubt that my eyesight is functioning well enough to locate my keys. 
Moreover, halting my search for my keys and investigating whether or not my eyesight is 
functioning properly enough to locate the keys would itself only lead to further 
presuppositions which would themselves be of no more secure epistemic standing. For 
instance, I might stop my search, walk to the doctor’s office, and get her to test my eyes. But, 
                                                            
36 Imagine that I undertake to make predictions about today’s results at the horse races by reading tea leaves. The 
effectiveness of this method is a presupposition of my cognitive project. However, clearly we do not want to say 
that I am entitled to the presupposition that this method is effective. This is precisely the rationale behind 
condition i). The thought is that I have every reason to doubt that my method is effective. Moreover, the 
presupposition does not satisfy condition ii). I can engage in further inquiry in discovering reasons to doubt that 
my method is not effective, and it is not the case that the presuppositions of this further inquiry are of less secure 
standing than the presupposition that my method is effective. Indeed, Wright notes that the fact that I have 
reason to doubt its effectiveness entails that ii) will not be satisfied (Wright 2004, p.196).  See next footnote for a 
related issue. 
37 The issue surrounding the first condition prompts a bigger one which ultimately has to do with the second 
condition, and which I will only very roughly outline here. Wright asks: “Suppose I postulate a tract of reality—it 
might be the realm of non-actual possible worlds as conceived by Lewis— which is spatio-temporally insulated 
from the domain of our usual empirical knowledge, and a special faculty—as it may be, our non-inferential ‘modal 
intuition’—whose operation is supposed to allow us to gather knowledge about it. Do I have an entitlement of 
cognitive project to trust the (alleged) faculty on any particular occasion? If not, why not?” (Wright 2004, p.196). 
The basic worry here is that conditions i) and ii) indeed seem to be met by the presupposition this faculty 
functions reliably, and as such his conditions on entitlement may seem too weak insofar as we are inclined to 
resist the idea that Lewis’s views about the nature of modality could turn out to be a matter of entitlement (it’s not 
clear to me whether Wright’s implying that Lewis’s views about the tract of reality, or the faculty by which we 
come to know it are at issue here). But Wright makes an important distinction in response to this. He grants that 
he may be forced to accept that we are entitled to something like the reliable functioning of a faculty of modal 
intuition (p.197). The bullet he does not want to bite, nor does he think he must bite, however, is that his 
conditions allow entitlement to the specific propositions involved in Lewis’ particular view about the nature of 





given that I have no special reason to doubt that my eyesight is functioning properly enough to 
locate keys, getting information via such a procedure would involve various presuppositions of 
no more secure an epistemic standing than the presupposition of my present cognitive project. 
I’m about as sure that my eyes are functioning properly enough to see my car keys right now 
(in good lighting) as I would be concerning the question of whether the doctor’s instruments 
are functioning accurately, or that the information she gives me is not distorted by pressure to 
sell me a new pair of glasses, etc.38  
The basic anti-sceptical thrust of all this is that, since the sceptic (according to Wright) 
proceeds by identifying cornerstones and arguing that we don’t have warrant to believe them, 
the sceptic can be defeated. Although we do not have evidential justification for cornerstones, 
we do have entitlement—when it comes to our cognitive projects, cornerstones are 
presuppositions that meet the criteria for presuppositions to which we are entitled. The general 
reliability of one’s senses is something to which one is entitled when undertaking everyday 
empirical cognitive projects. This is a cornerstone of cognitive competence. Since the reliable 
functioning of one’s senses excludes precisely the sorts of radical scenarios we’ve been 
discussing, that I am not now a BIV is something to which I am entitled. And, again, this is 
true despite the fact that I have no evidence in support of this proposition.   
Wright’s aim is to secure evidential justification for all of the ordinary sorts of things we take 
ourselves to have evidential justification to believe—such as that there is a table and two chairs 
in one’s office. The idea is that a background of entitlement to rationally trust cornerstones of 
cognitive competence can secure evidential justification to believe precisely those things that 
radical scepticism threatened. I will return to the details of how this is supposed to work 
below. Wright puts it in terms of the following structure.  
I) It appears to me as though I have hands. 
II) I have hands. 
III) I am not a BIV being deceived to believe that I have hands.  
 
                                                            
38 Compare a quote from Wittgenstein: “My having two hands is, in normal circumstances, as certain as anything I 
can produce in evidence for it. That is why I am not in a position to take the sight of my hand as evidence for it” 





The thought is that while some kind of support is necessary for III in order for I to provide 
any kind of evidential support for II, the sceptic is wrong to assume that evidential support is 
needed for III. Rather, so long as we are rationally entitled to III, I provides evidential support 
for II.  
The non-evidential nature of entitlement of cognitive project leads Wright to an important 
caveat (one that I’ve been skirting around in the discussion so far). This concerns the sort of 
propositional attitude that we are entitled to have when it comes to cornerstones of cognitive 
competence. Wright claims that we are entitled to rationally trust cornerstones. He contrasts this 
with belief—which he concedes, for the sake of argument, is essentially evidentially 
constrained—and with other attitudes of acceptance—such as taking for granted—which he 
claims are compatible with doubt or agnosticism, and which, as such, would introduce an 
unacceptable level of tension in our web of doxastic attitudes when it comes to connections 
between propositions that we are entitled to and those for which we have evidential 
justification. In the next section I discuss these details and an issue that Wright faces in light of 
them, as well as other concerns for the proposal.  
2.4 Relations of Support and the “Leaching” Problem 
A well-known objection to this strategy is that Wright has done nothing more than provide 
pragmatic justification for our beliefs. The thought is that an appeal to the avoidance of 
cognitive paralysis in vindicating our epistemic position with regard to cornerstones is no 
epistemic vindication—it’s a practical reason, akin to a “dominant strategy” in decision theory. 
However, this would be too quick, since Wright clearly states that the sort of paralysis that 
would ensue were we to doubt cornerstones is cognitive paralysis. Thus, rather than giving us a 
practical reason to trust cornerstones, it seems Wright’s view licenses the idea that we have an 
instrumental epistemic reason to trust cornerstones. There is of course a large debate over 
whether, in the first instance, there can be practical reasons for belief, but also whether 
epistemic reasons are instrumental reasons. I will not attempt to add anything to this sort of 
concern for Wright’s view here (Pritchard 2005b; Jenkins 2007; Pedersen 2009).39 Another 
                                                            
39 Indeed, it seems to me that the debate about practical reasons for belief, as well as the debate about epistemic 
instrumentalism is one of the most interesting and active areas in epistemology (Kelly 2003; Berker 2013;Foley 
1987; Leite 2007; Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen 2011). As such, criticizing Wright successfully on this score is bound 
to require a highly sophisticated view about these matters. At the very least this would take us much too far afield. 





prominent objection is that since Wright claims we cannot believe cornerstones, it’s not clear 
that we can know them (insofar as belief is necessary for knowledge) (Pritchard forthcoming Ch.3, 
p.16). And if that’s the case, his view has unsettling implications for closure. In particular, it 
seems that even though he allows we can know ordinary propositions, and that we know that 
these entail the truth of cornerstone propositions, he must deny that we know the relevant 
cornerstone propositions. Pritchard’s thought is that this undermines the view in virtue of the 
counterintuitiveness of such a consequence and insofar as Wright himself endorses closure 
(Wright 2004, p.208). But I’d like to focus on a (related but different) issue that I think pushes 
us in the direction of a more general worry. This issue surrounds the possibility of the relations 
of support that Wright is committed to when it comes to our evidential justification to believe 
ordinary empirical propositions and our entitlement to cornerstones. I turn now to a brief 
critique of Wright on this score. 
According to Wright, belief in everyday propositions can be saved given a background of 
rational trust in cornerstones. It will be helpful to start with a concern raised by Davies about 
this. Davies considers the question of whether, once we have secured evidential justification 
for an everyday belief—say, that I have hands—we cannot “perform a kind of epistemic 
alchemy” on our warrant for a corresponding cornerstone (Davies 2004, p.222). That is, he 
notes that the proposition that I have hands entails that there is indeed a material world. In light 
of this entailment, he wonders, what prevents my evidential justification for the ordinary 
empirical proposition from becoming evidential justification for a belief in the cornerstone 
proposition?40 Davies asks, “Does the I-II-III argument serve to transform the lead of rational 
trust into the gold of justified belief?” (Davies 2004, p.220). 41 Since Wright has secured 
evidential support for one’s ordinary belief that they have hands, why is it not available to one 
to competently deduce that since one has evidential support for the belief that they have 
hands, and since one’s having hands entails that one is not a BIV, that one therefore has 
evidential justification to believe that one is not a BIV?  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
can be taken to beg the question against Wright—we can understand his point about the avoidance of cognitive 
paralysis as precisely a sort of positing of the notion of an instrumental reason to trust cornerstones. That said, 
Jenkins’ critique engages with the issue in detail and does not argue against Wright simply on such a basis (see 
Jenkins 2007, p.36). 
40 Thus, Davies’ concern is closely related to Pritchard’s just noted above. But I go on to pursue this line of 
thought in a different direction than Pritchard’s. 
41 By “I-II-III argument” Davies just means an argument for a particular view about the inferential/justificatory 
structure of claims I, II, and III above. The thought is of course similar to the basic structure on the sort of neo-





The answer lies in Wright’s well-known claims about “transmission of warrant”. Wright 
discusses this notion in various other papers (Wright 2000; 2002). He calls attention to it in the 
context of the present discussion: “Type-III propositions cannot be warranted by transmission 
of evidence provided by type-I propositions for type-II propositions across a type-II to type-
III entailment—rather it’s only if one already has warrant for the type-III proposition that any 
type-II propositions can be justified in the first place” (Wright 2004, p.172). The thought is 
that because belief in a type-II antecedently depends upon the warrant one has for a type-III, 
the justification for II cannot work to give new justification for III. In fact, Wright suggests 
that this condition on transmission of warrant underlies our intuitive dissatisfaction with, for 
instance, Moore’s proof: it is a case of begging the question, according to Wright, to claim that 
because one is justified in believing one has hands that one is justified in believing there is an 
external world (Wright 2002).42 It is only against the background, antecedent, belief—or more 
precisely, rational trust—that there is an external world that one’s belief that one has hands is 
justified. 
Davies suggests, however, that Wright’s condition on transmission of warrant might raise a 
general concern about the ability of entitlement to save justified belief in type-II’s. Davies 
notes, “Someone might query whether something less than an antecedent warrant to believe the 
type-III proposition can really secure this favourable outcome for the type-II proposition” 
(Davies 2004, p.220). In other words, once the point about antecedent support is exhibited 
explicitly in the considerations about warrant transmission, it seems odd that a belief in a 
proposition that antecedently depends upon mere rational trust in another can achieve the 
status of evidentially justified belief in the first place (Davies 2004, p.222). Davies claims that 
the limitation to mere rational trust in a type-III, “taken together with the idea that we do 
indeed have a warrant43 to believe the type-II proposition, seems to impose some strain on our 
                                                            
42It is important to note the difference between the failure of transmission and the failure of closure. Wright endorses 
the possibility of the former but not the latter. The closure principle, as I finally formulated it in Chapter One, 
says: If S knows p, and p entails q, and S competently deduces q from p on the basis of knowing that p entails q, 
then S knows q. A related but different “transmission principle” can be stated as follows: If S knows p, and p 
entails q, and S competently deduces q from p on the basis of knowing that p entails q, then S knows q on the very 
same basis as the basis on which S knows that p. The difference, of course, is the additional point about the very 
same basis transmitting across the known entailment. And this is what Wright claims can fail. In particular (and this 
is what I’m calling Wright’s “condition of transmission of warrant”), if q is a proposition for which I require an 
antecedent warrant in order to have warrant for p, then I can know p (or have warrant for p), competently deduce 
that q from p on the basis of knowing that p entails q, and yet fail to know that q on the very same basis as that 
upon which I know that p. We can maintain closure, however, by allowing that one knows that q on a different 
basis (perhaps entitlement).  





ordinary thinking about the proper management of our web of belief”(Davies 2004, p.222). 
Although Davies doesn’t consider this “strain” necessarily a cause for rejecting Wright’s view, 
he does take it seriously enough to consider a different approach to the problem of our 
epistemic relationship to type-III’s, or cornerstones. In particular, Davies thinks it might be 
fruitful to consider whether, rather than a positive propositional attitude towards cornerstones, 
all that is required to save evidential justification for everyday beliefs is that we not doubt 
cornerstones. He develops a notion of “negative” entitlement which draws on Pryor’s 
“liberalism” about justification (Davies 2004, p.243; Pryor 2004). As I’ve said, I will discuss 
Pryor below. For now, note that the basic idea is to challenge the initial assumption which 
Wright grants to the sceptic—namely, that we need antecedent warrant of some kind for 
cornerstones in order to have justification for everyday propositions (Davies 2004, p.243). 
However, before considering whether this is a good route to go, I want to examine Wright’s 
treatment of Davies’ concern.  
Wright refers to this concern as the “leaching” problem (Wright 2004, p. 207). He 
acknowledges that it will be important for his view to show what prevents mere rational trust 
in cornerstones, upon which (he claims) justified belief in type-II’s antecedently depends, from 
supplanting genuine evidential justification for those type-II’s—or as Wright puts it, from 
“leaching upwards from the foundations, as it were like rising damp, to contaminate the 
products of genuine cognitive investigation” (Wright 2004, p.207). He considers the example 
of one’s perceptual justification that they have hands: “If [such a] cognitively earned 
warrant...is achieved subject to mere entitled acceptance that there is a material world at all, 
then why am I likewise not merely entitled to accept that there is a hand in front of my face, 
rather than knowing or fully justifiably believing that there is?” (Wright 2004, p.207). Wright’s 
answer is that there is leaching “but it is at one remove and can be lived with” (Wright 2004, 
p.207). We need to get clear on what he has in mind.  
Wright maintains that entitlement to trust cornerstones is all that is needed to secure first order 
evidential justification for everyday empirical beliefs. He seems to take this as an intuitive 
point, and asserts that if I am entitled to trust that there is a material world, or, say, that my 
eyes are working properly, then my perceptual experience that I have hands counts as evidence 
that there are indeed hands in front of me—I am “entitled to claim that my vision is right now 





service of the gathering of perceptual knowledge”(Wright 2004, p.207). Short of arguing for 
this, Wright appears instead to try to redirect the feeling that there is something odd about it: 
he notes that what I don’t have, in virtue of the above entitlements to trust, is second order 
evidential justification to believe the relevant type-II proposition. That is, I do not have 
evidential justification to believe that I have such evidential justification. “In general, the effect 
of conceding that we have mere entitlements for cornerstones is not uniformly to supplant 
evidential cognitive achievements—knowledge and justified belief—with mere entitlements 
right across the board but to qualify our claims to higher order cognitive achievement” (Wright 
2004, p.208). According to Wright, the problem of leaching amounts to a limitation on second 
order evidential justification.  
Against the background of an entitlement to trust, I cannot claim that I know that I have 
evidential justification to believe that I have hands. This is presumably to be understood in 
light of Wright’s commitments about the connections between knowledge claims and the 
“cannons of intellectual integrity”. Claims to know invite requests for reasons, they invite 
requests for evidential justification. But reflection on the presupposition upon which one’s 
evidential justification for their ordinary empirical beliefs is ultimately based should indicate 
that I can indeed only rationally trust that I have this evidential justification. Importantly, Wright 
thinks this is enough to go on in a response to scepticism. Recall again from earlier that 
Wright’s condition of adequacy on a response to scepticism is that we are able to claim the 
knowledge which scepticism calls into question. The basic idea here is that, while Wright’s 
strategy does not enable us to claim that we know that we have evidential justification for 
beliefs such as that we have hands, it does enable us to claim that we know we have hands. 
And concerning whether or not we should see that as a shortcoming, Wright thinks not. He 
says, despite our lack of second-order justification for type-II’s, the sorts of knowledge claims 
we can justifiably make “will still have every point if enough has been done to ensure that all 
that remains to put the knowledge claim at risk is the possible failure of conditions in which 
everybody, speaker and audience, (rationally) trusts”(Wright 2004, p.209). That is to say, a lack 
of second order justification should not seem threatening if all there is to threaten first order 
justification is the sort of sceptical worry that Wright has shown we have an entitlement to 
dismiss. I turn now to suggest that these comments of Wright’s about leaching may give rise to 





Wright claims that second order evidential justification for type-II propositions would require 
reflection on what kind of warrant one has for the relevant type-III. As Wright puts it, having 
second order evidential justification for a type-II requires that one “be able to know the 
presuppositions of its truth, some of which—we are taking it—sceptical argument has put 
beyond evidence” (Wright 2004, p.208). In contrast, according to Wright, first-order evidential 
justification for type-II propositions does not require such reflection. A crucial difference, 
then, between first- and second-order evidential justification for a belief about a type-II is 
precisely that, in the first-order case, one is not required to reflect on the kind of warrant one 
has for the type-III—the presupposition, as Wright has just put it—even though one’s 
evidential justification in some sense epistemically depends on it. But notice that rather than 
not requiring reflection on one’s warrant to trust cornerstones, Wright’s strategy for limiting the 
leaching problem seems to imply that agents must not reflect on their warrant to trust 
cornerstones, on pain of the leaching of mere entitlement to trust everyday empirical 
propositions. If this is so, perhaps entitlement to trust cornerstones is doing less work than 
Wright would have us believe. 
For one thing, it’s not clear that this doesn’t undermine Wright’s commitment to providing an 
internalist response to the sceptic. After all, entitlements are contrasted with externalist warrant 
in the sense that they are a priori accessible. But even if Wright can maintain that his view is 
consistent with internalism, it’s not clear that his internalist approach is as different as he 
would like to have us think from competitors. Recall Davies’ suggestion that we consider a 
different approach to cornerstones altogether—namely, what he calls “negative entitlement”. 
Again, Davies’ hypothesis is that instead of requiring some positive propositional attitude 
towards cornerstones, all that is required to secure our justification for everyday propositions is 
that we not doubt cornerstones. If the only evidential justification that the putative rational trust 
in cornerstones secures is that which we have so long as we do not actively reflect upon this 
rational trust, it is difficult to see the difference between the respective roles that Wright’s 
rational trust and Davies’ lack of doubt are meant to play in our “web of belief”.  
If we want to avoid leaching, we must not reflect on our warrant for cornerstones. Fortunately, 
our evidential justification to believe ordinary empirical propositions does not require such 
reflection. But this is the sense in which Wright’s view ends up looking more like his 





seems to amount precisely to advocating that evidential justification for everyday beliefs is 
saved so long as we don’t reflect upon the ultimate source of that justification—namely, 
rational trust in a relevant cornerstone. To be sure, the view would dramatically 
overintellectualize what it takes to have evidential justification if it required otherwise.44But the 
point is that the foregoing should make us wonder what is so important about having this 
antecedent warrant in the first place. Why not consider the possibility of a simpler view 
according to which we must merely not doubt cornerstones in order to have evidential 
justification to believe ordinary empirical propositions? At this stage in the dialectic, it is worth 
considering whether a positive trust in cornerstones, as opposed to an absence of doubt in 
cornerstones, is what is needed. 
2.5 From Entitlement to Immediate Justification  
Pryor’s anti-sceptical strategy contrasts with Wright’s in a helpful way. He argues that we do 
not require justification (or “warrant”) to believe the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses 
antecedently to having justification to believe that we have hands, in order to have justification 
to believe that we have hands. Thus he rejects the need for entitlement. Pryor’s view is that we 
have immediate justification to believe certain “perceptually basic” propositions. This justification 
can support our knowledge of (and justification to believe) ordinary empirical propositions, as 
well as the falsity of radical sceptical hypotheses. 
As we’ve seen above, Pryor essentially defines the sceptical problem in terms of an appeal to a 
“sceptical principle of justification.” It is worth restating this principle:  
(SPJ) If you’re to have justification for believing p on the basis of certain experiences 
or grounds E, then for every q which is ‘bad’ relative to E and p, you have to have 
antecedent justification for believing q to be false—justification which doesn’t rest on 
or presuppose any E-based justification you have for believing p.    
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We can see the plausibility of the principle by considering the following example. Imagine that 
you intend to walk to parking lot 22 and drive home. So you conclude that you will soon be 
driving your car out of parking lot 22. The basic idea behind (SPJ) is that it seems that in order 
for this belief to be justified, you need antecedent justification to believe that your car will still 
be in parking lot 22 when you get there. If you did not already have justification to believe that 
your car will be in lot 22 when you get there (for example, imagine you know that there have 
been very few car thefts in the neighbourhood in recent years), then your mere intention to 
drive home does not support a justification for the belief that you will soon be driving home. 
However, as I noted earlier, a lot hangs on what “bad” means. Here’s what Pryor says:  
So we might want to count a hypothesis as “bad” for the purpose of a skeptical 
argument just in case it is (and is recognized to be) incompatible with what you 
purport to know, but it is nonetheless “allowed” by your grounds E, in the sense I 
described (Pryor 2000, p.527). 
And here’s what Pryor means about a hypotheses being “allowed” by grounds E (i.e. “in the 
sense he described”): 
Say that some grounds E you have “allow” a possibility q iff the following 
counterfactual is true: if q obtained, you would still possess the same grounds E. 
(Pryor 2000, p.527). 
Pryor says that sceptical scenarios are “bad” in the sense that they are incompatible with 
ordinary beliefs about the external world, and that even if the scenario obtained one would 
possess the same grounds for believing what one does about the external world. According to 
Pryor, this is what explains the plausibility of the sceptic’s appeal to (SPJ). That is, it’s because 
sceptical hypotheses are bad in this way that we must have antecedent justification to believe 
that they are false in order to have justification to believe ordinary empirical propositions. The 
way Pryor puts it, both Wright and the sceptic accept the idea that in order to have justification 
to believe that you have hands, you must have antecedent justification to believe that a “non-
perceiving hypothesis” does not obtain. These are such hypotheses as that you are not 
dreaming, or not a BIV being deceived to think you presently have hands (Wright’s 
“cornerstones of cognitive competence”).  
Pryor rejects (SPJ). In cases of “perceptually basic” propositions, one can have immediate 





kind of justification that requires no antecedent justification to believe that a “non-perceiving 
hypothesis” does not obtain. An example of a perceptually basic proposition is that there is a 
red patch on the wall before you. Pryor thinks the belief that “here is a hand” is perceptually 
basic. So, Pryor claims, we can have immediate justification to believe that we have hands. As 
Pryor puts it, whether you are “liberal” or “conservative” about justification depends on which 
hypotheses you require an agent to have antecedent justification to believe. If you do not 
require antecedent justification to believe that a non-perceiving hypothesis does not obtain (“I 
am not a BIV”, “I am not dreaming”), then you are a liberal about perceptual justification. 
Liberals do not claim that all presuppositions can be safely ignored—Pryor accepts the parking 
lot example, for example (and he discusses others (Pryor 2004, p.362)). But the claim about 
non-perceiving hypotheses distinguishes his strategy from Wright’s in the relevant way.  
To be sure, Pryor claims that if one doubts whether or not one is a BIV, then they will lack 
“doxastic justification” to believe that they have hands. The distinction between propositional 
and doxastic justification is a familiar one in epistemology. The difference is between having 
justification to believe a given proposition (propositional) and coming to believe, or basing your 
belief on that justification in the right sort of way (doxastic). Part of what defines liberalism is 
that there can be relations of epistemic dependence such that were the agent to doubt q, they 
would lack doxastic justification to believe that p. The thought is that even though this sort of 
dependence between p and q may hold, this does not imply that the agent needs antecedent 
justification to believe q in order to have justification to believe p. Thus, another crucial 
distinction for Pryor comes into play here. Doubting whether one is a BIV is a matter of (a 
problem with) the beliefs one happens to have. Such doubt does not affect what one has 
justification to believe.45 Pryor discusses the way in which a doubt about the truth of radical 
sceptical hypotheses can rationally obstruct you from believing that you have hands (and thus 
obstruct you from having doxastic justification). But it does not affect the justification that you 
have to believe that you have hands.  
                                                            
45 Pryor’s view is about what he calls “prima facie justification”. He allows that if one has defeating evidence against 
a cornerstone proposition, one may lack all things considered propositional justification for an ordinary empirical 
belief. But so long as one lacks defeating evidence—or so long as one’s defeating evidence is itself defeated—
one’s prima facie justification constitutes all things considered justification. By defeating evidence, Pryor stipulates 
that he means “ordinary evidence of the sort employed by the man in the street and by the working scientist” 
(Pryor 2000, p.534), and maintains that a priori sceptical arguments do not introduce defeating evidence according 





Pryor claims, then, for example, that Moore’s argument from his hands exhibits a good 
“justificatory structure”.46 What he means is that Moore’s argument is not a case of 
transmission failure. You can have justification to believe that you have hands, competently 
deduce that if you have hands then you are not a BIV, and come to have justification to 
believe on that very basis that you are not a BIV. The whole point of his anti-sceptical strategy 
is to argue that an argument like Moore’s has this good justificatory structure, but to defend 
this claim by drawing crucial distinctions—for example between liberalism and conservatism 
and other “targets of evaluation” when it comes to assessing arguments—to convince his 
readers that they can enjoy and, if need be, make use of this justificatory structure.47 His story 
is intended to remove an agent’s rational obstruction to having justification to believe the 
falsity of sceptical hypotheses. And if one is not rationally obstructed, one does not need to 
hear Pryor’s philosophical story in order to have justification to believe the falsity of sceptical 
hypotheses.  
2.6 Immediate Justification   
Given the way Pryor defines the sceptical problem, it’s no surprise that liberalism has anti-
sceptical consequences. Liberalism entails the denial of (SPJ) (on any sceptical reading of it). 
But Pryor obviously needs some kind of story to tell about where our justification to believe 
ordinary propositions and the denials of sceptical hypotheses comes from. How does he 
defend the idea that we have immediate justification to believe certain “perceptually basic” 
propositions? And what is it in virtue of which immediate justification makes people justified?  
Pryor is careful to note what immediate justification is not. Immediate justification is not 
infallible justification—there is nothing about this kind of justification that suggests it is not 
defeasible, according to Pryor (Pryor 2000, p.532). Immediate justification does not imply 
autonomy of belief: it is compatible with the notion of immediate justification that to hold an 
                                                            
46 Recall the formulation of Moore’s argument from Chapter 1. 
47 Pryor claims there are at least five targets of evaluation when assessing an argument like Moore’s. We can assess 
its validity as a “proof” (i.e. a sequence of propositions and derivation-rules), its justificatory structure, the 
reasoning Moore engaged in, the dialectical power of the argument, and its effectiveness as a philosophical 
response to the sceptic. The most important distinction, I think, which cuts across this five-way distinction in 
different ways, is the distinction between rational obstruction and having justification to believe. The reason why 
it is important is that it allows Pryor to recognize an important sense in which Moore’s argument is “defective” 
(i.e. it can’t help you rationally overcome your doubt in the conclusion, if indeed you already doubt the 
conclusion), but which is not a defect that undermines its anti-sceptical potential (since antecedently doubting the 
conclusion can only be due to a fault in your beliefs, not to the—supposed lack of—justification you have to 





immediately justified belief requires that one has other beliefs; the point is that other beliefs 
need not be involved in the justification itself. They can be background beliefs, in the way that 
background beliefs can still play a role in a priori knowledge (Pryor 2000, p.534). Crucially, 
Pryor also notes that it may be difficult to assess when a proposition is perceptually basic, as 
opposed to when it is the result of inference. Only perceptually basic propositions are 
immediately justified (Pryor 2000, p.539). He claims that although this is a tricky issue, it does 
not detract from the idea of immediate justification. It seems clear, says Pryor, that at least 
some things can immediately justify (Pryor 2000, p.539).48 He casts his view as a sort of 
“sensible philosophical conservatism” (Pryor 2000, p.538). That is to say, he thinks of his 
position as commonsensical and phenomenologically accurate. As such, he sees the main task 
in defending it as showing why various objections are only apparently good.  
Pryor says that there are a variety of positive stories to tell that are consistent with his theory 
about why perceptually basic propositions have the epistemic standings that they do.49 The 
story he favours, however, is that the phenomenology of its “seeming to you that you ascertain 
that p” is something that has the relevant epistemic significance.  
I think there’s a distinctive phenomenology to the feeling of seeming to ascertain that a 
given proposition is true. This is present when the way a mental episode represents its 
content makes it feel as though, by enjoying that episode, you can thereby just tell that 
that content obtains (Pryor 2004, p.357). 
According to Pryor, this distinctive phenomenology is what makes you justified in cases of 
immediate justification to believe perceptually basic propositions. It’s important to note that 
Pryor is not a reliabilist. He does not claim that this distinctive phenomenology makes you 
immediately justified because it is a reliable indicator of the truth. He endorses “simple 
internalism” (Pryor 2001) (for our purposes, this can be understood as the same thing as 
supervenience internalism). That is, he claims, for example, that if your recently envatted twin 
were to come to believe that they have hands because of this distinctive phenomenological 
experience (and were they to have been otherwise epistemically responsible), they would, 
                                                            
48 This may be more of an issue for Pryor than he makes it out to be. I return to this below.  
49 For example, we might think that perceptually basic experiences are irresistible, and that justification is a matter 
of believing what you ought to believe, and because an ought implies can principle is true, it can’t be the case that 
you ought not believe something that it’s irresistible for you to believe. Or, we might think that there is something 
special about the concepts we employ in our perceptual beliefs that makes those beliefs epistemically appropriate 






according to Pryor, count as justified. It does not affect the agent’s justification that they 
formed their belief in a completely unreliable way.  
2.7 Locating the Perceptually Basic and the Problem of Easy Knowledge 
I want to raise one potential problem for Pryor before raising a deeper worry. It has to do with 
the notion of perceptually basic propositions. This notion stands in need of a good deal of 
clarification. And it’s not clear where Pryor is going to find the resources for clarification. 
Recall that Pryor casts his view as a kind of “modest conservatism”, which is to say that he 
thinks the main business for systematic epistemology in arguing for his view is to defend the 
view against objections. The reason for this is that he thinks the view is phenomenologically 
accurate and occupies a sort of privileged place in commonsense. Here is a quote in which 
Pryor explains his defence of immediate justification in Pryor (2000): “I emphasized there how 
simple and intuitively appealing the view is; I said the main work for systematic epistemology 
should be to defend the view against challenges” (Pryor 2004, p.356). He adds in (2004) that 
systematic epistemology can do more, but he doesn’t elaborate on the notion of perceptually 
basic propositions (Pryor 2004, p.537). Insofar as he needs to appeal to commonsense and 
ordinary epistemic practice to do so, it looks like he is in trouble. This is because everyday 
claims about what propositions people “seem to ascertain” to be true outstrip the sorts of 
propositions Pryor will be comfortable defending as ones for which we can have immediate 
justification. Pryor himself makes the point: 
It’s not easy to discern what propositions we ‘seem to ascertain,’ and what 
propositions we merely unreflectively infer. Our perceptual reports don’t track the 
difference very closely. When you have the right kinds of background evidence, you’ll 
unhesitatingly say things like ‘It looks as if the police have arrived’ and ‘I see that the 
Smiths have already left for Australia’. But I think there is a real difference. And my 
theory is that what we seem to ascertain, we thereby have immediate prima facie 
justification to believe (2004, p.357). 
But we need more of a story about an in-principle line to draw between what we seem to 
ascertain and what propositions we unreflectively infer. There may be a serious tension 
between Pryor’s ability to draw a principled line around the perceptually basic and his ability to 
defend his view as a kind of modest conservatism. Do the folk share his intuitions about what 
counts as perceptually basic? The way we talk doesn’t obviously suggest so. The tension is 





kind of modest conservatism. That is to say, he is unable to provide much by way of positive 
support for the idea of immediate justification (Pryor 2000, p.532-539; 2004, p.537).  
A more serious and well-known objection to liberalism about justification generally is the 
“problem of easy knowledge” (Cohen 2002; Vogel 2008; Wright 2002; Kallestrup 2012).50  
Consider the following case. You are driving along in your car and you read that the gas gauge 
says “full”. So you form the belief that the tank is full. You continue driving and the gauge 
reads “half full”. So you form the belief that the tank is half-full. Repeat this process any 
number of times. After a time, imagine that you reason as follows: at time t1 the gauge read 
full, and the tank was full, at time t2 the gauge read half-full and the tank was half full, and so 
on. You conclude that the gauge is working properly on the basis of this excellent track record. 
Thus, you’ve come to form a belief that the gauge is reliable. But this seems too easy: one 
cannot form a justified belief about the reliability of one’s gas gauge on the basis of the 
readings of the gauge alone. It seems like that’s the sort of thing you would need to do some 
kind of independent check in order to verify (such as using a dipstick). If the liberal about 
justification allows that you do not need antecedent justification to believe that the gauge is 
working properly in order to form a justified belief that the gas tank is full on the basis of what 
the gauge says, then it’s not clear how the liberal about justification can avoid this too easy sort 
of knowledge (I return to the question whether the liberal would indeed claim you do not need 
such antecedent justification). At each stage in this “track record argument”, your belief about 
what is in the tank is justified independently of any antecedent support for believing that the 
gauge is working properly. Your belief about what the gauge says is also of course justified. So 
what’s preventing you from reasoning in this way to the general conclusion about the reliability 
of your gas gauge?  
Notice that there is a disanalogy between the gas-gauge case and someone reasoning from their 
justification to believe that they have hands to the conclusion that they are therefore not a 
BIV, as Pryor explicitly allows. Cohen (2002) claims that the latter may look like a plausible 
enough thing to allow, but for the following reason: “I think it may look plausible only because 
                                                            
50 The problem is also raised in the context of the internalism/externalism debate (i.e. as a problem for 
reliabilism). But I think the problem is more clearly relevant to the liberalism/conservativism debate. This is 
because the problem plausibly arises for the reliabilist precisely because of the reliabilist’s liberalism about 
justification. Moreover, as we’ve seen, Pryor is himself an internalist (a supervenience internalist) – so if he faces 
this problem, it looks like the problem of easy knowledge is a problem for internalists as well as reliabilists, and 





it is obscure in general how we know global skeptical alternatives do not obtain, e.g., how we 
know we’re not brains-in-a-vat. And so insofar as we are inclined to say we do know such 
things, this can seem like a reasonable hypothesis about how we know” (Cohen 2002, p.313). 
Meanwhile, the idea of coming to know about the reliability of one’s gas gauge via the sort of 
reasoning just discussed does not look plausible because it is not obscure in general how we 
know about the reliability of our gas gauges. That is to say, such knowledge is intuitively gained 
by independent checks, such as comparing what the gauge says with a dipstick (see Vogel 2008, 
p. 518). Thus, the case brings to light an implausible implication of immediate justification in 
the sense that it demonstrates how the view licenses knowledge via methods that are at odds 
with intuitive judgments about what would normally be required for that knowledge. So, while 
the problem of easy knowledge may not have been immediately apparent when discussing 
Pryor’s view about immediate justification qua anti-sceptical strategy, the implications it has for 
beliefs, say, about gas gauge reliability, are more intuitively worrying.   
There are a number of things that the liberal can say in response. For one thing, they would do 
well to note that this issue afflicts a broad range of views in epistemology, not just a view like 
Pryor’s (Comesaña 2013). If this is a problem it is a problem for good deal of contemporary 
epistemology, so it’s unfair to burden Pryor’s view about immediate justification in particular 
with the objection. Moreover, a liberal may want to bite the bullet and claim that we can 
indeed form justified beliefs about the reliability of our gas gauges in this way—or at least, they 
can claim that this sort of reasoning does provide some justification to believe that one’s gauge 
is working properly (Pryor seems to take this approach). Another response might be to allow 
for liberalism while resisting the track record argument in some other way. For example, one 
might argue that this is a case of “bootstrapping”, and while there is a problem with 
bootstrapping, this is not a problem with liberalism per se (Kallestrup 2012).  
Perhaps most importantly, we should take note of the fact that Pryor is not a liberal about all 
presuppositions.51 We’ve seen how he is a liberal about perceptual justification, where this 
means that he thinks we do not need antecedent justification to believe that “non-perceiving 
hypotheses” obtain in order to believe such things as that we have hands. Again, these are 
hypotheses such as that one is now dreaming, or that one is a BIV. It is open to Pryor to 
respond to the gas gauge case by claiming that he is not a liberal about the relevant 
                                                            





presuppositions in that case. He may indeed want to require that we have antecedent 
justification to believe that the gauge is working properly in order to have justification to 
believe what it says is in the tank. But this raises a question about Pryor’s demarcation of the 
sorts of hypotheses it is legitimate to be a liberal about. Why exactly would one be liberal about 
non-perceiving hypothesis but not hypotheses about the reliable functioning of our gas 
gauges? After all, it’s not as though we go around asking each other whether we know that our 
gas gauges are reliable when someone says they need fuel. And this is precisely the sort of 
motivation driving the idea that we don’t need antecedent justification to believe that we are 
not BIVs when we make claims about our immediate environment. Consider that Pryor is not 
a liberal about the parking lot case discussed above. Again, the reasoning was as follows: I 
intend to walk to lot 22 and drive home; so I will walk to lot 22 and drive home; so my car will 
be in lot 22 when I get there. Pryor explains: “This argument sounds bad to us because we 
think your intention is not enough, by itself, to justify you in believing you’ll succeed in driving 
your car out of the lot. We think you also need antecedent justification to believe your car is 
still in the lot” (Pryor 2004, p.360). Notice that this explanation is very similar to my diagnosis 
of the gas gauge case. That is, we need antecedent justification for the relevant hypothesis 
because a route to justification is proposed that conflicts with intuitive judgments about what 
would normally be required in order to have such justification. 
Although Pryor may deny that he is a liberal about the latter sorts of cases, he does not deny 
that he is a liberal about an additional sort of case. Imagine that you are looking at what 
appears to be a red wall. Necessarily, if the wall is red then it is not a white wall being 
illuminated by tricky red lighting. So, it seems open to you to competently deduce that you are 
not looking at a white wall being illuminated by tricky red lighting (Pryor 2004, p,362).52 What 
Pryor requires in this case is that one not already doubt that the wall is being trickily lit (that 
would rationally obstruct you from having justification to believe that the wall is not being lit 
by tricky red lighting). This is important because I think precisely the same diagnosis as to why 
this is counterintuitive applies in this case as in other cases in which Pryor is not a liberal. That 
is to say, just as in the gas gauge case it’s intuitive that in order to know that one’s gas gauge is 
functioning reliably one must make some kind of check independently of reading the dial, it’s 
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intuitive that in order to come to know whether a wall is lit by tricky lighting one must make 
some kind of check independently of what the present appearance of redness indicates (such 
as going in for a close inspection of the room). After all, the appearance of a red wall is 
precisely what the tricky lighting is designed to imitate. So I think, again, this is pressure for 
more of an in-principle demarcation of the sorts of cases it’s legitimate to be a liberal about. 
2.8 The Liberal/Conservative Cycle 
All of these cases are precisely the sort of case that Wright would characterize as exhibiting 
transmission failure. Wright would claim that you cannot come to have justification to believe 
that you are not looking at a white wall being illuminated by tricky red lighting in this way. And 
this is because—he says—you require antecedent justification to believe that the latter 
hypothesis does not obtain in order for the appearance as of a red wall to provide evidence 
that you are looking at a red wall. Indeed, Wright’s entitlement strategy is designed to avoid the 
problem of easy knowledge. He claims that we do require antecedent support for propositions 
such as that the gas gauge is working properly in order to have justification to believe what’s in 
the tank on the basis of what the gauge says. Thus the present sorts of cases are appealed to by 
Wright and other conservatives precisely to motivate conservatism. The trouble with 
conservatism when it comes to sceptical scenarios is that it’s just not clear where the 
antecedent support comes from. This is what forces Wright to concede that we do not have 
evidential support for cornerstones of cognitive competence. He maintains that we have 
entitlement to rationally trust such cornerstones. However, I’ve argued that given Wright’s 
own constraints on an adequate anti-sceptical strategy, it’s difficult to see what work 
entitlement actually does in the justificatory structure of our everyday empirical beliefs. I’ve 
argued that Wright’s condition of non-reflection on entitlement to trust cornerstones makes it 
difficult, on closer inspection, to see the difference between his conservatism and Pryor’s 
liberalism. Perhaps it’s not clear that entitlement can help with the problem of easy knowledge 
after all. Indeed, we seem to be stuck in a cycle rather than getting any closer to a satisfactory 
way of thinking about external world scepticism.  
I don’t want to claim that there is no way to break out of the cycle. But I take the foregoing to 
suggest that we should return to Pryor’s point about what explains the plausibility of the 
sceptic’s appeal to (SPJ). Pryor himself says that sceptical scenarios are “bad” in the sense that 





evidence would be the same even if the sceptical scenario obtained. According to Pryor, this is 
what explains the plausibility of (SPJ). It’s because sceptical hypotheses are bad in this way that 
we must have antecedent justification to believe that they are false in order to have justification 
to believe ordinary empirical propositions.  
Notice that one potential way of rejecting the sceptic’s appeal to (SJP) would be by challenging 
the sameness of evidence thesis that’s also at play in the underdetermination argument. That is, 
we might try to undermine the plausibility of the sceptic’s appeal to (SPJ) by claiming that it’s 
false that one’s evidence (or “grounds”) would be the same if one were a BIV (that is, that one 
would still possess the same grounds E if q obtained). In effect, we’d be denying that our 
grounds E always “allow” the obtaining of a radical sceptical scenario in Pryor’s sense above, 
and thus that a condition on the hypothesis as counting as “bad” is not met. In other words, 
perhaps a successful response to the underdetermination argument would provide resources 
for a response to Wright and Pryor’s sceptical problem as well.53 
In any case, it seems clear that considerations about underdetermination of evidence are at 
work in Wright and Pryor’s formulation of the sceptical problem. Moreover, it’s not clear 
whether either Wright or Pryor has resources to deal with the underdetermination problem. At 
the very least, they do not explicitly consider that problem. When it comes to Pryor’s view, 
Pritchard puts his concern in the following way: “Let us state the matter baldly: why should its 
merely seeming to one as if p give one better rational support for believing that p than for 
believing that one is the victim of a known to be incompatible radical sceptical hypothesis?” 
(Pritchard forthcoming, p.14). Regardless of whether Pryor’s view has consequences for the 
underdetermination problem, Pritchard’s point is intended to motivate his own approach to 
the sceptical problem given that he has a sophisticated story to tell about how one’s evidence 
can favour the proposition that they have hands over that they are a BIV.  
2.9 Conclusion 
We’ve looked at two strategies for responding to a kind of scepticism about evidential 
justification. I’ve argued that they move in a cycle. We don’t seem to be getting any further 
along with external world scepticism by engaging with (SPJ). Moreover, I’ve suggested that a 
crucial feature of what makes the sceptic’s appeal to (SPJ) plausible is a commitment to 
                                                            





precisely the claims that are at work in the underdetermination argument. In particular, the 
sceptic’s appeal to (SPJ) seems plausible at least in part because the sameness of evidence 
thesis seems plausible. Important issues may remain when it comes to the particular form of 
scepticism Wright and Pryor are interested in, but the discussion of this chapter indicates that 























Chapter 3: Sameness of Evidence 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I introduce two ways of challenging the sameness of evidence thesis. These 
strategies engage directly with the underdetermination sceptic’s claim that one’s evidence does 
not favour that one has hands over that one is a BIV being stimulated to believe that one has 
hands. I begin with an approach known as “McDowellian neo-Mooreanism” (Pritchard 2006; 
2007; 2012; forthcoming). McDowellian neo-Mooreanism is motivated in part by its ability to 
accommodate internalist and externalist intuitions in a particularly effective way. I’ll argue that 
this strategy faces a difficulty in meeting a particular kind of explanatory challenge. This is the 
challenge of explaining how one’s evidence could be different in good and bad cases that are 
phenomenologically indistinguishable. Pritchard’s difficulties motivate turning to Williamson’s 
evidential externalist strategy (2000; 2009). If plausible, this approach to evidence would have a 
relatively easy time rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis. This is because it abandons the 
condition of “reflective access” that Pritchard aims to preserve. However, I will argue that this 
view raises an important issue about epistemic normativity.  
3.2 McDowellian neo-Mooreanism 
Pritchard claims that McDowellian neo-Mooreanism satisfies core intuitions motivating both 
internalist and externalist epistemology. The strategy aims to vindicate knowledge of the denials 
of sceptical hypotheses. It argues that we have this knowledge in virtue of our evidence.54 The 
evidence we have comes in the form of factive mental states. These are mental states that entail 
the truth of some proposition, such as that one can see that things are thus and so. Despite its 
appeal to factive mental states, Pritchard claims that he is not an evidential externalist (i.e. 
someone that claims that we do not have a special kind of access to facts about what evidence 
we have). Rather, McDowellian neo-Mooreanism maintains a condition of reflective 
                                                            
54 I should note that in recent work Pritchard switches from talking about evidence to talking about “rationally 
supported knowledge” (Pritchard forthcoming). This move may allow Pritchard to cast his anti-sceptical strategy in 
terms that would be acceptable to anti-evidentialists. But that all depends on what Pritchard means by “rationally 
supported knowledge”. I think the best way to understand what he has in mind is in terms of evidence. Rationally 
supported knowledge is evidentially supported knowledge. In any case, I do not think this switch is important for 
my purposes. Moreover, I think that given the way I’ve set up the debate, thinking of McDowellian neo-
Mooreanism in these terms is a fruitful strategy. That said, Pritchard has also switched to casting 
underdetermination-based scepticism as a problem about rationally supported knowledge. So he would obviously 





accessibility on one’s evidence. We’ll need to get clear on why one might think that reflective 
access to our evidence is an interesting and important thing to have. I’ll take up the bulk of 
that question in the next chapter. For now, I’ll note that one reason why Pritchard thinks so is 
because he thinks that this is the ordinary or commonsensical way of thinking about what’s 
required for justification. He takes it as an important constraint on epistemological theorizing 
to avoid revisionism whenever possible.  
For example, comparing McDowellian neo-Mooreanism with the strategy of Sosa from 
Chapter One, Pritchard offers the following remarks about why McDowellian neo-
Mooreanism is a preferred form of neo-Mooreanism: 
[O]n the face of it the McDowellian view is plausibly in a better position to be 
counted as the true heir to the Moorean tradition on account of how it retains core 
internalist intuitions. After all, part of the desiderata of neo-Moorean positions is that 
they are able, where possible, to accommodate our pre-theoretical intuitions, and 
internalist intuitions are surely highly embedded within folk epistemology. Moreover, 
since both views appear to endorse some form of disjunctivism, it seems that one 
could similarly argue that what the McDowellian picture highlights is how 
disjunctivism, properly understood, enables one to evade the sceptical problematic 
without having to resort to the revisionism of classical epistemic externalism (Pritchard 
2007, p.96). 
And here is Pritchard commenting on the advantage of McDowellian neo-Mooreanism over 
externalist strategies generally: 
Taking the externalist route out of the sceptical problem is not without its own 
difficulties, however, since there clearly is a strong intuitive pull towards epistemic 
internalism. Accordingly, the worry one might have is that by opting for an externalist 
version of neo-Mooreanism one fails to stay true to the commonsense credentials of 
Mooreanism. If such revisionism is unavoidable, then this price might be worth 
paying to get a way out of the sceptical predicament. My interest here, however, is in 
whether there is a version of neo-Mooreanism available which is true to our 
internalist intuitions but which avoids the problems facing classical internalist 
renderings of the neo-Moorean thesis (Pritchard 2006, p.10). 
The key theme is that Pritchard seems to understand internalism as a pre-theoretical, or natural 
epistemological position in line with common sense epistemology. At least part of his 
motivation for arguing in favour of the reflective accessibility of our evidence stems from a 
commitment to avoiding revision. I will leave to one side the issue of whether Pritchard is 
correct about the claim that internalism enjoys the title of a pre-theoretical or commonsense 





pointing out their own preferred range of cases, such as cases of small children, animals, and 
chicken-sexers. But another motivation for Pritchard’s commitment to an internalist condition 
of reflective accessibility turns on considerations about epistemic responsibility. Here is 
Pritchard: 
For if the facts in virtue of which one's beliefs enjoy a good epistemic standing are 
not reflectively available to one, then in what sense is one even able to take epistemic 
responsibility for that epistemic standing? (Pritchard 2012, p.2) 
Pritchard seems to accept the idea that an agent counts as in some sense epistemically 
responsible just in case the facts in virtue of which one is justified meet an internalist access 
condition. I will return to this point below. The point here is simply to get a handle on why 
Pritchard is interested in reflective accessibility. 
Of course we haven’t explained in any detail yet what “reflective access” is according to 
Pritchard. Indeed, the burden is on the McDowellian neo-Moorean to provide an adequate 
account of reflective access, since, as we’ve just seen, this is a key notion when it comes to the 
McDowellian neo-Moorean’s putative advantage over other forms of neo-Mooreanism. Here 
is what Pritchard says about access in connection with his understanding of internalism: 
By epistemic internalism, I mean access internalism such that what makes an epistemic 
condition (i.e., a condition which, perhaps in conjunction with other epistemic 
conditions, can turn true belief into knowledge) an internal epistemic condition is that 
the agent concerned is able to know by reflection alone those facts which determine 
that this condition has been met. Meeting the justification condition, for example, at 
least as it is standardly conceived, involves the possession of grounds in support of 
the target belief, where these grounds—and the fact that they are supporting 
grounds—is reflectively accessible to the subject (Pritchard 2006, p.6).55  
It’s not entirely clear how we are to understand the notion of “reflection”. But I think we can 
understand it in terms of “introspection”, where the main point is that this is not an ordinary 
empirical kind of access. And presumably the notion of “access” is to be spelled out in 
epistemic terms. Having access to one’s evidence is being in some sort of position to know that 
one has that evidence. The idea that this is reflective or introspective access indicates that, 
according to Pritchard, the internalist is interested in a special sort of epistemic position. As I 
                                                            
55 Note that this is not an articulation of mere supervenience internalism. Pritchard claims that, according to the 
internalism he’s interested in, the fact that one’s supporting grounds are supporting grounds is accessible to one.  
This is an essential condition of what I’ve called access internalism. As we’ll see below, Pritchard claims that the 
McDowellian neo-Moorean brand of internalism is a “non-classical” form of access internalism, however, in that 





said in the introduction, internalists are understood as requiring that agents are in an epistemic 
position with respect to their evidence such that they could not be non-culpably mistaken 
about what their evidence is, or that they are always in a position to know what they’re 
evidence is (plausibly two very closely related ways of putting the same idea). In other words, it 
seems fair to assume that Pritchard is interested in what I have called the “default” notion of 
accessibility.56 However, we will return to this point. 
Insofar as it claims that we have reflective access to factive mental states, Pritchard claims that 
McDowellian neo-Mooreanism sits somewhere between “classical” internalist and externalist 
views (Pritchard 2006; 2007; 2012).  It putatively satisfies the accessibility condition of 
internalism, yet it simultaneously satisfies the truth conduciveness condition that externalist 
views are so well-positioned to satisfy (after all, factive reasons to believe that p entail that p is 
true). Because one’s evidence in the good case is factive, it “reaches all the way out to the 
world”. It is precisely because of this position between classical internalism and externalism 
that Pritchard’s strategy looks like an interesting approach to supporting a rejection of the 
sameness of evidence thesis. According to Pritchard, in any case, it is in virtue of an ability to 
remain non-revisionary and to respect intuitions about epistemic responsibility that his strategy 
is a good way of rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis.  
3.3 Epistemological Disjunctivism 
The root of McDowellian neo-Mooreanism is a kind of disjunctivism. We can draw a distinction 
between two broad forms of disjunctivism. Disjunctivism about perceptual content (also known as 
metaphysical disjunctivism) says that veridical and non-veridical perceptual experiences have two 
metaphysically different sorts of content.57 Perhaps counter-intuitively, veridical and non-
veridical experiences do not share a “highest common factor”, despite being 
phenomenologically indistinguishable. A highest common factor is simply something in 
common between cases of veridical and non-veridical perception. We might think that such a 
view has immediate epistemological consequences: 
                                                            
56 That is, a notion of accessibility understood in terms of a “strong” access condition. As I said in the 
introduction, “strong” access says that one is in a position to know that condition C obtains when condition C 
obtains and that one is in a position to know that condition C does not obtain when it does not obtain. All I claim 
here is that given Pritchard’s interest in preserving access internalist intuitions, it is fair to understand Pritchard’s 
access condition in this way. However, we’ll see below that things are not so clear.  
57 For recent discussions of metaphysical disjunctivism, see Haddock & Macpherson (2008b), Byrne & Logue 





One would naturally expect [content] disjunctivism to have ramifications for one’s 
epistemology, since on most standard views of perceptual knowledge the nature of 
one’s perceptual experience forms part of one’s perceptual evidence, and thus if 
one’s experiences are different in the two cases just considered, then so too must 
be one’s evidence (Pritchard 2006, p.11). 
However, Pritchard has argued elsewhere that the kind of disjunctivism he is interested in does 
not entail content disjunctivism (Pritchard 2012). The basic thought seems to be that there is 
no immediately obvious reason why one’s experiences in different cases could not be 
metaphysically different while nevertheless giving one the same evidential support for a given 
belief in each case. In any case, this is why Pritchard goes on to say: 
Rather than consider the general issue of whether disjunctivism about perceptual 
experience has this consequence for perceptual evidence, I want to focus instead 
on the specific McDowellian version of disjunctivism which directly expresses the 
disjunctivist point in epistemic terms (Pritchard 2006, p.11). 
Pritchard is interested in a McDowellian form of disjunctivism, to be distinguished from 
content disjunctivism. He casts this form of disjunctivism directly in epistemological terms. It 
says that there is a difference in our evidence for believing that p in the good case and in the bad 
case. Again, this is true despite the phenomenological indistinguishability of the good and bad 
cases. In the good case, our evidence is factive—one’s evidence is that one can see that p. One’s 
evidence reaches all the way out to the world in the sense that it entails that such and such is 
the case. In the bad case, one’s evidence is a mere non-factive mental state (it does not entail 
the truth of p)—for example, ones’ evidence is that it merely seems to one that p. Crucially, 
again, according to Pritchard, that one has this evidence is reflectively accessible to one. One 
has reflective access to the fact that they can see that p.  
Before getting into further details, let’s take a closer look at the precise way in which 
McDowellian neo-Mooreanism responds to radical scepticism. I’ve said that the central move 
is to challenge the sceptic’s sameness of evidence thesis. As we’ve seen (Chapter One), that 
thesis motivates the sceptic’s favouring claim: 
S’s evidence does not favour that they have hands over that they are a BIV being 






By hypothesis, the sceptic claims that our experiences would be phenomenologically the same 
in each case and this is why one’s evidence doesn’t favour that they have hands over that one is 
a BIV. The move from phenomenological sameness of experience to evidential sameness is 
precisely what needs further investigation. But this claim works in combination with the 
underdetermination principle in order to draw the sceptical conclusion. Recall that (UP) goes 
as follows: 
(UP) For all S, p, q, if S’s evidence for believing p does not favour p over some 
hypothesis q which S knows to be incompatible with p, then S’s evidence does not 
justify S in believing p. 
The sceptic claims that because our evidence does not favour the proposition that one has 
hands over the proposition that one is a BIV being stimulated to believe that one has hands, 
one’s evidence does not provide justification for one’s belief that they have hands (and insofar 
as we need evidential justification for knowledge, we do not have knowledge that we have 
hands).58The McDowellian neo-Moorean challenges the favouring claim in this line of 
reasoning. He claims that, in the good case, our evidence does favour the proposition that we 
have hands over the proposition that we are BIVs. After all, in the good case, our evidence 
consists in the fact that we can see that we have hands—which entails that one has hands. Thus 
in a very strong sense our evidence favours that we have hands over that we are BIVs (in the 
good case). Moreover, since having hands in turn entails that one is not a (handless) BIV, by 
performing the relevant deduction, one can know that they are not a BIV. In other words, like 
all neo-Moorean anti-sceptical strategies, a distinctive feature of the view is that we can have 
knowledge of the falsity of radical sceptical hypotheses.59  Moreover, we can have evidentially-
justified beliefs about the falsity of radical hypotheses. As such, this sort of view, if correct, 
may provide a way of responding to Wright’s and Pryor’s (SPJ) sceptic as well.  
                                                            
58Pritchard motivates McDowellian neo-Mooreanism in part by its ability to grant this conception of the 
connection between evidence and justification and knowledge (see Pritchard 2007, p.94).  
59McDowellian neo-Mooreanism is cast as being able to respond both to the closure problem and the 
underdetermination problem (see Pritchard 2007; Brueckner 2010; Cohen 1998). I will return to this question in 
Chapter 5. There are a variety of features of McDowellian neo-Mooreanism that I am suppressing in this 
discussion in the interest of staying focused on my central issue. For example, it is claimed that the view has 
resources for accounting for the conversational oddness of explicit claims to know the falsity of sceptical 





A crucial question for McDowellian neo-Mooreanism concerns the motivation for 
epistemological disjunctivism. After all, appealing to epistemological disjunctivism is precisely 
the way in which the view is supposed to make headway on other forms of neo-
Mooreanism—such as Sosa’s—by allowing for a response to the sceptical problem that speaks 
to the question of the evidential basis of our knowledge of the falsity of sceptical hypotheses as 
well as the idea that we have reflective access to our evidence. Pritchard notes that we can say 
three sorts of things to support epistemological disjunctivism: a) it has strong anti-sceptical 
potential; b) it fits with an ordinary way of talking about evidence; and c) the best argument 
against it, the “highest-common factor” argument (which I will discuss shortly), is a bad 
argument. 60  Note that right away, it’s plausible that Pritchard’s main argument must derive 
from c). This is because, first, there are many views which, if true, would have strong anti-
sceptical potential, and second, Pritchard himself undermines the dialectical support deriving 
from b) by claiming that support from everyday language in this area is highly defeasible 
(Pritchard 2006, p.14).61 In any case, c) will be my focus in what follows.  
                                                            
60 In fact, Pritchard considers and rejects a number of arguments against epistemological disjunctivism. Pritchard 
does a convincing job of explaining why his form of epistemological disjunctivism does not face a variety of 
challenges we may initially think would rule out the availability of the view. The most important of these in the 
sceptical context is the highest common factor argument. But I’ll note one other, namely the so-called “McKinsey 
problem” for epistemological disjunctivism (see Neta and Pritchard 2007; Silins 2005). The problem is analogous 
to the famous objection to content externalism in light of intuitive claims about first-person authority concerning 
our mental states. That is to say, because the McDowellian neo-Moorean claims that we have reflective access to 
factive mental states, and because it’s plausible that one can know by reflection alone that if one can see that p, then 
p, it seems to follow that one can come to know some specific empirical fact about the world by reflection alone. 
And this would intuitively be a reductio of the view.  
Pritchard responds by claiming that the problem only arises if his view licenses the acquisition of non-empirical 
knowledge of empirical facts in this way. But, he claims, it does not. This can be seen once we note the following. 
First, according to Pritchard, having factive evidence that p, and basing one’s belief on that evidence, is sufficient 
for empirical knowledge that p. Second, having reflective access to the fact that one has factive evidence that p 
entails that one has factive evidence that p (this follows so long as we understand having “access” factively). And 
finally, the thought continues, although one may simply fail to form the belief that p, it’s clear that one cannot run 
through the chain of reasoning proposed in the McKinsey problem without thereby gaining empirical knowledge 
that p. This is because in doing so they meet a sufficient condition on empirical knowledge that p—according to 
the view. Pritchard says: “given the further trivial claim that if one has empirical knowledge of p then one cannot 
also have reflective (i.e., non-empirical) knowledge of p, it follows that there is no prospect of acquiring non-
empirical knowledge in this case, and thus McDowell’s McKinsey-style difficulty disappears” (Pritchard 2006, 
p.20). If the way in which one acquires reflective knowledge that one can see that p necessarily involves gaining 
empirical knowledge that p, the McKinsey problem does not arise: it’s simply not true that on the McDowellian 
neo-Moorean picture we can come to know by reflection alone that some specific empirical fact about the world 
obtains, simply because we have reflective access to factive mental states. 
61A common way to provide support from ordinary language for the idea that factive mental states are a kind of 
evidence is with the following sort of example. Imagine that someone calls you at work and asks if Bob is in 
today. As it happens, Bob is sitting in the next cubicle. You tell your friend that Bob is in, but (for some reason) 
your friend asks, “Well, but how do you know he’s in?” A natural reply is: “Because I can see him, he’s right 
there!” and not “Because it appears to me as though Bob is right there!” However, as Pritchard notes, it’s possible 





3.4 The Highest Common Factor Argument and the Explanatory Challenge 
The highest common factor argument can be put as follows: 
(P1) In the ‘bad’ case, the supporting reasons for one’s perceptual beliefs can only 
consist of the way the world appears to one. (Premise). 
(P2) The ‘good’ and ‘bad’ cases are phenomenologically indistinguishable. (Premise). 
(C1) So, the supporting reasons for one’s perceptual beliefs in the ‘good’ case can be 
no better than in the ‘bad’ case. (From (P2)). 
(C2) So, the supporting reasons for one’s perceptual beliefs can only consist of the 
way the world appears to one. (From (P1), (C1)). 
        (Pritchard 2006, p.15) 
The point of this conclusion is that, even in the good case, the best we have as evidence in 
support of our perceptual beliefs are facts about the way the world seems to us. Thus, the 
epistemological disjunctivist’s claim that there is such thing as evidence in the form of 
reflectively accessible factive mental states is challenged. I discuss the point in more detail 
below, but I will note briefly here that abandoning an accessibility requirement makes 
responding to this argument much easier. Namely, it enables us to more easily resist the move 
from P2 to C1 by arguing that just because the good and bad cases are phenomenologically 
indistinguishable, it doesn’t follow that the evidence one has in the good case is just as good as 
the evidence one has in the bad case. After all, it will be open to us to insist that one has 
evidence in the good case that one does not have in the bad case, it’s just that one is not in a 
position to know that one has it.  
According to McDowellian neo-Mooreanism the move from P2 to C1 is no good. There is a 
reflectively accessible difference in one’s evidence in the good and bad cases, even though this 
difference is not phenomenologically detectible. In other words, the McDowellian neo-Moorean 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the evidence cited. In other words, we can read claims such as “Because I can see him” as elliptical for “Given 
that certain error possibilities do not obtain (which are shared presuppositions of the conversational context), 
then my reason for believing that Bob is over there is that I can see him.” Although this sort of reading is perhaps 
equally consistent with the data, it provides no support for epistemological disjunctivism. This is obviously a very 





holds that a mere lack of a phenomenological difference between the good and bad cases does 
not settle the question of whether the evidence one has (and to which one has reflective 
access) is the same in each case. Thus, Pritchard urges, the proponent of the highest common 
factor argument owes us a justification for the move from P2 to C1. More precisely, he says: 
The proponent of the highest common factor argument thus owes us an 
explanation of what is wrong with such a view before they can help themselves to 
the key move from (P2) to (C1) (Pritchard 2006, p.17). 
A proponent of the highest common factor argument may indeed have something to say here 
(which I’ll discuss momentarily). But note, too, that it seems available to them to respond to 
Pritchard in precisely the same way—that is, to demand, on the contrary, that the move from 
P2 to C1 is quite intuitive indeed, and that the McDowellian neo-Moorean therefore owes her 
an explanation of what’s right about the disjunctivist view such that she cannot help herself to 
the key move. In other words, it is not difficult to imagine a standoff between the proponent 
of the highest common factor argument and the McDowellian neo-Moorean when it comes to 
the move from P2 to C1. Whether this is a genuine stand-off concerning who counts as 
holding the “default position”—and thus who owes a justification to whom—is an important 
question. 
I think the proponent of the highest common factor argument does have something to say here. 
They can respond by claiming that the best way to understand the support for the move from 
(P2) to (C1) is in terms of an explanatory challenge. The proponent of the highest common 
factor argument will claim that the best explanation of the phenomenological 
indistinguishability of our evidence in the good and bad cases is that our evidence is the same. 
And they’ll challenge an opponent to come up with a better explanation. I think we can 
highlight this thought by considering a slightly different formulation of the highest common 
factor argument, due to Macarthur: 
(P1*) Any experience of an object may be phenomenally indistinguishable from 
dreaming or hallucinating that object. 






(P3*) In order to explain such phenomenal indistinguishability we must suppose that 
one is perceptually aware of something in common to perceiving an object and 
dreaming or hallucinating the same thing. Call this a sensory ‘idea’ of an object.  
(C*) Therefore, in experiencing an object one is ‘directly’ aware of a sensory ‘idea’ of 
that object, which forms a defeasible basis for judging that there is an object there. 
        (Macarthur 2003, p.177) 
Again, the idea is that the best explanation of the phenomenological indistinguishability of 
one’s evidence in the good and bad cases is that one’s evidence is indeed the same. But this of 
course prompts a question. As Macarthur puts it: “No doubt the existence of phenomenally 
indistinguishable cases of deceptive and non-deceptive experience may tempt one to posit a 
highest common factor in order to explain this fact. But must we explain the fact in this way?” 
(Macarthur 2003., p.178). This is where a central feature of Pritchard’s interpretation of 
McDowell is of crucial importance. We’ve seen that Pritchard casts McDowell’s view as one 
according to which our evidence must meet a condition of reflective accessibility. But this 
seems to block an alternative explanation that might be offered to meet the explanatory 
challenge. In particular, the alternative explanation of how our evidence could be 
phenomenologically indistinguishable yet different in the good and bad cases could be that are 
not always in a position to know what our evidence is. Indeed, it seems that McDowell himself 
appeals to a claim like this in offering such an explanation.62 Here is McDowell: 
Of course we are fallible in our judgments as to the shape of the space of reasons as 
we find it, or—what comes to the same thing—as to the shape of the world as we 
find it. That is to say that we are vulnerable to the world’s playing us false; and when 
the world does not play us false we are indebted to it. But that is something we must 
simply learn to live with, rather than recoiling into the fantasy of a sphere in which 
our control is total (McDowell 1995, p.887). 
 
                                                            
62It’s crucial to note that Pritchard is not interested in doing “McDowell Studies”. He’s merely interested in taking 
inspiration from some of McDowell’s works and seeing if he can develop a plausible view that hasn’t been 
adequately explored in the literature. My interest in what McDowell’s own view may or may not be is not in 
whether Pritchard accurately accounts for it; rather, I’m interested in an alternative interpretation of McDowell’s 
view only insofar as I’m interested in the potential range of responses to the explanatory challenge under 
discussion.  To be sure, interpreting McDowell as some kind of externalist in the way I am here is controversial. 





It seems that McDowell’s own way with the highest common factor argument is to deny an 
internalist condition of reflective accessibility on our evidence. Moreover, one of his main 
diagnostic moves in the process is to claim that the internalist condition of accessibility 
represents a kind of fantasy view, albeit one with an “intelligible motivation”. Here is 
McDowell: 
I have described that conception in a way that equips it with an intelligible 
motivation. The aim is to picture reason as having a proper province in which it can 
be immune to the effects of luck; not in the sense of sheer chance, but in the sense of 
factors that reason cannot control, or control for. The idea is that reason can ensure 
that we have only acceptable standings in the space of reasons, without being 
indebted to the world for favors received; if we exercise reason properly, we cannot 
arrive at defective standings in the space of reasons, in a way that could only be 
explained in terms of the world’s unkindness (1995,p.885). 
As I’ve said, I will return to the issue of what motivates an accessibility condition next 
chapter.63 For now what’s important to note is that McDowell does not endorse the “fantasy 
view” – he merely says it’s an intelligible, though ultimately mistaken way of thinking. Once we 
abandon that way of thinking, an explanation of the phenomenological indistinguishability of 
our evidence in the good and bad cases which does not appeal to the idea that our evidence is 
the same in the good and bad cases opens up. We are simply not in always in a position to 
know what our evidence is. But this does not preclude the idea that, in the good case, the 
evidence we have, and therefore what we ought to believe, can be determined by our factive 
mental states. The fact that one sees that p can be a reason for believing that p. As McDowell 
repeatedly says: believing as one ought to believe is always in part due to a “kindness of the 
world” (McDowell 1995). Interestingly, a key move underpinning McDowell’s ability to 
endorse this idea is something that looks for all the world like a kind of externalism. 
Importantly, it’s not the basic externalism of a neo-Moorean view like Sosa (1999). Rather, it 
construes knowledge as (always and everywhere) a “standing in the space of reasons.”64 
However, the reasons one has, and whether one accords with them, can ineliminably depend 
                                                            
63I consider something very close to, if not the same as, McDowell’s diagnosis of the “fantasy view” in the next 
chapter.   
64I think McDowell’s notion that knowledge is a standing in the space of reasons means that knowledge is a 
normative status. It is normatively constrained and normatively constraining (Wright 2004, p.183). What I mean 
by normatively constrained is that a necessary condition on knowing that p is that one has formed one’s belief in 
response to reasons (where this is understood in normative terms). Moreover, what I mean by the idea that 
knowledge is normatively constraining is that when one knows that p, certain things are normatively implied, for 
example, perhaps it is OK for S to assert that p or to act on p (I don’t know what McDowell’s views on assertion 





on the way things really are out there in the world (whether one is in a position to know how 
things are or not). As McDowell continually emphasises, this just means that we must embrace 
the idea that enjoying a proper standing in the space of reasons is always in part due to the 
kindness of the world. 
Macarthur articulates this approach to the explanatory challenge in a helpful way:  “Only in the 
context of the view that the mind’s contents are wholly and infallibly accessible to itself does 
the failure to detect a difference between two appearances imply that they are the very same—
an admission that forces us to accept a ‘veil of ideas’ theory of perception and its sceptical 
consequences” (Macarthur 2003, p.178).65 We can meet the explanatory challenge by 
embracing the idea that we are not always in a position to know what our evidence is. 
Meanwhile, Pritchard’s commitment to a reflective access condition seems to render this 
second way of meeting the explanatory challenge unavailable. In other words, it seems that 
Pritchard faces the following dilemma in explaining how our evidence could be 
phenomenologically indistinguishable yet different in the good and bad cases: on the one hand, 
he can appeal to sameness of evidence. But since denying sameness of evidence is the whole 
point of disjunctivism, this move is obviously unavailable; on the other hand, he can deny that 
we are always in a position to know what our evidence is. But because of his distinctive 
commitment to the “reflective accessibility” of our evidence, it’s not clear that this move is 
available either.66 
However, at this point Pritchard might respond in the following way. He can distinguish 
between the “weak” and “strong” access conditions that I noted in the introduction (Smithies 
2013). A weak access condition on our evidence says that one is always in a position to know 
that one has evidence e when evidence e obtains. Strong access says that one is always in a 
position to know that one has evidence e when it obtains and that one is always in a position to 
                                                            
65Macarthur’s appeal to “infallibilism” is a red-herring here. What’s relevant is the idea that we are always in a 
position to know that p – mistakes about whether p are still possible even when one is in a position to know that 
p. As Williamson notes: “To deny that something is hidden is not to assert that we are infallible about it. Mistakes 
are always possible. There is no limit to the conclusions into which we can be lured by fallacious reasoning and 
wishful thinking, charismatic gurus and cheap paperbacks. The point is that, in our cognitive home, such mistakes 
are always rectifiable” (Williamson 2000, p.94). I return to Williamson’s metaphor of a “cognitive home” in 
Chapter 5. 
66This is because of the connection I’ve drawn above between endorsing a reflective access condition and the kind 
of epistemic position this seems to imply we ought to be in with respect to the facts about what justification we 
have. Once again, although Pritchard explicitly claims that he is offering a non-standard form of internalism, what 
he means by this is simply that he allows that we can have reflective access to our factive mental states (a view that 





know that one does not have evidence e when it does not obtain. In Pritchard (2012), Pritchard 
indeed claims that epistemological disjunctivism is only committed to the claim that one has 
reflective access to one’s evidence in the good case, not the bad case. In the bad case, one is 
not in a position to know that they do not have a factive reason to believe that p. And this is 
OK, because he does not endorse the claim that one is always in a position to know that one 
does not have evidence e when e does not obtain. The response to the explanatory challenge I 
have in mind, then, is that we can explain how it is that we can have different evidence in 
phenomenologically indistinguishable good and bad cases in terms of the fact that we can fail 
to be in a position to know what our evidence is when we’re in the bad case.  
This may be a way of responding to the explanatory challenge. But I think it raises an 
important question about Pritchard’s commitment to internalism in general. We’ve seen that 
he motivates the commitment by appeal to avoiding revisionism where possible. But we’ve 
also seen that he explains the motivation for internalism in terms of the notion of epistemic 
responsibility (Pritchard 2012, p.2). Again, Pritchard seems to accept the idea that an agent 
counts as in some sense epistemically responsible just in case the facts in virtue of which one is 
justified meet an internalist access condition. But if one’s evidence is not accessible to one in 
the bad case, it seems that Pritchard is committed to claiming that one cannot be held 
responsible in the bad case. As Smithies points out, however—and as I’ve indicated in the 
introduction— it’s something of a mystery why we would posit this asymmetry (Smithies 
2013). Why would we find it any more compelling to claim that an agent in the good case is 
epistemically responsible than an agent who believes in accord with how things appear to them 
(and behaves otherwise identically in their manner of inquiry) but who happens to be in a bad 
case? Usually, the thought taken to motivate internalism is precisely that, even in the bad case 
we are at least epistemically responsible (i.e. do not make culpable mistakes about our 
evidence). But moreover, a central motivation for internalism is that the agent in the bad case 
can be justified in believing that p. 
Indeed, it’s crucial to note that Pritchard explicitly denies what is known as the “New Evil 
Genius” thesis. Roughly, this is the intuition that S’s recently envatted counterpart is equally 
justified or reasonable in believing things about the world around them as S is under ordinary 
circumstances. Pritchard argues by way of rejecting the highest common factor conception of 





He considers the following argument that his internalism does entail the New Evil Genius 
thesis:  
i)  Accessibilism: S's internalist epistemic support for believing that p is constituted 
solely by facts that S can know by reflection alone. 
ii)  The Highest Common Factor Thesis: the only facts that S can know by reflection alone 
are facts that S's recently envatted physical duplicate can also know by reflection 
alone. 
iii)  The New Evil Genius Thesis: S's internalist epistemic support for believing that p is 
constituted solely by properties that S has in common with her recently envatted 
physical duplicate. [from (1), (2)].  
         (Pritchard 2012, p.39) 
Pritchard resists (iii) by rejecting (ii). He obviously resists that thesis given his view that in the 
good case one can have reflective access to factive reasons. This may be a legitimate way of 
separating his internalism from the New Evil Genius thesis. But the point I want to make is 
that doing so calls into question a central motivation for epistemological disjunctivism– namely 
its putative ability to reconcile externalist and internalist intuitions.67  In any case, it is not clear 
how Pritchard can meet the explanatory challenge without raising important questions about 
epistemic responsibility. As I just said, I will explore such questions further in the context of a 
card-carrying externalist view about evidence. For now it’s important to take stock. What 
we’ve seen is that Pritchard’s commitment to the reflective accessibility of our evidence is 
important when it comes to respecting the internalist intuitions he aims to respect. However, 
precisely how we understand the kind of access this implies really matters. Pritchard is getting 
pushed in two different directions. That is, if we endorse the strong access condition (which 
seems important for respecting internalist intuitions), we face the explanatory challenge. It’s 
tough to see a possible route for explaining the phenomenological indistinguishability of cases 
when one is always in a position to know what one’s evidence is—both when one has it and 
when one does not—other than by maintaining that one’s evidence is indeed the same in good 
                                                            
67Pritchard aims to account for internalist intuitions in this respect by claiming that agents in the bad case believe 
unjustifiedly but blamelessly. For my purposes, I think it is safe to interpret this move as similar enough to 
Williamson’s point about excuses (which I’ll discuss briefly below, and next chapter) to reserve discussion of the 





and bad cases. Endorsing a weak access condition perhaps allows for a response to the 
explanatory challenge. But we’re getting further away from one of the central motivations for 
the view in the first place. Moreover, by rejecting the New Evil Genius intuition, it seems that 
Pritchard’s view will generate the same consequences that I will go on to discuss about 
evidential externalism in Chapter Four. I take these issues about the explanatory challenge and 
access to motivate looking at a more thoroughgoing evidential externalism.  
3.5 Williamson and Evidential Externalism  
Perhaps the most well-known proponent of evidential externalism is Williamson (2000).  
Williamson’s particular form of evidential externalism is motivated by his thesis that one’s total 
evidence is equal to one’s total knowledge, or “E = K”. Williamson is an externalist about 
knowledge. Thus, his externalism about knowledge leads to externalism about evidence. 
According to Williamson, we are not always in a position to know what our evidence is.68 We 
do not have this sort of access to our evidence because we are not always in a position to know 
what we know. Williamson’s thesis about evidence partly motivates, and is partly motivated by, 
his broader “knowledge first” programme in epistemology, the details of which will largely be 
put to one side for our purposes. In this section I briefly examine the motivation for E=K 
independently of considerations about knowledge first epistemology.  
Why should someone who is not already convinced by the knowledge first programme think 
that our total evidence is equal to our total knowledge? Williamson argues from the function of 
evidence. Evidence plays a role in inference to the best explanation, probabilistic reasoning, 
and the exclusion of hypotheses. He claims that in all three of these cognitive activities, only 
E=K can make sense of the role that evidence plays.69  
For instance:  
When we prefer an hypothesis h to an hypothesis h* because h explains our evidence 
better than h* does, we are standardly assuming e to be known: if we do not know e 
why should h’s capacity to explain e confirm h for us? (Williamson 2002, p.200). 
                                                            
68We can take Williamson to be denying both the weak and strong access conditions.  
69These arguments constitute part of a “theory of evidential status” as opposed to a “theory of evidential 
relevance” (these terms are due to Joyce (2004)). Williamson is careful to point out that there are distinct 
questions about what it is for evidence to favour belief in a proposition p (he cashes this out in terms of probability 
relations), and about what sort of epistemic standing putative evidence must have in order to be evidence. The 







It is likewise hard to see why the probability of h on e should regulate our degree of 
belief in h unless we know e. Again, an incompatibility between h and e does not rule 
out h unless e is known (p.200). 
And finally, consider an example: 
Suppose that balls are drawn from a bag, with replacement. In order to avoid issues 
about the present truth-values of statements about the future, assume that someone 
else has already made the draws; I watch them on film. For a suitable number n, the 
following situation can arise. I have seen draws 1 to n; each was red (produced a red 
ball). I have not yet seen draw n+1. I reason probabilistically, and form a justified 
belief that draw n+1 was red. Consider two false hypotheses: 
 h: Draws 1 to n were red; draw n+1 was black. 
 h*: Draw 1 was black; draws 2 to n+1 were red.  
It is natural to say that h is consistent with my evidence and that h* is not. In 
particular, it is consistent with my evidence that draw n+1 was black; it is not 
consistent with my evidence that draw 1 was black. Thus my evidence does not 
include the proposition that draw n+1 was red. Why not? After all, by hypothesis I 
have a justified true belief that it was red. The obvious answer is that I do not know 
that draw n+1 was red (p.201). 
The moral of the example is that only E=K enables us to discriminate between hypotheses in 
the way we want to. We might wonder whether only knowledge can make sense of the 
function of evidence in these instances (Goldman 20009, Joyce 2004, Fumerton 2000, Owens 
2004). Alvin Goldman (2009), in particular, has challenged Williamson’s claims that nothing 
other than knowledge can make sense of the role of evidence. He offers an alternative 
conception of evidence which says, roughly, that a proposition p is evidence for S iff p is non-
inferentially justified for S. Goldman claims that evidence so construed can do the job just as 
well as E=K. I will not get into the question of whether Williamson, or Goldman, is correct 
about this (Littlejohn 2011, 2011b; Silins 2005). Instead, I’d like to consider some important 
consequences of E=K.  
The consequence immediately relevant for our purposes is that when it comes to the 
underdetermination argument for scepticism, the sameness of evidence thesis is readily 
challenged. If Williamson is right about evidence, there is a fundamental difference in the 





the world around them. As a BIV, you do not know that you have hands. After all, you are a 
BIV being stimulated to believe that you have hands. Thus, the proposition “I have hands” is 
not part of your evidence.  However, even when you are in the bad case you do know that it 
appears to you that you have hands.  Thus, the proposition “It appears to me that I have 
hands” remains part of your evidence. Meanwhile, in the ordinary case, you know you have 
hands. The proposition “I have hands” is part of your evidence. Thus, in the bad case one 
would not have the same evidence that one has in the ordinary case in which one knows lots of 
things about the world around them. Although it needs some careful spelling out, the view 
promises anti-sceptical results. 
 It’s worth emphasising here that once we abandon the idea that our evidence is always 
accessible, denying the sameness of evidence thesis seems relatively straightforward. This is 
arguably why it is so straightforward. In particular, this is exactly the sort of move that makes 
things so much easier when dealing with the proponent of the highest common factor 
argument. Indeed, we’ve just seen that it seems as though Pritchard’s adherence to reflective 
accessibility was what causes him problems in that respect. Of course, Williamson’s approach 
to scepticism is not without difficulties. 
3.6 Same Evidence or Same Justification?  
There are a variety of objections to Williamson’s anti-sceptical strategy in the literature. Getting 
into these here would take us too far afield. However, an important recurring theme is that 
Williamson’s strategy for dealing with the sameness of evidence thesis is compelling, but that it 
does not do the relevant work in challenging the evidential sceptic (Fumerton 2000; Owens 
2004; Schiffer 2009).70 The basic idea is that there is a difference between a subject having the 
same evidence in the good and bad cases and the subject being equally rational or justified in 
believing what they do on their evidence in the good and bad cases.71 Many epistemologists are 
inclined to think that a subject can be equally rational in both the good and bad cases (this is 
just the New Evil Genius intuition I mentioned above). Owens calls this the “equal rationality 
thesis”. He goes on to claim:  
                                                            
70 Presumably we might take the following objections to apply to disjunctivist strategies generally. I return to a 
related concern in Chapter 5. 
71 There are of course complex issues surrounding all of the different things people mean by “rational” and 
“justified”, especially in the present context. What is of central interest to me is the idea of an agent Ø-ing as they 
are normatively required to Ø. Though of course there are equally complex issues surrounding what that means. 






[I]f the equal rationality thesis is true, the evidence the subject in the bad case has that 
he is in the good case must be just as strong as the evidence that the subject in the 
good case has that he is in the good case. The subject in the bad case is no less 
reasonable in supposing that he is in the good case than he would be were he actually 
in the good case, so the evidence supporting his belief in the bad case must be just as 
strong as it would be were he actually in the good case (Owens 2004. p.3). 
Owens thus draws a distinction between strength of evidence and sameness of evidence. While he 
thinks that the subject in the good and bad case has equally strong evidence he does not think 
this has a bearing on the question of whether the subject has the same evidence. And so, he 
claims, whether or not we can successfully reject the sameness of evidence thesis does not 
necessarily have a bearing on the equal rationality thesis. As Owens puts it: “to establish that 
two subjects have equally strong evidence for p is not to establish that they have exactly the 
same evidence for p” (Owens 2004, p.3). And he goes on to ask: “But why need the sceptic 
take any further interest in sameness of evidence?” (2004, p.3). The question is rhetorical. 
Owens (and others) claims that all the sceptic needs is the equal rationality thesis to undermine 
our justification to believe ordinary propositions such as that we have hands.72 The argument 
can be put as follows: 
i) You think you have justification to believe that you are in the good case, but if 
you were in the bad case you would have the same justification to believe you 
were in the good case. 
ii) Therefore, you don’t really have any more justification to believe that you are in 
the good case than that you are in the bad case. 
iii) Therefore, you do not have justification to believe that you are in the good case 
(i.e. that you have hands).  
         (Owens 2004, p.4) 
 
                                                            
72 Schiffer (2009) argues that Williamson’s response to scepticism does not generalize to a formulation of the 
sceptical argument in terms of justification. He argues that the sceptic can plausibly argue that one has the same 
justification in the good and bad cases and from this derive a sceptical conclusion. He claims that Williamson’s 
theory that E=K fails to support a claim of asymmetry of justification in the good and bad cases (the details are 
complex and would take us too far afield here). Schiffer’s argument prompts Williamson to claim that we don’t 
have the “full normative status” required for justification in the bad case. We need to look more carefully at the 
implications of Williamson’s view about the relationship between epistemic normativity and justification and 





It seems that the obvious question to ask about this argument is why we would accept premise 
i).73 The answer that comes immediately to mind is the assumption that your evidence is the 
same in the good and bad cases, and in both cases you respect your evidence equally well. 
Owens might resist and say that what’s really doing the work for i) is just the idea that you 
respect what you take to be your evidence equally well in both cases, regardless of what your 
evidence actually is. I don’t think it’s worth getting hung up on the difference between these 
ways of spelling out the motivation for i).74 Indeed, I’m going to set to one side the question of 
whether this is a good argument. This is because I think it’s clear that Williamson takes his 
claims about sameness of evidence (or lack thereof) in the good and bad cases to directly imply 
a claim about sameness of justification and rationality. So he would reject the first premise of 
Owens’ argument. I think this highlights a particularly important consequence of his evidential 
externalism which will be the subject of the next chapter. But let me explain how we get there. 
 
3.7 Justification and Rational Requirements  
Williamson talks about being “justified” in normative terms. He says that a belief that p is 
justified just in case it is “OK” to believe that p.75 He goes on to explain what determines 
whether it is OK to have a belief that p: 
On the account in Knowledge and its Limits, justification is to be explained in terms of 
knowledge rather than vice versa. Belief that falls short of knowledge is to that extent 
defective. If we conceive belief as the mental analogue of assertion, then just as the 
rule for assertion is ‘Assert p only if you know p’, so the norm for belief is ‘Believe p 
only if you know p’. In this sense, a belief is fully normatively justified if and only if it 
constitutes knowledge (Williamson 2009, p.359). 
Thus, according to Williamson, because the agent in a bad case who believes that p does not 
know that p, the agent violates the rule “believe that p only if you know p”. The agent thereby 
fails to have the “full normative status” for justification.76  To be sure, Williamson is sensitive 
                                                            
73It’s not immediately obvious to me what the rationale behind the move from i) to ii) is either. Perhaps it’s 
something like an analogue of the underdetermination principle. 
74For example, it seems open to the disjunctivist to insist that what it is to respect your evidence well just is to 
proportion your beliefs to what your evidence really is. Indeed, I think this is a natural thing to say, and it’s how I 
understand Williamson to proceed (next section). 
75He distinguishes this sense of being justified from another “inferential” sense, according to which a belief is 
justified just in case one can support the belief with further argument. He claims this is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for a belief to count as being OK in the normative sense.  
76Precisely what Williamson means by “normative” is obviously an important question. For now I’ll take him to 





to the idea that a belief formed in the bad case can have some good normative standing. For 
example, believing that you have hands as a BIV when it appears to you just as though you 
have hands is better than believing under the same circumstances that you have hooks as 
opposed to hands.  
It is important to note that Williamson does not limit himself to talk of justification. He also 
talks about “requirements of rationality”.  According to Williamson, the requirements of 
rationality tell you to proportion your beliefs to the evidence (Williamson 2000, Ch.8). “If 
rationality requires one to respect one's evidence, then it is irrational not to respect one's 
evidence” (Williamson 2000, Ch.8). This is a normative requirement. Although the details are 
complex, the basic idea is that your degree of confidence that p ought to be proportioned to 
the probability that p given your evidence. If the probability that p given your evidence is 1, 
then you ought, for example, simply outright believe that p (believe to a degree of confidence 
of 1). If the probability that p given your evidence is less than 1, then you ought to have 
something less than outright belief that p. Perhaps you ought to believe that p is probable to n 
degrees, or perhaps you ought to have some distinct propositional attitude that is in some 
sense less committal about the fact that p – the details are unimportant here.  
Given this normative principle about what you ought to believe under certain conditions, what 
should we say about what S ought to believe in good and bad cases, respectively? Let’s start 
with the bad case. The evidence (what S knows) is that it appears to them that they have hands. 
After all, they are in the bad case. Since they do not have hands, and since knowledge is factive, 
they cannot know that they have hands—thus, S’s evidence cannot be that they have hands. 
However, S’s evidence (that it appears to S just as though S has hands), does make it highly 
probable that they have hands. So, proportioning their belief to the evidence, S ought to 
believe with a high degree of confidence that they have hands. In the good case, S’s evidence 
includes the proposition that they have hands. S knows that they have hands. According to 
Williamson, if a subject knows that p, then the probability of p on her evidence is 1.77 
Proportioning one’s belief to the evidence, one ought to believe outright that they have hands. 
As Williamson puts it: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
another way of understanding what he means, but then the upshot of his view concerning rational requirements 
will not be as controversial as he himself and many others seem to acknowledge that it is.  
77 As Williamson notes, if we are to avoid scepticism about knowledge, this implies that a proposition can be 
evidence for itself. Brown (2013) argues that this is an unpalatable upshot of the view based on considerations 





[P]robabilities on one's evidence are what one's degrees of confidence must match if 
one is to satisfy the norm of proportioning one's belief to the evidence. In Bad, if one 
knows e and falsely believes [that they have hands], one deviates from that norm with 
respect to [the proposition that they have hands] by only a little, even if that result is 
partly the outcome of one's blunder in misconstruing the extent of one's evidence 
(Williamson 2009, p.362). 
Of course we are familiar with the idea that one cannot tell whether one is in the good or bad 
case.78 This is built into the description of the bad case. The point is that although different 
degrees of confidence are normatively required of you, depending on which case you are in, 
you are not in a position to know which case you are in. You are thus not in a position to 
know what you ought to do. And yet, because you ought to do one thing or the other, failure 
to do so entails that you are at some sort of normative fault.79 Williamson’s spells this out in 
terms of a lack of justification, and in terms of failing to meet the requirements of rationality. 
In the bad case, when you believe outright that you have hands, you are not justified in 
believing that you have hands. As he puts it, your belief fails to have the “full normative 
status” of justification (Williamson 2009). Indeed you are not even fully rational.  
To be sure, Williamson allows that while it is true that you violate a normative requirement 
(and thus are not justified or even fully rational in believing that p) in such a case, you 
nevertheless have a “cast iron excuse” for believing that p (Williamson 2009, p.360). This is 
presumably the sense in which your belief is still better than had you believed, as in the 
example above, that you have hooks rather than hands. I will return to this point about excuses 
in the next chapter. For now I simply want to claim that, given the foregoing considerations, 
it’s becoming clear that Williamson’s view about evidence—specifically, the externalist feature 
of it—has some important consequences. In particular, it leads to claims about the conditions 
under which we are normatively required to Ø that are highly counterintuitive in at least some 
kind of way (as many epistemologists in the literature, including some who I’ve cited above 
would agree). It turns out, however, that it’s not easy to spell out what this claim amounts to.  
 
 
                                                            
78 This does not mean merely that some subject can’t tell but that there is no difference for the subject. Nothing is 
available to the subject with which they could tell. 
79 For an interesting argument that a consequence of Williamson’s view is that we ought to have lower credences 






We can challenge the sameness of evidence thesis in at least two broad ways: by retaining an 
internalist access condition on our evidence or denying that an internalist access condition is 
necessary. Pritchard motivates his McDowellian neo-Mooreanism by saying that he can 
preserve internalist and externalist intuitions in a particularly satisfying way. He thinks this is 
important because it allows us to preserve a commonsensical way of thinking about our 
epistemic commitments as well as intuitions about epistemic responsibility. We saw that he 
runs into trouble when it comes to explaining how one’s evidence could differ between the 
phenomenologically indistinguishable cases. Of course, at that point he can appeal to the 
“weak access” condition. But then, I argued, his view starts to lose its internalist-friendly 
appeal. I then turned to the card-carrying evidential externalism of Williamson. Denying an 
internalist access condition makes challenging the sameness of evidence thesis a lot easier. But 
I’ve started to draw out an unsettling implication that comes with this approach. I turn now to 

















Chapter Four: The Natural Reaction 
4.1 Introduction 
Gibbons claims that there is a “natural reaction” to the general idea that one can be 
normatively required to Ø when that requirement is in some sense outside of one’s first person 
perspective or inaccessible to one, and thus (according to Gibbons) incapable of playing a 
guiding role (Gibbons 2013).80 Because I think the case with Williamson’s view about evidence 
is an instance of this more general issue, I will call a basic concern we might have with 
Williamson’s view the “natural reaction” to Williamson’s view about evidence.81 Gibbons uses 
this term because he wagers that many people have it when they reflect on the idea of what’s 
involved in being normatively required to Ø. But more needs to be said about how to spell out 
the natural reaction. We’ll see that it’s not easy to articulate exactly what it amounts to. Before 
engaging in this project, I’d like to note that the following is not intended as a comprehensive 
and watertight account of what this concern with Williamson’s view amounts to. Rather, the 
point of the label “natural reaction” is to indicate that I take it that (at least part of) the burden 
is on Williamson (or evidential externalism generally) to explain why this intuitive worry is 
misguided or mistaken. I’ll consider an important part of Williamson’s diagnosis in Chapter 5. 
But I think Williamson goes against the grain of our intuitions about the relationship between 
agents’ capacities to accord with normative requirements and the conditions under which those 
normative requirements obtain, whatever the comprehensive theory of this relationship is. In 
this chapter I offer a brief account of some features of this relationship. The goal is to provide 
enough of a story about the natural reaction to make accounting for it look like an important 
desideratum for any anti-sceptical strategy that seeks to reject the sameness of evidence thesis. 
4.2 Deliberation-Guidance 
One way of spelling out the natural reaction is as follows. We’ve seen that Williamson argues 
for his view about evidence by considerations about the function of evidence in conducting 
our cognitive lives in various ways. Another crucial function of evidence, missing from the list 
last chapter, is that we use evidence in our deliberations about what to believe, and thus 
indirectly in our deliberations about what to do. For example, when thinking about whether 
                                                            
80 Gibbons’ main concern is with what he calls “the ethicists’ notion of objective reasons” (Gibbons 2013, Ch.1). 
81 Insofar as I’m using Williamson’s view as a paradigm case of evidential externalism, I will also refer to this as 





you stole my bike or not, I consider what evidence I have in support of thinking this. This is a 
good example because a lot hangs on something like accusing someone of stealing my bike. 
And it’s often the case that a lot hangs on what one believes given their evidence. We might 
wonder, then, whether the sort of opacity of our evidence on Williamson’s view has 
counterintuitive consequences in light of this further important function of evidence. 
Williamson recognizes this: “How can one follow the rule ‘proportion your belief in p to your 
evidence for p’ when one doesn’t know exactly what one’s evidence is?” (Williamson 2000, 
p.192). I will call this the “deliberation-guidance” worry. 
The deliberation-guidance worry can be sharpened in the following way. Call a norm 
“operationalizable” just in case, “if one knows the norm, one is always able to use the norm as 
a premise in a competent deduction, together with one’s knowledge of whether the norm’s 
triggering condition obtains, to come to know whether one is acting in conformity with the 
norm” (Srinivasan unpublished, p.11).82 For example, the norm “One ought to proportion one’s 
beliefs to the evidence” is operationalizable just in case one can use it in a competent 
deduction, together with their knowledge that they now have evidence E and degree of 
credence C on E, to come to know whether they believe in conformity with the norm. The 
idea is that such knowledge is necessary for being “guided” by a norm. One must be able to 
know whether one is acting in accord with the norm or not in order to properly be counted as 
being guided by the norm. Without such knowledge, the deliberation-guidance worry goes, 
one’s accordance with a norm is at best a sort of accident—in which case it’s questionable that 
one deserves a normative status for believing in accordance with the norm. So the problem 
with Williamson’s view, according to this worry, is that it renders the evidential norm 
“unoperationalizable.”  
How serious is the deliberation-guidance worry? On one hand, Williamson argues that the 
opacity of our evidence, on his view, is not extensive enough to give this concern any bite. He 
says: “Although we have no infallible procedure for determining whether we know p, in 
practice we are often in a position to know whether we know p” (Williamson 2000, p.193). The 
point here is that the fact that we are “often” in a position to know whether we know p is 
                                                            
82 As I said in the introduction, we can think of Srinivasan’s helpful phrase “triggering condition” as meaning 
something like the condition under which a given normative requirement applies. And again, here’s Srinivasan’s 
explanation of her own terminology: “A norm is a universal generalisation about how one ought to conduct one’s 
practical or doxastic affairs, involving a normative state N and a triggering condition C, of the form “N 





enough to dismiss the deliberation-guidance worry. While it might be true that we could not 
use our evidence to guide deliberation (and indirectly action) if we were never in a position to 
know what our evidence is, this doesn’t entail that we cannot use our evidence to guide 
deliberation given that we are often (though not always) in a position to know what our 
evidence is. Compare the following example from Srinivasan: 
SEDER NORM: When setting the table for Passover, one ought to set as many 
places as there will be Seder guests plus one. 
Srinivasan notes that, while it’s true that one is not always in a position to know how many 
guests one will have at one’s Passover Seder (there may be unexpected arrivals, or someone 
might get sick), we can clearly employ such a norm in our reasoning about what to do at 
Passover.  Norms can guide us even if we’re not always in a position to know what they tell us 
to do.83  
This seems fair enough.84 But we might press the basic spirit of the deliberation-guidance 
worry in the present context. We might insist on something that Williamson himself notes: 
“None of this would be much consolation if our beliefs about our knowledge were hopelessly 
unreliable. Sceptics say that those beliefs have no rational basis...” (Williamson 2000, p.193). 
The thought is something like this. If scepticism is true, then it is simply false that we are often 
(even if not always) in a position to know what our evidence is (given E=K). Of course, 
Williamson is not worried about what the sceptic says. He reminds us: “We have found [the 
sceptic’s] reasons for saying so inadequate” (p.193). And what he means (very roughly) is that 
we can reject the sceptic’s appeal to the sameness of evidence thesis. Perhaps at this stage in 
the dialectic of my thesis (i.e. considering whether a knowledge-first account of evidence can 
support a rejection of the sameness of evidence thesis and thus provide a response to 
                                                            
83 Williamson offers an example in this context, too. He compares the evidential norm to the rule, “Proportion 
your voice to the size of the room”. He claims we can perfectly well be guided by such a rule even though we are 
fallible about the size of the room we are in. “To have applied the rule ‘Proportion your voice to the size of the 
room’, one needs beliefs about the size of the room, but they need not have been true—although if they were 
false, one's application was faulty. Similarly, to have applied the rule ‘Proportion your belief in p to the support 
that p receives from your knowledge’, one must have had beliefs about how much support p received from one's 
knowledge, and therefore about one's knowledge, but those beliefs need not have been true—although if they 
were false, one's application was faulty (2000, p.192).” For a critique of Williamson’s analogy, see Owens (2004).  





scepticism), endorsing a move like this is inappropriate.85 But rather than pursuing that 
question, I think a deeper issue is as follows.86 
4.3 Normative Requirements and Blameworthiness 
It’s plausible that what’s behind the deliberation-guidance worry is a deeper worry about the 
idea that one could ever be normatively required to Ø when one is not in a position to know 
that one is required to Ø.87 Srinivasan suggests that what lies behind such a worry is a desire to 
align the “deontological” and “hypological” perspectives (Srinivasan, p.14). The deontological 
perspective is just the perspective from which we make judgments about whether an agent 
conforms to normative requirements – i.e. their obligations, duties, or what they ought to do 
or think, etc. The hypological perspective is the perspective from which we make judgments 
about whether an agent is blameworthy or praiseworthy for their actions or attitudes. One 
reason we might think that these perspectives should be in alignment is if we think that 
judgments of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness are in some sense central to the very idea 
of normative requirements.  Indeed, the thought goes, we might think that they are so central 
that it’s difficult to understand the possibility of a mismatch between the conditions under 
which someone is blameworthy and the conditions under which they count as violating a 
normative requirement. As I will explain further below, whether one is blameworthy intuitively 
depends on whether they are in a position to know that the conditions under which they 
would be blameworthy obtain (Williamson, for example, seems to agree, as we can see from 
his use of excuses in his theory of evidence and justification – more on this below). Thus, 
allowing that one might ever violate a norm when one is not in a position to know that its 
triggering conditions obtain effectively introduces a mismatch between conditions of 
blameworthiness and conditions of norm-violation. And so, on the present assumption, it is to 
                                                            
85 What I mean is the following. If the guidance-deliberation worry is to be avoided, scepticism must be false (so 
we’re assuming here, at any rate). I wouldn’t want to assume that scepticism is false in considering whether 
Williamson’s view can support a rejection of the sameness of evidence thesis and successfully respond to 
scepticism. But note that I don’t intend the point here to apply to Williamson’s own appeal to this anti-sceptical 
remark.  
86 Srinivasan points out a second objection to the deliberation-guidance worry. This is that the deliberation-
guidance worry seems to presuppose that our practical and cognitive lives, when they go well, are a rule-governed 
affair. That is, it seems to presuppose that well-lived practical and cognitive lives involve actively applying general 
rules to specific cases. She notes that there are many reasons to think that is an implausible (Srinivasan unpublished, 
p.13). 





misplace something central about normativity. We can sharpen the idea that blameworthiness 
is “central” to normativity in the following way. Call it the “hypological principle” (H): 
(H): S ought to Ø only if, if S doesn’t Ø, then S is blameworthy for not Ø-ing.     
The principle says that it’s only true that S is normatively required to Ø if, were they not to Ø, 
they would be blameworthy for not Ø-ing. The basic idea behind the present way of spelling 
out the natural reaction is that, once we grant (H), a condition of access on our normative 
requirements follows. This condition is incompatible with Williamson’s view about evidence. 
One reason we might think that judgments of blameworthiness give rise to these 
considerations about access has to do with the intuitive incompatibility of judgments of 
blameworthiness with what Williams (1976, 1981) and Nagel (1979) call “moral luck” or 
“resultant luck” (respectively). Imagine the following case:  
 Suppose Kate, a generally thoughtful person, brings some soup to her friend Mary, 
who is down with the flu. And suppose further that Kate isn’t in a position to know 
that the soup contains an allergen that, rather than making Mary feel better, will make 
her more ill. In trying her best to help her friend, Kate inadvertently makes her friend 
worse off (Srinivasan, p.15). 
This is an example of “bad resultant luck.”88 Intuitively Kate is not blameworthy for what she’s 
done to Mary. And an issue about access seems like precisely the relevant feature of the case. 
That is, the best explanation for why she is not to blame is that she was not in a position to 
know that the soup contains the allergen (imagine, too, that she was very cautious in checking 
all the allergens and that she asked Mary about her allergies). Thus the idea of resultant luck 
brings out the intuitive plausibility of accessibility conditions on blameworthiness.89As 
                                                            
88 As Srinivasan notes, when Williams and Nagel speak of resultant luck, they are speaking about both the 
presence and the absence of the phenomenon of luck exhibited in the Kate and Mary case. We can contrast the 
Kate case above with a case in which the soup does not contain allergens that will make Mary ill. According to 
Williams and Nagel such a case is an example of the absence of bad resultant luck. Kate would be said to benefit 
from the absence of bad resultant luck. In this chapter, I will only have in mind the phenomenon of the presence 
of bad resultant luck when I speak of resultant luck.  
89 It’s important to differentiate resultant luck from other kinds of luck that are intuitively compatible with blame. 
For example, behavioural dispositions that are not the result of an agent’s free will, but rather the result of natural 
events and laws are regarded by many to be compatible with judgments of blame. Moreover, the kind of luck 
involved growing up in a community of slave owners may plausibly be compatible with blame. Also, the kind of 
luck involved in finding oneself in a situation such that one performs an action that one would otherwise have 
had no inclination to perform—for example the actions of a concentration camp prison guard—seems to many 
to be compatible with blame (Srinivasan unpublished, p.15). To the extent that we have intuitions that agents 
subject to these kinds of luck are not the proper subjects of blame, it is again plausibly because of the agents’ lack 






Srinivasan puts it, “this form of luck is present when one’s ignorance of the relevant 
circumstantial facts prohibits one from controlling the outcome or result of one’s actions” 
(Srinivasan unpublished, p.15).  
Notice that Kate violates the normative requirements of at least some possible normative 
theories. For example, to put it roughly, if we assume that Kate only had the choice of either 
giving Mary the soup or not, and that Kate’s giving Mary the soup reduces the overall good, 
then Kate violates a consequentialist norm of action that says: “One ought to Ø iff Ø-ing 
would maximise the good”. Taken together, the consequentialist norm and the intuitive 
judgement about Kate’s blameworthiness suggest that blameworthiness and norm violation 
indeed come apart. However, if we think that blameworthiness is central to normativity in the 
way specified above, we might be inclined to say that the consequentialist norm—in virtue of 
having opaque triggering conditions—misses, or fails to account for or respect something 
central about normativity. In other words, it conflicts with the (H) principle. Consider the 
following claim: 
Kate ought to maximize the good only if, if Kate doesn’t maximize the good, then 
Kate is blameworthy for not maximizing the good.     
Because Kate is intuitively not to blame for not maximizing the good here, (H) tells us that it’s 
false that she really ought to have done so—i.e. it’s false that she violated a normative 
requirement in bringing Mary the soup. Likewise then, when it comes to Williamson’s theory 
of evidence, the evidential norm’s triggering conditions are opaque (in the relevant sense). It’s 
possible to violate the norm due to resultant luck. As such, it will conflict with the (H) 
principle. Consider the following claim: 
S ought to proportion her beliefs to what she knows only if, if S doesn’t proportion 
her beliefs to what she knows, then S is blameworthy for not proportioning her 
beliefs to what she knows.     
Because there are many cases in which one is intuitively not to blame for failing to proportion 
one’s belief to what they know (as Williamson of course agrees), (H) tells us that it’s false that 
they really ought to have done so when in fact they did not. This is one explanation of the desire 





we are always in a position to know about them. That is, doing so enables us to eliminate the 
possibility of resultant luck in our conformity to norms (as in the example with Kate and the 
consequentialist norm). Once a norm’s triggering conditions are accessible in the right way, 
violation of the norm goes hand in hand with the appropriateness of judgments of 
blameworthiness. A case like the Kate and Mary case will never count as the violation of a 
normative requirement. Our norms won’t conflict with the (H) principle. More schematically, 
this interpretation of the natural reaction can be put as follows:  
i) Blameworthiness is central to normativity (S ought to Ø only if, if S doesn’t Ø, then 
S is blameworthy for not Ø-ing). ((H) principle) 
ii) Blameworthiness is incompatible with resultant luck. (premise) 
iii) The right kind of access condition eliminates resultant luck. (premise) 
iv) Thus, the connection between blameworthiness and normativity generates an 
access condition on our normative requirements (i.e. it motivates the natural 
reaction). (from i, ii, and iii) 
So far we only have a sort of structural understanding of why we might think that connecting 
blameworthiness and normativity leads to the idea that we should always be in a position to 
know what our normative requirements are. What’s missing in all of this, of course, is any 
reason to think that blameworthiness is central to normativity, or in other words that (H) is 
true. It’s interesting that Srinivasan, the person to whom this diagnosis of the natural reaction 
is due, doesn’t really provide much of an explanation for why we might think this in the first 
place. Rather, her suggestion is accompanied by assertions such as: “The hypological 
perspective has a strong grip on contemporary normative philosophy, and perhaps 
contemporary culture more generally. Perhaps this is a result both of overconfidence in our 
theoretical powers and naïveté about the place of luck in human life” (Srinivasan unpublished, 
p. 34). Srinivasan’s aim in introducing this diagnosis is to challenge the natural reaction. But I 
think her comments on the plausibility of this explanation of the natural reaction suggest that 
it is probably not quite the right place to be looking in the first place. Here are the comments I 






Consider a political leader who, doing his best to act on his evidence and follow his 
conscience, leads his country into an illegal, immoral and materially devastating war. 
That he is in some sense excused for so doing is and should be of little interest to 
those who are not his biographer. Indeed, a first personal fixation on one’s own 
culpability seems to indulge a narcissism deeply at odds with the normative. It is fine 
and important to tell children that all that matters is that they try their best. But when 
this thought becomes a complete consolation for failure – when I, harming you, care 
only that I am trying my best not to – I have abandoned the deontological 
perspective. Williams launches a similar criticism against the Christian outlook when 
he says that it “associates morality simultaneously with benevolence, self-denial, and 
inner directedness or guilt (shame before God or oneself)” [(Williams 1981, p. 244)]. 
Seeking to avoid blame, moral or epistemic, is a form of cowardice, a turning inward 
of the normative perspective (Srinivasan unpublished, p.34).  
Ultimately, I think I agree with the spirit of these remarks. But I also think this suggests that 
the foregoing is not a good way of spelling out the natural reaction. For example, the case of 
the political leader seems like a counterexample to (H). In other words, the claim that 
S ought not to have led his country into an illegal, immoral and materially devastating 
war only if, if S did so, then S is blameworthy for leading his country into an illegal, 
immoral and materially devastating war 
seems false. Srinivasan’s remark that the political leader is in some sense excused suggests we 
can imagine the case such that he’s not to blame for leading his country into an illegal, immoral 
and materially devastating war. But her point is well taken that it seems true that normatively 
he ought not to have done so—or that something could be said to have gone horribly morally 
wrong for the leader. The details are of course complex, and I wouldn’t want to rest much on 
this case.  
Moreover, it’s important to keep some things in mind about blameworthiness before assessing 
(H). It’s important to note, first, that the idea should not be taken to imply that violation of 
normative requirements goes hand in hand with the appropriateness of blame. There are crucial 
differences between the conditions of the appropriateness of blaming someone, and whether 
that person is blameworthy. For one thing, blaming is highly positional in nature—for example, 
being implicated in the wrongdoing of some other agent can place constraints on the 
appropriateness of one blaming that agent. Meanwhile, while blameworthiness is also considered 
by some to be to a certain degree positional in nature, it is arguably less so (Kelly forthcoming). 





idea that there is some essential connection between blameworthiness and normativity is at 
least more plausible than the idea that there is some essential connection between the 
appropriateness of actual blame responses and normativity. Moreover, it’s also important to 
note that blameworthiness and the sorts of responses that this may elicit from people can be 
wide-ranging and subtle. Kelly notes that:  
These responses are commonly associated with condemning and punishing. But 
blaming responses might also be understood, more broadly, to include less retributive 
sentiments, such as disappointment, sadness, or resignation. Although they are not 
oriented punitively, these attitudes respond to an agent’s demonstrated capacity for 
wrongdoing and take it seriously. They may be accompanied by behavioral responses 
that are not retributive in nature, such as calling for an explanation or apology, 
lowering or otherwise changing expectations regarding future interactions, breaking 
off a relationship, trying to make the wrongdoer feel guilty or make amends, and so 
on. I submit that any of these responses might qualify as blame when they accompany 
or express moral criticism of a person (Kelly forthcoming, p.2).  
We might think that taking this into consideration serves to weaken, and thus render more 
plausible, the claim that (H) is true (i.e. in the sense that one can easily imagine cases of norm 
violation that do not go hand in hand with, say, punitive measures – for example, violations of 
the evidential norm).  
However, even granting all of this, it’s still not clear to me that the foregoing is the best way of 
spelling out the natural reaction. I suggest that the way to investigate the matter further is by 
looking more closely at the notion of responsibility. Blameworthiness and praiseworthiness are 
obviously closely connected to the notion of responsibility. So we might think that the view 
that blameworthiness is central to normativity just is the view that responsibility is central to 
normativity. But there are at least three different notions of responsibility relevant to our 
purposes.  Examining the differences between these notions will allow us to see why (H) is 
implausible. However, I’ll argue that a picture emerges that provides a more plausible, though 
closely related, way of spelling out the natural reaction.  
4.4 Normative Requirements and Responsibility 
There is a standard distinction in the literature on responsibility between accountability and 
attributability (Shoemaker 2011; Watson 2004, 2011).90 Accountability is a notion of 
                                                            
90 For a dissenting view, at least when it comes to moral responsibility, see Smith (2012). Smith argues directly 





responsibility that is often spelled out in terms of the appropriateness of praise and blame or 
other similar reactive attitudes (Strawson 1962).  Shoemaker articulates accountability in the 
following way. He says that we are responsible in the sense of being accountable when we 
flout “relationship-defining demands”. He adds that a certain kind of blame is fitting when 
these demands are flouted. That is, to hold someone to account “is precisely to sanction that 
person, whether it be via the expression of a reactive attitude, public shaming, or something 
more psychologically or physically damaging” (Shoemaker 2011, p. 623). Contrast this with 
attributability. There are different ways of spelling out the notion of attributability. Scanlon 
(1998) and Smith (2008; 2012), for example, treat attributability as coextensive with S being 
answerable for an action or attitude Ø. Being answerable amounts to the idea that S can be 
called upon to give reasons in order to justify her action or attitude. For example, Smith claims 
that the actions I perform “reflect my assessment of reasons, and therefore I can, in principle, 
be called upon to defend them and am open to rational (and in some cases moral) criticism if 
an adequate defence cannot be provided” (Smith 2008, p.385). 
Shoemaker argues that this way of spelling out attributability is too strong. An action or 
attitude can also simply be attributable to an agent where this picks out a genuine kind of 
responsibility for the action or attitude which comes apart from having the capacity to give 
reasons in justification of one’s action or attitude. Shoemaker points to aretaic assessments to 
fill this out.91 92We often make judgments about an agent’s character and the actions and 
attitudes that manifest that character without requiring that an agent is able to justify the 
relevant attitude or action. Shoemaker gives the example of Huck Finn: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
me how to assess the consequences of all of the different views in the literature about moral responsibility for 
epistemic responsibility. Smith herself takes the view she defends to have direct consequences for our 
understanding of responsibility for belief. However, what she has in mind is moral responsibility for belief: “I have 
argued that this condition of moral responsibility implies that we are morally responsible not only for our 
intentional actions but also for the majority of our attitudes (our beliefs, desires, emotions, etc.)...” (Smith 2012, 
p.578). In any case, responding to Smith’s conception of responsibility would take us too far afield in the present 
context. 
91 See Watson (2004). According to Smith (2012), the notion of aretaic appraisal was introduced by Watson. 
According to Watson, aretaic appraisal is an evaluation of an agent’s “excellences and faults—or virtues and 
vices—as manifested in thought and action” (Watson 2004, p.266). 
92 Shoemaker also argues from cases of irrationality. He argues that a consequence of the answerability view is 
that agents are not responsible for their irrationality in certain cases where this is implausible (Shoemaker 2011, 





[W]e rightly assess Huck Finn as courageous, loyal, and kind, regardless of what he 
thought of himself and independently of what he took his reasons to be when he 
failed to seize the opportunity to turn in the slave Jim. Furthermore, these are 
assessments of his actual character, of his authentic agential nature, and as such they 
have real depth. Answerability demands to Huck, however, would be senseless. After 
all, he lacks access to any reasons there are that ground his evaluative commitment 
(Shoemaker 2011, p.614). 
In the case of Huck Finn, according to Shoemaker, what is essential is that the action or 
attitude is something that discloses Huck’s “authentic agential nature”, not his ability to justify 
the action or attitude.93 The crucial thing about attributability on both views is that the action 
or attitude for which the agent is responsible is one that discloses the agent’s evaluative 
commitments and as such the agent’s authentic agential nature.94 The disagreement between 
Scanlon and Shoemaker is about what is required in order for this latter condition to be met. I 
tend to favour Shoemaker’s position. For one thing, I find the Huck Finn case plausible, and I 
find it plausible that the ability to justify one’s action or attitude Ø comes apart from whether 
Ø is in some relevant sense a manifestation of one’s agential self.  
In any case, one point I want to make is that distinguishing between accountability and 
attributability allows us to see why the (H) principle above is implausible. I should 
acknowledge before continuing, however, that we seem to be getting continuously further 
away from the central issue of this chapter —namely, spelling out the natural reaction to 
Williamson’s view about evidence. We seem to be a long distance from doing epistemology. 
However, I think the distinctions that I am drawing, and the various (non-epistemic) cases I’m 
discussing are helpful for elucidating a broader point about normativity in general, one that I 
                                                            
93 Shoemaker appeals to cases of arational emotional commitments for a more general defence of the claim that 
there are cases of responsibility as attributability that come apart from the appropriateness of a demand for 
justification (Shoemaker 2011, pp.611-612). Shoemaker claims of himself, for example, that his deepest emotional 
commitments  “reflect on me, on my deep self, and in particular on who I am as an agent in the world, but they 
are not grounded in any evaluative reasons (at least of the sort I take to justify my attitudes or actions)” (pp. 611–
12). Smith responds to this idea in Smith (2012), p.582. Smith, responding to Shoemaker’s cases of aretaic 
appraisal, invokes cases of OCD, depression, and Tourette’s syndrome as counterexamples. She says: “I think a 
more careful look at [Shoemaker’s] cases will reveal that we are willing to apply these aretaic predicates [i.e certain 
judgments of character] to agents only in cases where we regard the agent as answerable for the attitudes and 
conduct on which these appraisals are based. And I fear that if we deny this presupposition, then we will have to 
regard agents as morally responsible for many psychological conditions for which, intuitively, they do not appear 
to be responsible in any sense.”(Smith 2012, p.586). I’m inclined to bite the bullet here in favour of Shoemaker. 
That is, I’m inclined to say that an action or attitude of a person with OCD is attributable to the person (and that 
they are in that sense responsible for it) even when it’s in some sense the manifestation of their condition. What I 
don’t think is plausible is that such an action or attitude is one that the person is answerable for.  
94 Note that I don’t intend to suggest that there are not complex issues surrounding how to spell out what counts 





take to apply in the epistemic domain (i.e. insofar as our concern has to do with a normative 
principle about evidence). So before bringing this all back to epistemology, let me continue 
with the distinction between accountability and attributability and the implications it seems to 
have for the (H) principle.  
It will be helpful to look at another case to spell this out. Shoemaker has a compelling account 
of responsibility-judgments concerning psychopaths.95 Shoemaker argues that psychopaths can 
be attributable but not accountable in at least some central cases of actions or attitudes. The 
reason why is that accountability, by virtue of its essentially social structure—recall, it is spelled 
out in terms of a sensitivity to relationship-defining demands—implies certain capacities which 
the psychopath lacks. These are capacities to recognize the reasons implied by the relationship-
defining demands at play in their relationships with others. As Watson puts it (in a discussion 
of the case of psychopaths that shares significant similarities with Shoemaker’s):  
[P]sychopathy (as I read the evidence) precisely involves an incapacity to recognize 
the interests of others as making any valid claims on them. Consequently, they are 
disabled from standing in the reciprocal relations or (to use another idiom) from 
engaging in the mutual recognition that lies at the core of moral life. In John Rawls’s 
sense, they lack the features of moral personality: a sense of justice and a conception 
of the good (Watson 2011, p.307). 
By appeal to the “ought implies can” principle, Shoemaker argues that the psychopath cannot 
be held accountable for her actions and attitudes (importantly, Shoemaker means morally 
accountable – he claims that there is no reason why we cannot stand in other kinds of non-moral 
relationships with psychopaths, such as an “aesthetic relation” or “fellow citizenry relation,” 
and thereby hold the psychopath accountable in these non-moral arenas).96This is because the 
psychopath lacks the relevant capacities required in order to do so. Nevertheless, we can still 
understand the psychopath as responsible in the sense of attributable. The psychopath’s 
                                                            
95 I rely on Watson’s (2011) characterization of the psychopathic profile: “Psychopaths (as such) suffer no 
psychoses or notable neuroses, or general deficits of intelligence. Their condition is characterized by callous 
interpersonal relations, lack of significant attachment to other people or institutions (shallow and fleeting 
“friendships,” amorous relations, and loyalties), lack of a sense of shame and guilt, lack of self-criticism, refusal to 
take responsibility for the troubles caused to others or oneself, and lack of sincere commitment to long-term 
goals. Psychopathy is present from childhood and, by all indications, endures a lifetime. As this description 
implies, this condition has proven unamenable to psychopharmacological or psychological therapies and 
treatments” (Watson 2011, p. 308).  
96 Shoemaker’s key point is that psychopaths are incapable of recognizing moral relationship-defining standards, 





actions and attitudes disclose the agent’s evaluative commitments, they are expressions of his 
self qua agent.  
Imagine a psychopath who cheats an elderly woman of out her life savings. If Shoemaker is 
right, the psychopath is not accountable for this action. The psychopath is insensitive to the key 
moral relationship-defining demand that he be sensitive to the elderly woman’s interests.97 
Thus, Shoemaker claims that  “The kind of moral address involved in holding someone 
accountable is thus pointless with respect to the psychopath” (Shoemaker 2011, p.629). This 
explains why there is a good case to be made that the psychopath is not an appropriate target 
of blame.98 This is not to say that blame wouldn’t be understandable in such a case (i.e. it’s 
understandable that, for example, the elderly woman would blame the psychopath). The point 
is that blame would unreasonable.99 Nevertheless, it’s intuitive to treat the psychopath as morally 
responsible for this action. And the notion of responsibility Shoemaker thinks is appropriate 
for this case is attributability, as I’ve just explained. Notice, however, that it’s plausible to 
regard the psychopath’s action as violating some moral requirement. The psychopath does 
something wrong in cheating the elderly woman out of her life savings. This is a case, then, in 
which blameworthiness and a violation of normative requirements plausibly come apart. In 
                                                            
97The point is not that the psychopath cannot understand that some moral relationship-defining demand applies 
to him. The point is that the psychopath is incapable of seeing that the demand is reason-giving. “Let me be clear: 
the psychopath may well understand that there is a demand being made of him; what he cannot understand is that 
the demand is reason-giving. There are facts being presented to him that he judges irrelevant—“Yes, I understand 
that when I do this you will be in pain and you won’t like it,” he says, “but so what?”—so they simply fail to 
constitute any sort of constraint on his deliberations or motivations (Shoemaker 2011, p.629). 
98 Although of course it depends on what we mean by “blame”. Shoemaker distinguishes between “Scanlonian 
blame” and “accountability blame”, and allows that the psychopath is “Scanlonian” blameworthy (Shoemaker 
2011, p.630). The details would take us too far afield here. For now I’m depending on the intuitiveness of the idea 
that if an agent is incapable of recognizing that a key moral relationship-defining demand (being sensitive to 
others’ interests) is reason giving, and thus that these demands are incapable of constraining his deliberations or 
motivations in practical reasoning, then the sort of reactive attitude that is involved in holding someone 
accountable – i.e. blaming them – is simply lost on that agent. This supports the claim that such  an agent is not 
the appropriate target of a blame response. Shoemaker provides a helpful analogy for the case of psychopaths. It 
involves a community of aliens who are morally just like the members of one’s own community, except that they 
believe that grass has a kind of moral status. He argues that while one may be able to stand in a variety of moral 
relations with these aliens, when it comes to the grass, one is simply incapable of seeing what the aliens think is 
genuinely reasoning giving when it comes to grass (i.e. its being crushed or breaking) as genuinely reason-giving. 
And so, one is incapable of recognizing certain relationship-defining demands in one’s moral relationship with the 
aliens –i.e. “respect the moral status of the grass”. For example, when you walk across some grass to get a better 
look at a particular species of bird in the forest, an alien spots you and shouts at you with indignation. Shoemaker 
asks whether you are the appropriate target of this blame-response. He of course claims that you are not. And the 
point is that the sort of insensitivity to a certain relationship-defining demand –“respect the moral status of the 
grass” – is analogous to the psychopath’s insensitivity to moral relationship-defining demands. See Talbert (2008) 
for opposing view on the issue of whether psychopaths are blameworthy. 





other words, perhaps it’s another case like Srinivasan’s case of the political leader above. It 
seems like a counterexample to the following claim: 
S ought not to have cheated the elderly woman out of her life savings only if, if S did 
cheat the elderly woman out of her life savings, then S is blameworthy for cheating 
the elderly woman out of her life savings.    
There are many other examples we could appeal to. However, what’s important about this case 
is that it is still a case of attributability. And I think this motivates a different but closely related 
way of spelling out the natural reaction. We could put what I have in mind in the form of the 
following principle. Call it the “attributability principle” (A):  
(A): S ought to Ø only if, if S doesn’t Ø, then S is attributable for not Ø-ing 
The idea is that attributability, as opposed to blameworthiness, is central to the notion of a 
normative requirement. What (A) says is that it’s only true that S is normatively required to Ø 
if, were they not to Ø, they would be attributable for not Ø-ing. This way of spelling out the 
natural reaction avoids the implausible implications of the blameworthiness view. For example, 
the psychopath case does not seem like a counterexample to the following: 
S ought not to have cheated the elderly woman out of her life savings only if, if S did 
cheat the elderly woman out of her life savings, then S is attributable for cheating the 
elderly woman out of her life savings.    
But more positively, I think the plausibility of this idea is derived from the plausibility of the 
simple idea that we make normative demands on the actions and attitudes of persons or agents. 
We don’t make normative demands, for example, on inanimate objects, or the proceedings of 
nature.  The domain of normative requirements does not plausibly extend beyond the actions 
and attitudes of persons (and perhaps persons themselves (i.e. one’s character).That said, here’s a 
possible objection against this way of positively motivating a connection between attributability 
and normative requirements. The objection is that we do attribute things to inanimate objects 
and to the proceedings of nature.  And we use the language of responsibility to do so. For 
example, it’s perfectly intelligible to say that the avalanche was responsible for the destruction 
of the ski lodge. But we would not plausibly say that the avalanche violated some normative 





this in terms of attributability as I’ve outline that notion. Rather, I think what’s plausible is that 
the avalanche is causally responsible for the destruction of the ski lodge. That said, it’s not 
difficult to imagine someone putting pressure on me to explain exactly what the difference is. 
But my first response would be to say that the avalanche does not disclose any evaluative 
commitments, or manifest its agential self in destroying the ski lodge. It doesn’t have any 
evaluative commitments or an agential self.100 Getting into the details of this enormously 
complex issue would take us to far afield.   
4.5 Attributability and Access  
One way of putting what the proponent of the blameworthiness view has in mind is that the 
presence of an excusing condition serves to undermine the judgment that a normative 
requirement has been violated. On this view, having an excuse just means that one’s action or 
attitude fails to violate the relevant norm(s). One way of putting the present proposal is to say 
that, not just any sort of excusing condition, but rather a particular kind of excusing condition 
serves to undermine the judgment that normative requirements are violated. In particular, 
when an excusing condition is such that the agent no longer counts as attributability-
responsible for some action or attitude, this undermines the judgment that an action or attitude 
violates a normative requirement. Under such conditions, the relevant action or attitude no 
longer counts as an expression of the agent’s self qua agent. 
Compare two cases. Imagine that you absentmindedly run someone over after an extremely 
long-winded drive through a blizzard. Because you were so tired you lost your focus just at the 
moment someone suddenly appeared in front of the car. In such a case, the action is 
attributable to you in the sense that you were being absent minded. You weren’t being careful 
enough. And the thing that’s important is that you weren’t being careful enough. It remains 
plausible to insist that you did something wrong here, even though our inclination to blame 
might be mitigated by certain features of the case. But now imagine that you are driving in an 
obstacle course that’s full of life-like dummies, and your objective is to run all of the dummies 
over. You’ve been led to believe that this is just a game and there are no real people on the 
obstacle course. Unbeknownst to you, however, a real person has snuck onto the course and in 
the process of doing your best to succeed in the game you run the person over. Intuitively, the 
                                                            





fact that you run this person over does not per se disclose anything about your evaluative 
commitments, or manifest your agential self. The action is not attributable to you (though you 
are of course causally responsible). Indeed, I think this is where a central point for my purposes 
needs to be made.  
I want to claim that attributability implies an accessibility condition. We can call it an 
“accessibility condition on attributability”. It’s not clear exactly how this should be spelled out. 
For a start, we might say:  
Necessarily, an agent is attributable for Ø-ing only if they are in a position to know 
that they are Ø-ing.  
Note that this condition says that the agent must be in a position to know and not that the agent 
must know that they are Ø-ing. There is a big difference. For example, one can fail to know 
that they are Ø-ing where it would be appropriate to say, “but they should have known”. 
However, if one is not even in a position to know, it’s far less clear there’s any sense to the claim 
that they should have known. After all, knowing is not something the agent is in a position to 
do. That said, we may also need to add that an agent can of course fail to be in a position to 
know when they ought to have been in a position to know. For example, doctors are obligated 
to read about the latest important findings in their area. Now imagine a GP who doesn’t 
bother, and so ends up making an error that kills a patient. The doctor was not in a position to 
know that what she was doing was an error (according to the latest findings), but she ought to 
have been in a position to know. So perhaps the access condition should go: 
Necessarily, an agent is attributable for Ø-ing only if they are in a position to know 
that they are Ø-ing (and they have not culpably failed to put themselves in a position 
to know that they are Ø-ing). 
There are no doubt further refinements we could make to such a condition. But the basic idea 
behind this condition of accessibility on attributability is that if S is not in a position to know 
that they are Ø-ing (and they have not culpably failed to put themselves in a position to know), 
it’s not at all clear that their Ø-ing discloses their evaluative commitments or manifests their 
authentic agential nature. For ease of exposition, from now on I will take the further condition 





talk about being in a position to know. Taking the access condition on attributability together 
with (A), we get the result that when an agent is not in a position to know that they are Ø-ing, 
this undermines the judgment that in Ø-ing the agent violates some normative requirement. 
One way of putting the thought here seems simply to be that attributability, like 
blameworthiness, is incompatible with the notion of resultant luck discussed above. Recall, as 
Srinivasan put it, “this form of luck is present when one’s ignorance of the relevant 
circumstantial facts prohibits one from controlling the outcome or result of one’s actions” 
(Srinivasan unpublished, p.15).  
To illustrate we can bring this back to the BIV case. The BIV’s failure to proportion their 
beliefs to what they know is plausibly not something that is attributable to them. The BIV 
simply has no way of knowing that they are not proportioning their beliefs to what they know. 
And because the BIV’s failure to proportion their beliefs to what they know is not attributable 
to them, this undermines the judgment that they violate a normative requirement in so doing. 
So this conflicts with Williamson’s view about evidence. Moreover, I don’t think Williamson’s 
appeal to excusing conditions helps here. When he claims that the BIV violates the evidential 
norm but has an excuse, the kind of “excuse” he has in mind is precisely that the BIV is not 
attributable (though Williamson of course doesn’t put it this way) for failing to proportion his 
beliefs to what he knows. Again, this is because the BIV is not in a position to know what he 
knows. 
When it comes to (A), it’s important to avert a potential confusion. The confusion might arise, 
for example, if we return to the case of Kate and the soup. Someone might want to point out 
that of course Kate’s action of bringing the soup to Mary is attributable to Kate. But the 
intuition in the case was supposed to be that it’s implausible that Kate violated some moral 
requirement. To avoid a counterexample to (A), we need to distinguish the following: while 
bringing the soup is attributable to Kate, what’s not plausible is that bringing a soup with 
allergens that will make Mary ill (qua such a soup) is an action that is attributable to Kate.101 
And that’s just because she was in no position to know the soup would have the bad effects. 
Bringing such a soup to Mary does not disclose Kate’s evaluative commitments, it is not an 
                                                            
101 I recognize that I’ve already been in tricky territory in the philosophy of action, and I’m now getting into even 
trickier territory. But again, the point here is to spell out the beginnings of a general way forward in understanding 
what the intuition that there’s something odd about Williamson’s view about evidence (vis-à-vis the evidential 





expression of her self qua agent. And the same thing needs to be said in cases in which 
Williamson’s evidential norm is putatively violated, where the person is not in position to 
know that its triggering conditions do not obtain. Take the BIV: while it’s of course true that 
the agent’s belief that p is attributable to the agent (insofar as the agent, say, is responsive to 
the way things appear and checks for relevant defeaters, the belief reflects the agent’s 
evaluative commitments). What’s not plausible, in an analogous way to the Mary case, is that 
the agent’s belief qua belief that’s based on something less than knowledge, is attributable to 
the agent. After all, the agent is in no position to know that she does not have the knowledge 
she thinks she has.  
Here’s one way to put the point: in both the BIV case and the Mary case, had the agent known 
that the conditions under which their actions/attitudes come out less than ideal obtained, they 
would not have performed the action/formed the attitude. If, say, I had known that the 
appearance as of a hand in front of me was indeed a mere appearance, I wouldn’t have formed 
the belief that there is a hand in front of me. Williamson would no doubt claim that all this 
explains is why I have an excuse. But what I’m suggesting is that the excusing condition is one 
such that the faulty belief (qua faulty belief) is not attributable to me. Thus, given (A), the 
excusing condition undermines the idea that I violate a normative requirement.  
Another important confusion to avert is the following. We have to distinguish between an 
agent’s being in a position to know that the conditions under which they count as Ø-ing 
obtain, and an agent’s being in a position to know what their evaluative commitments are. I 
certainly do not mean to imply by my accessibility condition on attributability that agents must 
be in a position to know what their evaluative commitments are in order to be attributable for 
Ø-ing (perhaps something like that would be required if I was talking about answerability, but 
I’m not sure). It seems to me perfectly plausible that an agent’s evaluative commitments could 
be rather opaque to them (an agent who is in denial or who represses some part of themselves 
could be an example, but there are probably many ways in which one’s evaluative 
commitments are opaque to oneself).102 Rather, I take the accessibility condition on 
attributability to be that the agent must be in a position to know that the conditions under 
which they count as Ø-ing obtain, in order for Ø-ing to count as disclosing the agent’s 
evaluative commitments, or manifesting their agential self.  
                                                            






If the basic story I’m telling is correct, then we need some other understanding of the 
evidential norm’s triggering conditions in order to make sense of the evidential norm as a 
genuine normative requirement. We cannot simultaneously endorse E=K and the idea that the 
evidential norm is a genuine normative requirement. A BIV case is one particularly compelling 
way of bringing this out. But more schematically, this interpretation of the natural reaction can 
be put as follows: 
i*) Attributability is central to normativity (S ought to Ø only if, if S doesn’t Ø, then S 
is attributable for not Ø-ing). ((A) principle) 
ii*) Attributability for Ø-ing implies a certain kind of accessibility to the fact that one 
is Ø-ing. (accessibility condition on attributability) 
iii*) Thus, the connection between attributability and normativity generates an access 
condition on our normative requirements (i.e. it motivates the natural reaction). 
(from i*, and ii*) 
The key difference between this argument and the argument from the (H) principle is that the 
(A) principle is more plausible.103 We’ve located something that is more plausibly connected to 
normative requirements than blameworthiness, but which nevertheless implies the same sort 
of accessibility conditions. Thus, when it comes to questions about evidence in light of the 
normative principle about proportioning our beliefs to the evidence, accounting for the natural 
reaction would amount to endorsing a view about evidence that accounts for (A). It would 
either amount to endorsing a view about evidence such that we are always in a position to 
know what our evidence is, insofar as that is what is required for us to be attributable for 
proportioning our beliefs to the evidence on any given occasion; or it will involve rejecting (A), 
or the accessibility condition (or both), and explaining away their plausibility.  
                                                            
103 That said, I’ve defended the claim about access in a different way as well. Although I think it might be possible 
to spell out the plausibility of the access condition in terms of issues about resultant luck (as I noted above), I’ve 





Concerning the first option, Williamson of course thinks that there can be no such view of 
evidence, and I’ll return to his reason why in Chapter 5.104 Thus, he would of course take the 
second route. So I’m suggesting that part of the burden on Williamson, in explaining why 
there’s something highly counterintuitive about his view about evidence, is to explain what’s 
wrong with at least one of the premises above. All of this needs a lot more development and 
defence in order to make a compelling case. But I turn now to offer a few more general points 
that I think lend support to the foregoing. 
4.6 Further Reflections  
It is important to keep in mind that while we can speak of the “normative” broadly in contrast 
with the “descriptive”, we can also speak of the “normative” more narrowly in contrast with 
the “evaluative”. For example, many moral philosophers distinguish between judgments about 
what one is required, or obligated, or has a duty, or ought to do on the one hand, and judgments 
about what would be good or best on the other. I think this is important when assessing 
claims—such as Williamson’s, for example—that a recently envatted BIV who behaves with 
perfect epistemic responsibility is unjustified but nevertheless has a cast iron excuse for 
believing outright that they have hands. In particular, I think there is pressure on those who 
would claim that the BIV is excused but not justified for believing responsibly to demonstrate 
that the contrast they intend to latch onto is that between what the agent is excused for doing 
versus what they are normatively required to do, as opposed to a contrast between what the agent 
is normatively required to do versus what would be good or best for the agent to do (Broome 2013; 
Gibbons 2013). After all, it is easy to interpret the case in both ways (although I wager it is 
much easier to interpret in the second way). It is easy to imagine the BIV case as one in which 
the BIV does what she normatively ought to do (say, she forms her perceptual belief on the 
basis of careful enough attention to the look of things) while nevertheless does not do what 
would be best (for example, refrain from believing she has hands).  
                                                            
104 As we’ll see, Williamson’s diagnosis of the natural reaction suggests that the only possible option for accounting 
for it could be rejecting (A) and/or the accessibility condition, since, as he puts it, there are no (non-trivial) 
luminous conditions. But moreover, as I will discuss, setting the putative impossibility of (non-trivial) luminous 
conditions to one side, Williamson’s diagnosis might be taken to imply that taking the first option in accounting 
for the natural reaction would make it in-principle impossible to support a rejection of the sameness of evidence 
thesis. And this is because of the claim that the idea that we are always in a position to know what our evidence is 
entails accessibilist supervenience internalism (and that view, in turn, is plausibly tantamount to the idea that our 





One might want to support the idea that the BIV violates certain epistemic normative 
requirements by pointing out that it’s perfectly natural to say that the BIV fails to believe what 
she ought to believe. After all, she believes something completely false and continues to do so 
systematically. However, it is worth noting that pointing to intuitive ‘ought’-claims concerning 
the BIV’s doxastic states won’t settle anything in this matter. This is because the various 
“flavours” of ought in ordinary language vary in their semantic contribution to a sentence 
which is plausibly determined by the context of utterance.105 For instance, it is easy to imagine 
a context for which it would be natural to read the following as an ‘ought’ that states an 
obligation or duty or requirement (and thus something paradigmatically “normative”): 
a) You ought to stop eating animals.  
But not all uses of ‘ought’ state an obligation or duty or requirement. For example, people 
often use ‘ought’ in the following sorts of ways: 
b) They ought to be here by now.  
c) Milton you ought to be living at this hour (as England needs you!). 
d) If you don’t want to blow the fuse, you ought to turn off one of your appliances. 
None of these are naturally read as stating an obligation, duty, or requirement. For example, b) 
is referred to as the “epistemic ought” or “predictive ought”. It has to do with something like 
what is likely or probable given our evidence. c) is sometimes referred to as the “evaluative 
ought”. It evaluates some state of affairs relative to a given standard. In other words, it is one 
way of saying that it would be good or perhaps even best if Milton were alive (say relative to 
standards of what would be morally and politically good for England).106 d) is an example of  a 
“teleological ought”. What this sentence tells you to do is entirely contingent on your goals 
(namely, say, not blowing the fuse, or more generally, keeping the power on, etc.). If a 
characteristic feature of the “normative ought” is its detachability, then this is not a normative 
ought. 107 So there are a variety of seemingly quite different uses of ‘ought’ in ordinary English. 
                                                            
105 See Chrisman forthcoming.  
106 The example is borrowed from Chrisman (forthcoming). But it comes from Wordsworth’s sonnet “London, 
1802”.  
107 An aside: many think it’s possible to account for all of these different “flavours” of ought in a unified 
semantics by thinking of ‘ought’ as a unary modal operator. As Chrisman notes, “the orthodox view in theoretical 
semantics is that ‘ought’ is monosemous operator (akin to deontic necessity) but semantically underdetermined, 
such that its uses require significant contextual augmentation to determine a definite sense” (Chrisman 2012, p.3). 





This complicates our understanding of any linguistic data used to motivate claims about 
normativity. 
In light of this, I think the metanormative theorist who would challenge the centrality of 
attributability to normative requirements faces a second related challenge. This is the challenge 
of explaining what’s distinctive of the normative, as opposed to, say, the evaluative (a notion 
that seems readily available in explaining away, for example, Williamson’s interpretation of the 
BIV case) without appealing to judgments about responsibility. I won’t try to do this on 
anyone’s behalf here.108  
4.7 Conclusion 
Taking stock, I’ve examined three potential ways of spelling out what the natural reaction to 
Williamson’s view about evidence amounts to. The first way was the deliberation-guidance 
worry. I claimed that this worry did not entail that we ought to have any sort of access to our 
evidence that would be inconsistent with Williamsons’ view. We can use the evidential norm to 
guide deliberation because, as Williamson claims, in practice we are often in a position to know 
what we know. I said that perhaps a deeper worry behind the deliberation-guidance worry 
concerns the idea that one could ever be normatively required to Ø when one is not in a 
position to know that that they are required to Ø. The first way of spelling out why this 
mightn’t be possible turned on considerations about a deep connection between the 
hypological and deontological perspectives. I put this in terms of the (H) principle. I then 
turned to an examination of three different kinds of responsibility and suggested that the (H) 
principle is not compelling. Rather, a closely related (A) principle says something more 
compelling about normative requirements, but nevertheless implies the same sort of 
accessibility conditions as the (H) principle. This accessibility condition conflicts with 
Williamson’s view about evidence. And this, in a nutshell, is what I’ve suggested the natural 
reaction amounts to. I’ve also suggested that accounting for the natural reaction (when it 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
that arise in understanding the ‘ought’ of obligation in terms of a unary modal operator (Chrisman 2012; 
forthcoming; Schroeder 2011). Chrisman provides a compelling account of how this might work in Chrisman 
(forthcoming).  
108To be sure, explaining what’s distinctive of the normative might just be an impossible task (i.e. if the notion of 
normativity is an explanatory primitive) (see Broome 2013). I myself have only given a very rough outline of what 
I mean by “normative”, with no pretention to have explained what’s distinctive about it. Still, the objection can be 
pressed in a slightly different way: the challenge is to explain how we should understand the claim that the BIV 






comes to questions about evidence in light of the normative principle about proportioning our 
beliefs to the evidence) means doing one of two things. Either we endorse a view of evidence 
according to which we are always in a position to know what our evidence is, or we reject (A), 
























Chapter 5: Considering the Options 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I consider some options moving forward. I start by examining the possibility 
that when it comes to accounting for the natural reaction and supporting a rejection of the 
sameness of evidence thesis, only the second option is available—that is, the option of 
rejecting (A) or the accessibility condition on attributability (or both) and explaining away their 
intuitive plausibility.  I don’t suggest that this would necessarily be a bad thing, but it’s worth 
examining whether it’s the case. The basic thought is that endorsing an internalist condition of 
access on our evidence makes rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis impossible. I appeal to 
recent work from Gibbons (2006; 2013) and Daniel Greco (2013) to show that there are 
theoretical resources available for claiming that it does not. The upshot of the discussion is 
that an internalist approach to accounting for the natural reaction and rejecting the sameness 
of evidence thesis is still an option. However, we are no further along in understanding how 
such a view would go, or what the best way to reject the sameness of evidence thesis is. In light 
of the difficulties raised so far for disjunctivist strategies, I conclude the chapter by taking a 
step back and considering whether the strategy is worth pursuing after all. In particular, I 
examine whether a strategy that rejects the sameness of evidence thesis has adequate scope for 
responding to scepticism about evidential justification generally. I argue that it does. 
5.2 Anti-Luminosity 
I’ve said that there are two ways of accounting for the natural reaction to evidential 
externalism. Either we endorse a view of evidence according to which we are always in a 
position to know what our evidence is (thus rejecting evidential externalism), or we reject (A), 
or the accessibility condition on attributability (or both), and explain away their intuitive 
plausibility. Williamson would of course take the second option. This is necessary insofar as he 
wants to endorse his particular form of evidential externalism. But he also has powerful 
resources for arguing that this is the only way to account for the natural reaction. In particular, 
Williamson claims that a commitment to the idea that we are always in a position to know 
what our evidence is boils down to an untenable commitment to the idea that we have a 
“cognitive home”. This is a distinctive realm in which nothing is hidden, so long as we pay 





“luminous” conditions in our cognitive home. Here is Williamson on the notion of a cognitive 
home: 
There is a constant temptation in philosophy to postulate a realm of phenomena in 
which nothing is hidden from us. Descartes thought that one's own mind is such a 
realm. Wittgenstein enlarged the realm to everything that is of interest to philosophy. 
That they explained this special feature in very different ways hardly needs to be said; 
what is remarkable is their agreement on our possession of a cognitive home in which 
everything lies open to our view. Much of our thinking—for example, in the physical 
sciences—must operate outside this home, in alien circumstances. The claim is that 
not all our thinking could be like that (Williamson 2000, p.94). 
Williamson claims that the notion of a cognitive home is nothing more than a “quaint relic of 
Cartesian epistemology”. He spells out luminosity as follows: 
For every case x, if in x condition C obtains, then in x one is in a position to know 
that C obtains. 
I’ve certainly spelled out the natural reaction in terms of something like the idea that our 
normative requirements, or their triggering conditions, must be luminous. This is because of 
the connections I’ve drawn between being in a position to know and attributability, and 
attributability and normative requirements via (A). But Williamson wants to know, what sorts 
of conditions could possibly be luminous? The condition of having my computer in front of 
me is intuitively not a luminous condition. It is not true that whenever this condition obtains, 
necessarily, no obstacle blocks my path to knowing that it obtains. For example, my computer 
might be in front of me and I could be asleep. Williamson talks about pain, meaning things 
with one's words, and statements of the form “it appears to S that A”, as characteristic 
examples of luminous conditions. So a candidate example might be: necessarily, when it appears 
to me that my computer is in front of me, I am in a position to know that it appears to me that 
my computer is in front of me. Traditionally, luminous conditions obtain in the realm of the 
reflectively accessible, or introspectible.     
A crucial point to draw from this, then, is that if the natural reaction to Williamson’s view 
amounts to the idea that normative requirements are luminous, it’s starting to look very much 
like accounting for it in the first way (i.e. by endorsing the idea that we are always in a position 





commitment to accessibilist supervenience internalism about evidence and justification.109 The 
reason for this is implicit in the prima facie plausibility of Williamson’s examples of luminous 
conditions. If it is plausible that anything is a luminous condition, it is an internal condition—a 
condition that obtains in the realm of the reflectively accessible, or introspectible. On the face 
of it, then, this looks like bad news for the project of rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis. 
And that is because, if our evidence supervenes, for example, on our non-factive mental states 
(say, on the way things appear to us), it simply follows that one’s evidence is the same in the 
good and bad cases. After all, for example, by stipulation the BIV case is one in which 
everything appears to you to be exactly the same as it does now.110 So we might think that, in 
addition to making it difficult to meet the explanatory challenge, maintaining an internalist 
condition of access on our evidence simply implies that it is impossible to reject the sameness 
of evidence thesis. This is not necessarily a surprising or even negative result. However, it is 
worth examining whether it in fact follows from endorsing an internalist condition of 
accessibility.   
Importantly, Williamson argues that there are no non-trivial luminous conditions. He has an 
“anti-luminosity” argument. 111 Thus, he’s not interested in examining the upshots of an 
internalist condition of accessibility on our evidence in the context of scepticism. He simply 
thinks such a position is unavailable. I don’t want to get into the issue of whether the anti-
luminosity argument is successful. An enormous literature is devoted to this issue (Cohen 
2010; Greco forthcoming; Owens 2004; Smithies 2012). What I want to do is agree with 
Williamson that we do not have a cognitive home, but challenge his assumption that the 
natural reaction can be successfully diagnosed in terms of a commitment to the idea that there 
must be a distinctive internal realm in which luminous conditions obtain—that is, that it can be 
successfully diagnosed as entailing a commitment to the notion of a cognitive home. I agree 
with Williamson that the internal world—the realm of reflective and introspective access—is 
                                                            
109 Of course, as I note shortly below, Williamson denies that there is any reason to think conditions obtaining in 
the internal world are more likely to be luminous than conditions obtaining in the external world. However, as I 
note presently, independently of Williamson’s arguments against luminosity, there is more prima facie plausibility 
to the idea that internal conditions are luminous (at least according to many epistemologists). This is, to my mind, 
the best explanation of the internalists’ interest in reflective or introspective accessibility.  
110 Note that we can construe Pritchard’s epistemological disjunctivism as a kind of supervenience internalism, 
provided that we understand supervenience internalism as the view that our evidence and justification supervenes 
on our mental states and that Pritchard’s view can be understood as claiming that our evidence (in the good case) 
consists of factive mental states.  





not as important for justification as his quaint Cartesians take it to be.112 However, I’m not 
convinced that the natural reaction (even understood in terms of normative luminosity) must 
be understood as implying that it is. I turn now to the project of showing how one can 
legitimately think both of these things at the same time.  
5.3 Access Externalism 
The first view I want to look at in order to spell this out is due to Gibbons (2006; 2013). 
Gibbons argues for a view that he calls “access externalism”. Access externalism is a view 
about justification that says that we have “privileged access” to the facts about what we have 
justification to believe (as we’ll see below, this entails that we are always in a position to know 
the facts about what we have justification to believe), but that the supervenience base for facts 
about justification is not necessarily internal.113 Here is an instructive quote:  
One strategy for explaining privileged access to our genuine requirements is to 
identify the reasons metaphysically, as things of a certain sort. Maybe they’re all 
nonfactive mental states, or maybe it’s the nonfactive mental states plus the necessary 
truths...The other strategy is to make your requirements, in a particular situation, out 
of whatever you have plain old regular access to in that situation (Gibbons 2013, 
p.184). 
This talk of a “particular situation” is important for Gibbons and I’ll return to it briefly below. 
But for now, note that according to Gibbons’ usage, we can have a kind of “privileged access” 
to conditions that we are in a position to know through empirical investigation—or as Gibbons 
puts it, “plain old regular access”. In other words, privileged access is not the same thing as 
reflective or introspective access. This might seem odd. But his use of the notion of privileged 
access has nothing to do with a special source of knowledge, like introspection. As I 
understand Gibbons, the way to think about privileged access starts with intuitive judgments 
about responsibility.114 An agent has privileged access to a condition just in case judgments of 
                                                            
112 See Smithies for a defence of what Williamson would call quaint Cartesianism (Smithies 2012). Smithies argues 
in favour of a sophisticated version of a luminosity condition on justification within a supervenience internalist 
framework.  
113 I should note right away that although access externalism is a view about justification, all of the crucial claims 
Gibbons makes for our purposes can be framed in terms of propositional justification. If we assume that having 
evidence that p is necessary for having propositional justification that p, then we can translate Gibbons’ claims 
about justification into claims about evidence. So, even if Gibbons does not endorse that assumption, I will 
interpret his discussion in this way when I want to talk about evidence. 
114Gibbons doesn’t explain what he means by “responsibility”, although he does explain what he means when he 
talks about epistemic responsibility: “Epistemic responsibility as I understand it is not a responsibility for doing 





the agent’s responsibility concerning their knowledge that the condition obtains would always 
be warranted.  It doesn’t matter how the agent is able to know about the condition (whether 
it’s through perception, or introspection). The important thing is that, having privileged access 
to a condition amounts to the idea that, when the condition obtains, this is something they are 
responsible for knowing (and thus the agent can be said to violate some normative 
requirement if they fail to proportion their beliefs accordingly).   
So how does Gibbons argue for access externalism? He starts with the following case: 
The other morning, I went downstairs to make a mushroom, jalapeno, and cream 
cheese omelette. I had checked the night before to make sure we had all of the 
ingredients. Since Sunny rarely eats breakfast, it was reasonable for me to believe that 
the ingredients were still there. I went to the refrigerator and pulled out the eggs and 
mushrooms. While chopping, I firmly believed that I would soon have a mushroom, 
jalapeno, and cream cheese omelette. Unfortunately, in plain sight on the door of the 
refrigerator, there was a note. ‘We’re out of cream cheese.’ I didn’t notice the note, 
but I should have. After all, this is where we leave notes in our house (Gibbons 2006, 
p.22). 
Gibbons firmly believed that he was about to have a cream cheese omelette for breakfast, but 
he should have known better. An important principle that Gibbons endorses is that if one 
should have known that not-p, then one is not justified in believing that p.115 Granting this 
principle, because Gibbons claims that he should have known that he was not going to have a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
obligations to act. You ought to care about the well-being of others, even if caring is not an action. To say that 
you are epistemically responsible for the fact that p is to say, roughly, that whether you are aware of the fact or 
not, you ought to know that p” (Gibbons 2006, p.23). It’s interesting to note that he likely doesn’t have 
accountability in mind, at least insofar as accountability is linked to blameworthiness: “While I will rely on your 
intuitions about when people ought to know and believe things, nothing I say will rely in any way on anyone’s 
intuitions about when blaming someone is appropriate. The appropriateness of the action does not completely 
determine the appropriateness of blaming. If I stop blaming you because I forgive you, something that happens 
every day, this is a situation in which I think you did something wrong, but I do not think blame is appropriate. 
Forget about blame, and think about what ought to be” (Gibbons 2006, p.22). That said, in this quote Gibbons is 
talking about blame responses as opposed to blameworthiness. In any case, the text is consistent with interpreting 
Gibbons as thinking about responsibility in terms of attributability.  
115 This principle is motivated by two further principles. The first is a principle that says that if you ought to know 
that not-p, then you oughtn’t believe that p. As long as we’re understanding ‘ought’ as an epistemic (or doxastic) 
‘ought’, this seems relatively straightforward. Consider an example: Jim ought to know that he’s not going on 
vacation tomorrow, since recently learned that all the flights have been cancelled. But Jim believes that he’s going 
vacation (say, he’s got a bad case of wishful thinking). Jim violates the principle (although it’s true that it seems he 
violates more than one principle here). The second principle is essentially an expression of a deontological view of 
justification (which is consistent with the way I’ve been talking about justification all along in this thesis). It says 
that if you ought not believe that p (again, epistemically speaking), then you are not justified in believing that p 
(Gibbons 2006, p.24). Gibbons notes that it’s controversial to say that meeting one’s epistemic deontological 
requirements (if there are any) is sufficient for justification, but he claims (and I agree) that it’s necessary. Putting 
these two principles together, we get the principle above: if one should have known that not-p, then one is not 





cream cheese omelette for breakfast (because of the note), he is not justified in believing that 
he is about to have a cream cheese omelette.116 Gibbons uses this case as a counterexample to 
supervenience internalism. To see why, we have to look at his next case: 
In a nearby possible world, things are the same inside me, but slightly different inside 
and outside the refrigerator. In that possible world, there is cream cheese in the fridge 
and no note on the door. My belief that I would have cream cheese for breakfast was 
based on the same reasonable grounds. Unlike the first case, there was no evidence 
(or potential evidence) available to me to override these reasonable grounds. So in 
this case I am justified in my belief about my breakfast (Gibbons 2006, p.22). 
By stipulation there is no difference in the internal facts in each case. However, in the first 
case, there is a note on the fridge, and in the second case there is not. According to Gibbons, 
the note in the first case is something Gibbons is responsible for knowing about. Since it’s in 
the place where they normally keep such notes, he should have known about it. As Gibbons 
says, if he should have known that not-p, then he’s not justified in believing that p. However, 
in the second case he is justified. So because the cases involve internal duplicates with different 
justificatory statuses, justification does not supervene on the internal world.  
What is the motivation for the idea that Gibbons is responsible for knowing about the note? It 
seems there are at least two things that Gibbons cannot say about this (if he wants to maintain 
that justification does not supervene on the internal world). We said that by stipulation the 
cases involve internal duplicates. So the motivation for the idea that Gibbons is responsible for 
knowing about the note cannot be that he is in some sense aware of the note but has not yet 
noticed it. If that’s why we think it’s plausible that he ought to know about it, then it’s not true 
that the cases involve internal duplicates. Gibbons’ awareness of the note in the first case 
would imply that there is a difference in his internal mental life, even though he hasn’t noticed 
the note. If so, the case does not function as a counterexample to supervenience internalism.  
Alternatively, we might find it plausible that Gibbons is responsible for knowing about the 
note in the sense that he has background beliefs about where notes of this sort are usually 
placed and that he has some responsibility to check that spot under such circumstances. 
Gibbons seems to draw on precisely this thought with the point that he knows that this is the 
place where notes are usually kept. However, if this is the motivation for the idea that he is 
                                                            
116 Although this is a claim about doxastic justification, the reason Gibbons claims he is not justified is because he 
has justification to believe not-p, and he fails to believe accordingly. So I think we can also interpret this latter 





responsible for knowing about the note, it is doubtful that the case functions as a 
counterexample to supervenience internalism. This is because the lack of justification will be 
due to a lack of responsible inquiry on Gibbons’ part. And that is compatible with the idea that 
the determinants of one’s justification are internal to one. All the case serves to show is that an 
additional condition on justification is that one engage in duly diligent inquiry, or something 
along those lines. In other words, the difference in justification in the two cases is not (directly) 
down to a difference in the evidence. It comes down to a difference responsible inquiry. Again, 
that is compatible with supervenience internalism. We’ve merely added a further condition on 
justification as opposed to established the idea that the determinants of one’s justification to 
believe that p can “reach all the way out to the world”. 
It looks like the motivation for the idea that Gibbons has a responsibility to know about the 
note has to come from somewhere else. Gibbons agrees. What he says instead is that the 
motivation comes from the idea that the note is sufficiently “obvious” and therefore, whether 
he’s aware of it or not, he should be (Gibbons 2006; 2010). According to this way of putting 
things, the fact that the note is on the fridge is a determinant of Gibbons’ justification to 
believe what he’s about to have for breakfast because it’s so obvious. He ought to have been 
more attentive because the note is in that sense part of his evidence. This is where a further 
point about the motivation behind the idea that Gibbons is responsible for knowing about the 
note needs to be made. In particular, it’s clear that the note has to be in some sense relevant. It’s 
plausible that being responsible for knowing that p, entails that p is in some sense relevant to 
one’s inquiry. For example, in the cream cheese case, the note is defeating evidence – it 
undermines Gibbons’ justification for thinking that he will soon be eating a cream cheese 
omelette. We might think that this is the reason why the note is relevant, and that this in turn is 
at least partly why he’s responsible for knowing about it. Compare: there are also a number of 
breadcrumbs on the countertop where he is chopping ingredients. Intuitively Gibbons does 
not have a responsibility to know how many breadcrumbs are on the table in this case. Even 
though he’s in a position to know about them, they are simply irrelevant to what he thinks he’s 
going to have for breakfast. Ultimately Gibbons himself is prepared to leave the notion of 
relevance at the intuitive level. He feels comfortable doing so in part because he thinks 






I must set aside the important question of what makes a fact, mental or otherwise, 
relevant to the justification of a belief. Here, I focus on the question of what kind of 
access we must have to the relevant facts. In this, I take it that I am following the 
internalist. Internalism is a supervenience thesis. It does not say that everything in the 
supervenience base is relevant. It says that everything relevant is in the supervenience 
base. If you lack some belief about how you don't feel, the introspectively accessible 
fact that you don't feel that way may be irrelevant to the justification of your beliefs 
(Gibbons 2006, p.26). 
The idea, then, is that S is responsible for knowing that p, if p is sufficiently obvious – where 
obviousness is to be spelled out in terms of relevance and being in a position to know. 
Moon (2013) objects to this way of thinking about the motivation for the claim that Gibbons 
is responsible for knowing about the note. Considering his objection will shed some further 
light on the notion of obviousness. Moon presents a case that he takes to be analogous to the 
cream cheese case in all respects except that we should not have the intuition that the agent is 
responsible for knowing about the relevant evidence. Moon asks us to consider the famous 
interview in which Bertrand Russell claims that, if asked by God when he got to the pearly 
gates why he did not believe, he would reply “there wasn’t enough evidence!” Moon adds the 
following alteration to the situation, in which God replies: 
‘Well Bertrand, there was relevant, available evidence for my existence at various 
points in your life. For example, did you know that during the evening of June 16, 
1956, when you were alone in your room reading your book, I had an angel silently 
hold up a sign with the message “God does indeed exist!” right behind your head for 
five minutes? If you had turned your head and checked, you would have had strong, 
relevant evidence for my existence; indeed, you’d have come to know that I exist! 
Hence, you should have known that I exist, and so your belief in my nonexistence 
was unjustified’ (Moon 2013, p.147). 
The idea is that Russell is not justified in believing that God does not exist, since he should 
have known about the sign that was above his head for five minutes—a sign that would have 
provided strong relevant evidence for believing in the existence of God. The thing to ask 
about this case is whether it is analogous to Gibbons’ cream cheese case in the right way. I 
don’t think it is. In particular, the sign above Russell’s head just wasn’t sufficiently obvious to 
generate the intuition that he should have known about it. After all, he was busy reading a 
book and the sign was completely out of sight. It’s true that all he would have had to do to see 
the sign is turn his head upwards, but it’s not plausible that while one is reading a book, a sign 





suddenly by an angel) above one’s head is in any sense an obvious bit of evidence for or against 
some standing belief (about the existence of God) that one happens to have. Meanwhile, in the 
cream cheese case, the note is right there in front of Gibbons on the fridge, in the place where 
they usually keep such notes. It’s plausible that, even if Gibbons is in no sense aware of the 
note, the existence of the note is sufficiently obvious such that he should have known about it.  
But we have to be careful here. In particular, Gibbons is walking a fine line between the first 
sort of motivation for the idea that he ought to have known about the note that I said was not 
available to him – i.e. that he is in some sense aware of it but hasn’t noticed it – and the second 
sort of motivation—namely, the idea that he failed as a responsible inquirer. Gibbons seems to 
invite further scrutiny along the first sort of line when he says:  
Oddly enough, not everyone is moved by my original version of the story. So I will 
show you how to construct a range of stories, and you can use the one that suits your 
intuitions. We begin with a standard-sized notepaper stuck to the door of the 
refrigerator. Now gradually increase the size of the note. Make the letters larger, 
brighter, and more colourful until you get a billboard-sized note with the letters 
written out in bright lights. Somewhere along the line, probably well before you get to 
the billboard, you will get to the point where you think that whether I noticed or not, 
I should have” (Gibbons 2006, p.24). 
Appealing to billboard-sized notes is not doing Gibbons any favours in this context.117 But his 
point is that somewhere well before you get to the billboard, you should have the intuition that 
a subject can be responsible for knowing about something that they may or may not have 
noticed (nor are aware of in any sense). As the note gets smaller, however, pressure builds on 
Gibbons to acknowledge that the motivation for the idea that he was responsible for knowing 
about the note comes from intuitions about responsible inquiry. And this is just because the 
smaller the note gets, the less inclined we’ll be to think that, even though he is in no sense 
aware of the note, he ought to be in the sense that it is right now a determinant of his 
justification. Perhaps Gibbons can claim that the notion of obviousness does the work he 
needs for walking this fine line. Recall that we spelled out obviousness in terms of being in a 
position to know and relevance. In a sense, perhaps we can think of the fact that notes are 
usually kept on the fridge as part of what makes the note relevant in this case (as opposed to 
driving the intuition that he has a responsibility to inquire about it). If he can build relevance 
                                                            
117 Again, because he can’t motivate the intuition that he responsible for knowing about the note in terms of the 






into the notion of obviousness in this way, then perhaps Gibbons’ appeal to obviousness is an 
appeal to something in between awareness and diligent inquiry which allows him to walk the 
line.  
This needs further defence, and of course there are further objections to Gibbons’ view we 
could pursue here. Moreover, we haven’t even begun to explore whether Gibbons’ appeal to 
cases in rejecting supervenience internalism is consistent with holding on to an internalist 
condition of accessibility on our evidence. Gibbons has a story to tell about this which relies 
on the notion of an “epistemic situation.” In particular, he claims that we must relativise our 
judgements about whether an agent has privileged access to the facts about what they have 
justification to believe to the agent’s actual epistemic situation. As I read Gibbons, he claims 
that two importantly different claims need to be distinguished. The first is that Gibbons (in the 
cream cheese case) could not make a non-culpable error about whether he has justification to 
believe that he is about to have a cream cheese omelette, in any epistemic situation. The idea is 
something like: we consider all the possible worlds in which Gibbons is in his kitchen and 
believes he is about to make a cream cheese omelette and ask whether Gibbons could make a 
non-culpable error about what he has justification to believe. The second claim is that he could 
not make a non-culpable error about what he has justification to believe in his particular epistemic 
situation. The idea is something like: holding certain epistemic features of the case fixed, we 
consider all the possible worlds in which Gibbons is in his kitchen and believes he is about to 
make a cream cheese omelette and ask whether Gibbons could make a non-culpable error 
about what he has justification to believe. Gibbons claims that the note should only be 
considered a determinant of his justification in his particular epistemic situation. It would not be a 
determinant of his justification were Gibbons to be in any epistemic situation (for example, if 
the note was in his wife’s back pocket, or if Gibbons was a BIV stationed in his kitchen being 
stimulated to believe he was about to have a cream cheese omelette). We need to examine in a 
bit more detail what Gibbons means and how he might defend this claim.   
First of all, we need to spell out in at least some detail what Gibbons means by an “epistemic 






So how do we individuate epistemic situations? Why, epistemically of course. 
Whatever an epistemic situation is, the following should hold true. If a has 
justification for believing that p in e and b does not have justification for believing 
that p in e', then e is not the same epistemic situation as e'. You just don't get for free 
the claim that if a and b are the same on the inside then a and b are in the same 
epistemic situation. This is to beg the question. But I do not have to beg the question 
against the internalist (Gibbons 2006, p.34).118 
In other words, Gibbons says nothing positive about what an epistemic situation is. He merely 
says that it is not to be understood in terms of how things are on the inside for an agent. But 
I’m not sure that Gibbons needs to rely on much more than rough intuitions about what an 
epistemic situation is. This just isn’t where the real controversial action in his view is (that’s 
coming shortly). So I’ll suggest on Gibbons’ behalf that we think of an epistemic situation in 
the following way: an epistemic situation (with respect to proposition p) is individuated in 
terms of the method of belief formation one can use in forming the belief that p and the 
obstacles (if any) that stand in the way of successfully using it. So for example, right now my 
epistemic situation is such that I can come to know by visual perception that there’s a 
computer and a phone on my desk, not to mention all manner of things in the room around 
me. Nothing stands in the way of me coming to know all of these things as long as I turn my 
head and look. In short I don’t think there’s any more content to the idea than the notion of 
what I’m in a position to know (which is of course itself a vague idea). Recall what Williamson 
said about being in a position to know: 
To be in a position to know, it is neither necessary to know p nor sufficient to be 
physically or psychologically capable of knowing p. No obstacle must block one’s 
path to knowing p. If one is in a position to know p, and one has done what one is in 
a position to do to decide whether p is true, then one does know p. The fact is open 
to view, unhidden, even if one does not yet see it” (Williamson 2000, p.95). 
Gibbons claims that the only way to imagine him making a non-culpable error about whether 
he is justified in believing that he is about to have a cream cheese omelette is by changing the 
epistemic situation—again, for example, by changing the epistemic situation such that the note is 
in his wife’s back pocket, or Gibbons is a BIV stationed in his kitchen being stimulated to 
believe he is about to have a cream cheese omelette. In other words, only in cases in which he 
is in a position to know about the note does the note count as a determinant of his 
justification. The cases in which a non-culpable error about his justification is ostensibly 
                                                            
118 What he means by this last claim is that he’s offered counterexamples to supervenience internalism – for 





possible would co-vary with cases in which he is not in a position to know about the note. In 
other words, holding the relevant features of the case fixed – i.e. the features such that he is in 
position to know about the note – he could not make a non-culpable error about the note. 
And so, the idea that the note (something in the external world) is a determinant of his 
justification is compatible in this way with the idea that he cannot make a non-culpable error 
about what he has justification to believe.  
I’m not sure what to make of Gibbons’ employment of the notion of epistemic situation. It 
seems perilously close to getting him the claim he wants about the compatibility of an access 
condition with a rejection of supervenience internalism at the cost of being trivial. The notions 
of being in a position to know, privileged access, and epistemic situation all seem to sit so close 
together that it’s difficult to get a sense of a genuine explanation of the compatibility of an 
access condition with a rejection of supervenience internalism. Regardless, I won’t pursue this 
critique here. My main point in appealing to Gibbons is to show that there is theoretical space 
worth exploring when it comes to considering whether the idea that we are always in a position 
to know what our evidence is implies supervenience internalism. Ultimately, although I think 
Gibbons’ access externalism is one option available, it leaves a variety of important questions 
open.   
5.4 Contextualism and Luminosity 
There are other possibilities for making the case that privileged access to justification is 
compatible with supervenience externalism. In particular, it will be helpful to turn to recent 
work from Greco (2013). Greco (2013) connects considerations about access with a form of 
contextualism about justification. There’s a bit more stage-setting to follow before seeing how 
Greco’s discussion is relevant for our purposes.119 
Greco calls his particular brand of contextualism “contextualism about foundations”. 
According to Greco, a foundational proposition is one that is justified even in the absence of 
further support from other beliefs. The non-contextualist foundationalist claims that a certain 
                                                            
119 Greco’s discussion, like Gibbons’, is in terms of justification. But he also makes all of his main points in terms 
of propositional justification. Once again, at this stage in the thesis we are assuming that having evidence that p is 
necessary for having propositional justification that p. So, even if Greco does not endorse that assumption, I 
think I can safely interpret his discussion in this way when I want to talk about evidence. Although he doesn’t 
frame his view this way himself, I think Greco offers a way of rejecting supervenience internalism about evidence 





class of propositions enjoy the status of being foundational in virtue of properties like being 
indubitable, or self-evident. Meanwhile, the contextualist about foundations claims that while 
in any given context, certain propositions count as justified even in the absence of further 
support from other beliefs, there is no cross-contextual line to draw around the kinds of 
properties foundational propositions must have in virtue of which they enjoy the status of 
being foundational.120 Rather, foundational propositions—in a given context—simply have the 
formal property of being presupposed by parties to an inquiry or conversation.121 In different 
contexts, different propositions are presupposed. These may be propositions about the internal 
world or the external world, they may be what the non-contextualist foundationalist calls self-
evident or indubitable, but they certainly need not be. They can be ordinary empirical 
propositions such as that one has hands, for example. Greco motivates contextualism about 
foundationalism in virtue of its ability to provide a promising middle way through a dilemma 
for traditional (non-contextualist) forms of foundationalism—namely, the dilemma of making 
foundations too restrictive and inducing scepticism, or too broad and licensing an 
unsatisfactory “epistemic permissivism” (Greco 2013, p.9). But he also notes that there’s an 
interesting upshot when it comes to preserving internalist intuitions about access.122  
Here is how Greco understands access internalism: 
(Access) If S has justification to believe that p, then S is in a position to know that S 
has justification to believe that p. 
Thus, he understands access in precisely the same way that we’ve been discussing it. Indeed, he 
says: “(Access) just amounts to the claim that the condition of having justification to believe 
that P is “luminous" in the sense of luminosity for which Williamson (2000) argues that no 
                                                            
120 Greco claims that the broad point he argues for is compatible with a variety of different ways of individuating 
contexts, including the ways commonly associated with sensitive invariantism, relativism, expressivism, and what 
he calls orthodox contextualism. Since his discussion proceeds on the “orthodox” framework, I’ll note what he 
says this view amounts to here: Sentences of the form “S's belief that P is justified" (as well as sentences 
attributing foundational justification more narrowly) express different propositions when uttered in different 
conversational contexts. Features of conversational contexts that affect which propositions such sentences 
express may include the presuppositions made by the participants to a conversation, the purposes of the 
conversation, and the practical situation faced by the participants to the conversation. In general, a proposition P's 
being presupposed by the parties in a conversational context C tends to make sentences of the form “S's belief 
that P is foundational," true, when uttered in C (Greco 2014, p.6). 
121 Note, on Williams’ (1991; 2001) version of a similar view about justification, Williams also requires a reliability 
condition. That is, our presuppositions in any given context must in fact be reliably formed beliefs in order to 
count as justified. 





non-trivial conditions are luminous” (Greco 2013, p.24).123 Greco recognizes that the thought 
that we are always in a position to know what our evidence is, or whether we have justification 
to believe that p, can easily seem to lead to a problematic position according to which our 
evidence or justification must supervene on facts that are reflectively or introspectibly 
accessible to one. He puts the point nicely: 
A natural, almost inescapable thought, is the following. (Access) could only be true if 
there were some distinctive realm of propositions that constituted the supervenience 
base for facts about what we have justification to believe, such that concerning claims 
in this distinctive realm, one is always in a position to know the truth (Greco 2013, 
p.25). 
The natural thought is that justification, or what counts as our evidence, supervenes on the 
reflectively accessible, or introspectible—in short the thought is that it supervenes on the 
internal. But Greco is sympathetic to an access condition on justification.124 He thinks he can 
show that an access condition does not lead to supervenience internalism. The basic idea is 
that, once we endorse contextualism about justification, the claim that being justified in 
believing that p is a luminous condition is a much less controversial idea.  
Structurally, Greco’s thought is that whenever S has justification to believe that p, in a given 
context, S will also be in a position to know that S has justification to believe that p. The only 
way to make it the case that S is not in a position to know what S has justification to believe, is 
by changing the context, and thereby changing the facts that S’s justification supervenes on. 
An example will be helpful to spell this out. Imagine that Jim is hosting a party and he either 
tells Susan that the party starts at 8pm or that it starts at 9pm. Now imagine some people are 
discussing Susan’s epistemic credentials and someone raises the question of what justification 
Susan has to believe about when the party starts (in this context it’s a shared presupposition 
that Susan heard what Jim said). The natural answer, Greco suggests, is that she has 
justification to believe whatever Jim told her. In the given context, the facts about what Susan 
has justification to believe supervene on the facts about what Jim said (as Greco puts it, they 
                                                            
123 We can translate this into a claim about what accessibility of evidence would amount to.  
124 He spells out the potential motivation in terms of considerations about guidance (which I examined last 
chapter), and also in terms of an access condition’s ability to explain the felt badness of “Moorean conjunctions” 
about justification (Greco 2013, p.24). This is an interesting area for further exploration of the motivation for an 
access condition which I would have liked to examined last chapter, but it would have taken us too far afield (see 





determine the “local supervenience base”). Now, since we’re assuming that Susan heard what 
Jim said, it’s also true that Susan is in a position to know what she has justification to believe.  
What’s important to note is that facts about what Jim said do not make a plausible 
supervenience base for facts about what an agent has justification to believe across all contexts 
(as Greco puts it, they do not determine a good “global” supervenience base for justification). 
Imagine, for example, we come to believe that Jim had mumbled or that Susan is hard of 
hearing (in this context, it’s no longer presupposed that Susan heard what Jim said). If we 
continue to think that the facts about what Jim said determine what she has justification to 
believe, then we’ll be claiming that she is not in a position to know what she has justification to 
believe (i.e. that Jim said the party starts either at 8pm or 9pm). Greco suggests, however, that 
in this context, when we ask about what justification Susan has to believe about when the party 
starts, a more natural answer is not going to be facts about whatever Jim said—rather, it may 
be facts about when Jim’s parties have started in the past (if we presuppose that Susan 
remembers this), or what Jim’s email said (again, presupposing that she remembers what it 
said). The point is that the facts we now take her justification to supervene on are once again 
facts that she’s in a position to know. So, when the context changes (such that what we are 
presupposing in assessing what Susan has justification to believe changes), the facts that what 
Susan has justification to believe supervenes on are always facts that she’s in a position to 
know. But this is not to say that there is some realm of facts which could form a supervenience 
base for justification such that in any context Susan would be in a position to know what she 
has justification to believe. As Greco puts it: 
...[B]ecause we do not believe in cognitive homes of the traditional sort, we'll 
admitthat whatever B is [i.e. the supervenience base for S’s justification], we will be 
able to raise reasonable doubts about S's ability to know which are the truths in B. To 
the extent that we take such doubts seriously, the context will shift, and in our new 
context C`, B will not be the local supervenience base for facts about what S has 
justification to believe. Rather, there will be some new supervenience base B`, such 
that S does count as in a position to know which are the truths in B` (Greco 2013, 
p.28).  
There are obviously a lot of details to be filled in here, and I haven’t even begun to provide any 
sort of support for Greco’s contextualism about justification. I think an interesting question is 
whether we would need to endorse Greco’s kind of contextualism in order to defend the idea 





example, it’s not clear to me exactly how to understand whether Gibbons’ view about 
epistemic situations could be understood as a non-contextualist way, or whether it is just some 
other kind of contextualism about justification). In any case, I think Greco provides another 
potential way of showing that the idea that we are always in a position to know what our 
evidence is does not simply entail accessibilist supervenience internalism. There are options on 
the table for resisting that move. I take this to suggest that it would be hasty to conclude that 
accounting for natural reaction in the first way (that is, by rejecting evidential externalism and 
allowing that we are always in a position to know what our evidence is) makes it impossible in-
principle to reject the sameness of evidence thesis.125 
5.5 Sameness of Evidence and the Closure Problem 
 
All of this said, I haven’t come up with a way of showing how this could be done. Indeed, 
even if there is no in-principle reason to think it cannot be done, I find it difficult to see how a 
strategy that holds on to the idea that one is always in a position to know what one’s evidence 
is will be able to meet the explanatory challenge. In particular, if we acknowledge that the good 
and bad cases are indistinguishable, it’s simply very difficult to see how one could claim that 
one’s evidence in the good and bad cases is different, while holding on to the accessibility 
condition. The best way to reject the sameness of evidence thesis in light of the explanatory 
challenge seems to be some form of evidential externalism. However, of course, I’ve claimed 
that doing so comes with a significant burden, namely accounting for the natural reaction to 
evidential externalism in the second way – that is, showing why (A) or the accessibility 
condition on attributability (or both) is false, and explaining away the intuitive plausibility of 
these theses.  
 
I haven’t tried to do this on behalf of the evidential externalist. That strikes me as a book-
length project in its own right. While I cannot engage further in that direction here, I think it’s 
important to take a step back and note that the dialectic I’ve ended up with raises a question: 
perhaps rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis is not a promising way to respond to 
scepticism about evidential justification after all. Despite the motivation I’ve put forward for 
                                                            
125 It’s important to point out that the contextualist views about justification or evidence that Greco’s view is 
inspired by have their own particular ways of responding to the sceptic (Annis 1978; Neta 2003; Williams 1991; 





pursuing this line, we can see now that it faces considerable challenges – at least as troubling as 
the challenges faced by all of the other anti-sceptical strategies I’ve considered in this thesis. 
This invites a reassessment of the approach. In light of this, I want to close this chapter by 
examining a further reason we might think that rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis 
cannot provide an adequate response to scepticism about evidential justification.126 I want to 
examine whether the approach has adequate scope for dealing with scepticism about evidential 
justification generally – in other words, whether there are any obviously important forms of 
scepticism remaining that rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis would leave untouched.  
We started the discussion of scepticism with the closure problem for knowledge. This quickly 
led to the claim that the really interesting forms of scepticism challenge our evidential 
justification to believe ordinary empirical propositions. But I noted briefly that the closure 
argument can be reformulated in terms of evidential justification. Pritchard (forthcoming) shows 
how this can be done, although he does it in terms of “rationally supported knowledge”. For 
our purposes, we can translate “rational support” to “evidential justification.” The argument 
goes as follows:127 
1**) One cannot have evidential justification to believe that one is not a BIV. 
2**) If one cannot have evidential justification to believe that one is not a BIV, then 
one cannot have evidential justification to believe that one is seated at a desk. 
3**) Therefore, you cannot have evidential justification to believe that you are seated 
at a desk. 
While the anti-sceptical strategies we’ve considered that proceed by denying the sameness of 
evidence thesis —if correct—clearly have a way of dealing with the underdetermination 
argument (and I hinted at the possibility that they might have a way of undermining the 
plausibility of Wright’s and Pryor’s sceptic’s appeal to (SPJ)), an important desideratum for 
                                                            
126 The considerations to follow are of course similar in spirit to the issue we saw Owens and Schiffer raise in 
Chapter 3 for Williamson’s anti-sceptical strategy. That is, they claimed that even if we can reject the sameness of 
evidence thesis, this isn’t enough to defeat the sceptic. I noted that Williamson can respond at least to Owens’ 
objection by simply allowing that our justification would be different in good and bad cases.  
127 Pritchard formulates the argument as a paradox instead of an argument. That is, instead of the conclusion 
(3**), he simply points out that it’s of course highly intuitive that, imagining you are in fact seated at a desk, you 
do have rationally supported knowledge that you are seated at a desk. This claim stands in conflict with (1**) and 





these strategies is that they are able to deal with this sort of argument as well.128 After all, this is 
just another way of formulating scepticism about evidential justification.  
The most obvious way for a disjunctivist to challenge the reformulated closure argument (if 
they do not want to deny a closure principle for rationally supported knowledge) is to 
challenge premise (1**).129 On the face of it, it seems that they are well positioned to do so. 
That is, they can claim that the only motivation for the claim that we do not have evidential 
justification to believe we are not BIVs is a sceptical appeal to the favouring claim that’s at 
work in the underdetermination argument. That is, the sceptic proceeds by claiming that one’s 
evidence does not favour that one is not a BIV over that one is a BIV, and thus, via (UP),130 
that one does not have justification to believe that one is not a BIV. If this is right, then 
disjunctivist strategies can (in principle) resist this claim in the same way that they resist the 
sceptical appeal to underdetermination of evidence concerning one’s ordinary empirical beliefs. 
They will have a story to tell about how we can be justified in believing that we are not BIVs 
and reject premise (1**) of the reformulated closure argument on that basis (of course, they 
will also need a diagnostic story to tell about why this seems so implausible).131 The trouble is, 
this sort of response is conditional on its being true that the only motivation for premise (1**) 
is the sceptic’s appeal to the favouring claim and (UP). If the sceptic has some other motivation, 
which strategies that proceed by challenging the sameness of evidence thesis don’t speak to, 
then this approach to premise (1**) will at best challenge only one way of motivating that 
premise, and thus leave an important argument for evidential scepticism open for 
                                                            
128Concerning Pryor’s (SPJ), the way I said there is potential for undermining the plausibility of the sceptic’s 
appeal to (SPJ) was as follows. Pryor’s explanation of the plausibility of (SPJ) was that radical sceptical scenarios 
are “bad” in the sense that even if they obtained we’d have the same grounds to believe ordinary empirical 
propositions – this was the explanation for why it’s plausible we should have antecedent justification to believe 
they do not obtain if we are to have justification to believe ordinary empirical propositions. I said that we might 
try to undermine the plausibility of the sceptic’s appeal to (SPJ) by claiming that it’s false that one’s evidence (or 
“grounds”) would be the same if one were a BIV. In effect, we’d be denying that our grounds E always “allow” 
the obtaining of a radical sceptical scenario in Pryor’s sense, and thus that a condition on the hypothesis as 
counting as “bad” is not met. 
129 This closure principle for rationally supported knowledge goes as follows: “If S has rationally grounded 
knowledge that p, and S competently deduces from p that q, thereby forming a belief that q on this basis while 
retaining her rationally grounded knowledge that p, then S has rationally grounded knowledge that q” (Pritchard 
forthcoming, Ch.1, p.13). It’s not clear why we would find this principle any less plausible than the closure principle 
for knowledge (CK3) that I formulated in Chapter 1. That is, it seems to satisfy the same intuition that one’s 
knowledge is preserved through competent deductions. Why would evidentially grounded knowledge be any 
different? But considering this issue further here would take us too far afield.  
130Recall that the underdetermination principle (UP) says: For all S, p, q, if S’s evidence for believing p does not 
favour p over some hypothesis q which S knows to be incompatible with p, then S’s evidence does not justify S in 
believing p. 





consideration. Again, we might take this as further reason – in addition to the problems I’ve 
discussed so far – to abandon the project of rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis. 
There are of course alternative possible explanations of what motivates (1**).132 For example, 
Cohen (1998) argues that the claim that we don’t have evidential justification to believe that 
we’re not BIVs is motivated by a principle that says:  
(Z) For all S, p, if the truth of p would explain S’s evidence, then S’s evidence does 
not justify not- p   
(Z), like (UP), is meant to tell us why, according to the sceptic, some body of evidence E does 
not justify S’s belief that some radical sceptical hypothesis is false. Roughly, it is because that 
evidence would be explained by the radical sceptical hypothesis. Cohen’s point is that, if the 
truth of the BIV hypothesis can explain E, then E cannot justify the claim that I am not a BIV. 
According to Cohen, premise (1**) depends on the thought that every bit of evidence one 
might appeal to to justify ~BIV would be explained by the BIV hypothesis. Cohen claims that 
this principle does not appeal to claims about underdetermination of evidence and that it 
underwrites a very natural way of understanding the plausibility of premise (1**). “My claim is 
not that this reasoning will move everyone to skeptical doubt. But I do think it represents a 
very natural motivation for premise [(1**)]” (Cohen 1998, p.147).133 
We might think that if Cohen is correct, and we can motivate (1**) with (Z), then it’s not clear 
that we can challenge (1**) via a rejection of the sameness of evidence thesis. That is, we might 
wonder whether, in seeking to establish that our evidence is not the same in the good and bad 
cases, our anti-sceptical strategy will stand up to the idea that our evidence would be explained 
by the BIV hypothesis in the good case. The obvious point to make here is that Cohen’s 
principle seems to work as motivation for (1**) only insofar as we assume that our evidence 
consists in non-factive mental states. After all, the only way it would be possible for a BIV 
hypothesis to explain the evidence one has for believing, say, that they have two hands, is if 
that evidence is non-factive. As a BIV, one does not have two hands, so a BIV hypothesis 
cannot explain one’s having evidence that entails that one has two hands. In other words, it 
                                                            
132 Some of the material in this section draws heavily on my Boult (2013).  
133 Cohen appeals to (Z) in the context of challenging Brueckner’s (1994) claim that we must appeal to (UP) in 
motivating (1**). Cohen acknowledges (in a footnote) that the “order of justification” between (Z) and (1**) is 





seems the principle is only plausible insofar as we presuppose a highest common factor 
conception of evidence. If so, then the disjunctivist is just as well-positioned to deal with this 
motivation for (1**) as she is for dealing with motivation that directly appeals to (UP) and the 
favouring claim. 
That said, it is interesting to consider whether Cohen might take the intuitive plausibility of the 
idea that a BIV hypothesis could explain one’s evidence as reason to resist the idea that our 
evidence could possibly consist in factive mental states. In other words, we might take his 
principle as motivation for a highest common factor conception of evidence. The thought would 
be that if it seems highly intuitively plausible that a BIV hypothesis would explain all of one’s 
present evidence for believing ordinary empirical propositions, and if the truth of a BIV 
hypothesis would entail that one’s evidence must be non-factive, then one’s evidence must 
(always) consist in non-factive mental states.  
I’m not sure how a disjunctivist would want to deal with this claim. For one thing, it seems 
open to the disjunctivist to insist again that the only reason it seems intuitively plausible that a 
BIV hypothesis would explain one’s evidence is if we are already taken in by the highest 
common factor conception of evidence. Indeed, they’ll note that what’s intuitive here is simply 
the idea that all of one’s present phenomenal experiences would be explained by a BIV hypothesis, 
not one’s evidence. But again, this may be a sort of stand-off that is similar to the stand-off that 
Pritchard seemed to be in when it came to dealing with the initial highest common factor 
argument I presented in Chapter 3. In particular, that stand-off had to do with whether 
someone who makes the move from 
(P2) The ‘good’ and ‘bad’ cases are phenomenologically indistinguishable 
to the conclusion that  
(C1) The supporting reasons for one’s perceptual beliefs in the ‘good’ case can be 
no better than in the ‘bad’ case. 
owes the disjunctivist a justification for why this is legitimate move, or whether the 
disjunctivist owes the proponent of such a move a justification for why it is not. And again, I 
noted that that the proponent of the move from (P2) to (C1) does have a kind of justification 





that the best explanation of the indistinguishability of one’s evidence in the good and bad cases 
is that one’s evidence is the same. In light of that challenge, I claimed that the way for the 
disjunctivist to approach this stand-off—if it is one—is by endorsing some form of evidential 
externalism. It seems likely that something similar might apply when it comes to a disjunctivist 
response to any claim that Cohen might make about the intuitive plausibility of his principle 
(Z). That said, I think it’s worth digressing for a moment and considering whether Cohen’s 
principle is really all that plausible as motivation for (1**), independently of the issue of 
whether our evidence can consist in factive mental states.  
For one thing, it is not immediately obvious that sceptical hypotheses are equally good 
explanations of E as other anti-sceptical hypotheses, even when E is construed non-factively. 
For example, the BIV scenario does not immediately come across as a satisfactory competitor 
with what we can call the “real world hypothesis”. Of course, it is difficult to say why. But one 
possible way of spelling this out is due to Vogel (1990). Vogel claims that on the real world 
hypothesis the spatial properties of objects already do real explanatory work (Vogel 1990, 
p.664). “The fact that something is spherical explains why it behaves like a sphere (in its 
interactions with us and with other things). If something that is not a sphere behaves like one, 
this will call for a more extended explanation” (Vogel 1990, p.664). Vogel’s point is that spatial 
behaviour comes “for free”, so to speak, with real spheres but it must be supplied by 
additional BIV programming when the ‘spheres’ in question have no spatial properties at all.134 
To be sure, insofar as it has been offered as an anti-sceptical strategy, Vogel’s argument has 
attracted criticism (Fumerton 2005). But regardless of whether or not this line of thought is 
successful as an anti-sceptical strategy, it does articulate the intuition that the BIV hypothesis 
has shortcomings as an explanation of our evidence (even construed non-factively). That is, 
something along the lines articulated by Vogel gives expression to an inchoate, intuitive 
thought about the explanatory shortcomings of the BIV hypothesis. In this respect, even if 
Vogel’s argument can ultimately be challenged as an anti-sceptical strategy, it provides a useful 
                                                            
134 Here is a very brief illustration of the point. It is a necessary truth about physical objects that two objects 
cannot occupy the same location at the same time. “We do not need any empirical law or regularity to explain 
this” (Vogel 1990, p.664). Because the BIV scenario posits objects with mere pseudo-locations, some explicit 
principle will be required to explain why no two objects can have the same pseudo-location. In other words, an 
additional regularity is required to explain why objects that are not genuinely spatial behave as though they are. 
According to Vogel (given certain assumptions about goodness of explanation—presumably these are 
assumptions of a “unificationist” variety (Kitcher (1981)) these are grounds for taking the real world hypothesis to 






way of bringing out the claim that (Z) is at best a sort of motivation for (1**) that puts the 
sceptic on less than plausible ground at the outset. If one appeals to the claim that the BIV 
hypothesis would explain one’s evidence in order to motivate the claim that one does not have 
evidential justification to believe that the BIV hypothesis doesn’t obtain, it seems both natural 
and epistemically relevant to wonder whether the BIV scenario is a very good explanation of 
one’s experiences. The explanatory goodness of the BIV hypothesis may or may not be a 
decisive concern—or even, in the final analysis, anti-sceptically relevant—but it is an issue, 
nevertheless, that makes for implausible ground upon which to motivate or in other words 
explain the intuitive plausibility of (1**). 
I’ve been focusing on Cohen because I think he presents a particularly elegant and interesting 
alternative to the idea that (UP) and the favouring claim motivate (1**). Of course there are 
other arguments to consider concerning what motivates (1**). Other discussions on this issue 
include Wright (2004), Greco (2007), Weatherson (2007), and Briesen (2010). Briesen and 
Weatherson both think that an argument which Weatherson calls the “exhaustive argument” 
best supports (1**). The argument essentially proceeds as follows: S is not justified in believing 
that they are not a BIV by way of empirical evidence; nor is S justified in believing that they are 
not a BIV by way of non-empirical evidence; since all evidence is either empirical or non-
empirical, S is not justified in believing that they are not a BIV, and thus does not know that 
they are not a BIV. I don’t want to place too much weight on disputing Briesen’s claim that 
this argument “does not refer to the underdetermination principle” (Briesen 2010, p.9). I will 
note, however, that a natural question to ask Briesen (and Weatherson) is: what motivates the 
claim that S is not justified by way of empirical evidence in believing that they are not a BIV? 
Is this to be understood as primitively plausible? Or is there some further explanation for why 
it is that S isn’t empirically justified in her beliefs about not being a BIV. A good candidate is 
of course the plausibility of claims about underdetermination of evidence. 
In a recent discussion, Dodd argues that “the closure argument is better than the 
underdetermination argument” (Dodd 2012). Dodd has a particular version of the closure 
argument in mind which appeals precisely to (1**). What he means by the foregoing claim is 
that his closure argument is harder to respond to. Dodd (following Cohen) distinguishes 





That being said, there are different ways to evaluate the relative strengths of different 
arguments for a single conclusion. Cohen (1998, p. 156) distinguishes between the 
refutability of an argument and the cogency of an argument. One argument may be less 
refutable than another argument because it relies on weaker premises. But that 
doesn’t mean it’s more cogent—i.e., that it makes a better case for the conclusion 
(Dodd 2012, p. 343). 
He notes that he hasn’t said anything about the relative cogency of the closure and 
underdetermination arguments: 
I’ve argued that the Closure Argument relies on weaker premises. In Cohen’s 
terminology, it’s better in the sense of being less refutable. But it doesn’t follow that the 
Closure Argument is also more cogent than the Underdetermination Argument. Why 
think there’s anything to [(1**)]—the claim that S’s evidence doesn’t provide S with 
propositional justification for believing not-sk [the proposition that they are a BIV]? Maybe 
we find this premise plausible only insofar as we’re thinking that S’s evidence doesn’t 
discriminate between h [the proposition that they have hands] and sk. S’s evidence 
supports h no better than it supports sk. If it’s thoughts like these that underlie our 
finding [(1**)] plausible, then there’s another sense in which the Closure Argument is 
no better than the Underdetermination Argument. That would be because we find 
the key premise of the Closure Argument compelling only to the extent to which we 
find the key premise of the Underdetermination Argument compelling (Dodd 2012, 
p.343). 
The basic idea is that, for all Dodd is concerned, the reason why we find premise (1**) of the 
closure argument plausible is because we find the claims about underdetermination in the 
underdetermination argument plausible. So Dodd’s discussion does not present any reason to 
think that a disjunctivist strategy that proceeds by challenging the claims about 
underdetermination in the underdetermination argument does not have scope for dealing with 
the reformulated closure argument. Thus, we can see that a variety of recent discussions of the 
motivation for (1**) place it within the scope of a rejection of the sameness of evidence thesis. 
As such, this is good reason to think that a disjunctivist strategy has at least as much scope as 
any other strategy I’ve considered in this thesis for dealing with scepticism about evidential 
justification generally (at least when it comes to evidential justification concerning our ordinary 
beliefs about the external world). If the argument in Chapters 1and 2 is on the right track, the 
disjunctivist plausibly has more scope for dealing with scepticism about evidential justification 
than any of the other strategies I’ve considered in this thesis. The question, of course, is 
whether such a strategy is ultimately plausible. But the foregoing is motivation for taking the 
issue I’ve sharpened when it comes to rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis seriously, as 






I started this chapter by looking at the options when it comes to accounting for the natural 
reaction and rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis. Williamson’s diagnosis of the natural 
reaction suggests that the only way of accounting for it is by rejecting the claims that I’ve said 
it amounts to—namely the (A) principle and the condition of accessibility on attributability. 
His diagnosis came down to the idea that an internalist condition of accessibility on our 
evidence amounts to endorsing accessibilist supervenience internalism. I claimed that this is 
tantamount to the idea that our evidence is the same in the good and bad cases. But I appealed 
to the work of Gibbons and Greco to show that there are theoretical resources available for 
arguing that an internalist condition of accessibility does not entail supervenience internalism. 
As such, I claimed that—at least insofar as these considerations are concerned—it would be 
hasty to conclude that we only have one option when it comes to accounting for the natural 
reaction and rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis. That said, I then noted that we are no 
further along in understanding how such a view would go, or what the best way to reject the 
sameness of evidence thesis is. In light of the challenges this strategy faces, I concluded the 
chapter by reconsidering the potential scope of disjunctivist strategies in responding to 
scepticism about evidential justification generally. I concluded that the prospects on this score 















The central claims of this thesis can be put as follows. 
 
1)  The best (or at least a particularly promising) way of responding to the most interesting (or 
at least a particularly interesting) argument for external world scepticism involves rejecting 
the sameness of evidence thesis.  
 
2) There are two broad ways of rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis. One way holds on 
to a condition of accessibility on our evidence; the other way rejects that condition. 
 
3) Holding on to the accessibility condition makes it very difficult to meet the explanatory 
challenge (although we can endorse a weak form of the accessibility condition – but I 
argued that this seems to undermine the motivation for holding on to an accessibility 
condition). 
 
4) Rejecting the accessibility condition generates the natural reaction. That is, granting that 
there is a normative requirement such that agents ought to proportion their beliefs to the 
evidence (which, again, is something I’ve assumed in this thesis – along with the main 
parties to the debate I’m engaging in), rejecting the accessibility condition implies that 
agents can be normatively required to Ø when they are not in a position to know that they 
are normatively required to Ø. The natural reaction expresses the idea that this is 
impossible. I filled out the natural reaction in terms of the (A) principle: 
(A): S ought to Ø only if, if S doesn’t Ø, then S is attributable for not Ø-ing 
and an accessibility condition on attributability, which said: 
Necessarily, an agent is attributable for Ø-ing only if they are in a position to know 
that they are Ø-ing (and they have not culpably failed to put themselves in a position 






These two claims together (along with the truth of the evidential norm) imply that a view 
about evidence which allows that we are not always in a position to know when the 
triggering conditions in our normative requirements obtain must be mistaken. 
5) Any anti-sceptical strategy that rejects the sameness of evidence thesis must account for the 
natural reaction. We can do so in two broad ways: a) by holding on to the accessibility 
condition; or b) by showing why either (A) or the accessibility condition on attributability or 
(or both) is mistaken and explain away their intuitive plausibility. 
 
6) Both a) and b) are live options, but I’ve left it an open question what the best way to go is.  
 
There is still of course much to be discussed about the plausibility of the central ideas I’ve 
sketched out above. Given the seeming impossibility of meeting the explanatory challenge 
while endorsing an accessibility condition on our evidence, I am inclined to think that rejecting 
(A) or the accessibility condition on attributability (or both) is where the most promising 
action is. Indeed, my aim in this thesis has not been to show that there is no way out of this 
issue. It has been to sharpen the issue and explore some related issues in the process. The fact 
that I’ve been focusing so heavily on the natural reaction should not be taken to imply that I 
have no sympathy or hope for evidential externalism. Rather, my discussion of the challenges 
for rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis has been guided by the idea that it’s important to 
understand what we are doing when we approach a rejection of the sameness of evidence 
thesis in one way or another. I think doing this via evidential externalism comes with 
underappreciated difficulties, and I’ve spelled out what I take these to be. 
Of course, there are many other potential ways of responding to scepticism besides rejecting 
the sameness of evidence thesis. I’ve explored a good number of these in this thesis. I found 
that close examination of the issues that these strategies give rise to suggests that rejecting the 
sameness of evidence thesis is a particularly promising way of responding to external world 






I started off with strategies for dealing with the closure-based argument—rejecting premise (1), 
rejecting premise (2), and semantic contextualism. The overarching dialectic that emerged 
when examining those strategies was the following. First, when considering  rejecting premise 
(1), there are of course well-known difficulties with rejecting the closure principle. But more 
interestingly when this strategy is carefully examined it seems to suggest that a more natural 
approach to closure-based scepticism is to challenge the second premise (this idea emerged 
when modifying Nozick’s modal conditions on knowledge to basis-relative formulations). But 
rejecting premise (2) requires explaining how we can know the falsity of sceptical hypotheses. 
An important early example of such an explanation is Sosa’s safety-based approach. The denial 
of (2) strikes many as simply too implausible, or at the very least raises important questions 
about externalist responses to scepticism. DeRose takes the issues that arise when denying 
either premise of the closure-based argument to motivate contextualism, which seeks neither 
to deny the first nor second premise outright. But I argued that going contextualist (at least in 
the paradigmatic way represented by DeRose) seems to require presupposing that the sceptical 
problem turns on a high-standards conception of knowledge. Of course, DeRose also has 
resources in the form of externalist conditions on knowledge at this point. But, again, we saw 
that there are important issues that arise with externalist responses to external world 
scepticism. I argued that these issues turn on considerations about what an adequate response 
to external world scepticism should hope to achieve. I argued that one condition of adequacy 
in responding to external world scepticism is being able to account for radical forms of 
scepticism which challenge not only that our beliefs enjoy the epistemic status of knowledge 
(however that status is conceived) but also that our ordinary empirical beliefs are justified, or 
that we are reasonable in holding them.  
I introduced the underdetermination problem as an example of a sceptical argument that 
challenges the idea that we are justified or reasonable in holding ordinary empirical beliefs. But 
in Chapter Two I examined two anti-sceptical strategies that deal with a different form of 
scepticism about evidential justification. In particular, these strategies engage with a sceptical 
argument that makes central use of a claim that we need antecedent justification to believe that 
we’re not BIVs in order to have justification to believe ordinary empirical propositions. I 
argued that Pryor’s and Wright’s views are caught in a dialectical circle. I took the difficulties 
faced by Pryor and Wright, along with further considerations about the relationship between 





engaging directly with the underdetermination argument, and in particular the sameness of 
evidence thesis.  
All of that said, the issue I’ve tried to sharpen in this thesis need not be understood as an issue 
that must be resolved insofar as we want to resolve the problem of the external world. Rather, 
it may simply be an issue that we need to resolve if we want to approach that problem 
(understood as an underdetermination problem) successfully via a rejection of the sameness of 
evidence thesis. Still, again, the first two chapters of this thesis contain a detailed discussion 
which suggests that approaching external world scepticism in this way is a particularly 
interesting and promising approach. Moreover, at the end of the last chapter I provided a 
further defence of the claim that rejecting the sameness of evidence thesis has adequate scope 
when it comes to responding to scepticism about evidential justification generally.  
The problem of our knowledge of the external world is a particularly resilient problem. Part of 
this may be due to the fact that there’s arguably not really one problem of our knowledge of the 
external world. As Williamson puts it, “There is no silver bullet against scepticism. It is robust, 
in part because sceptical arguments form a complex terrain across which sceptics show great 
facility in subtly shifting their ground as they come under pressure at point after point” 
(Williamson 2009, p.357). An advantage of bringing the underdetermination argument to 
centre stage is that the plausibility of its central commitment—the sameness of evidence 
thesis—is particularly susceptible to scrutiny. But challenging the sameness of evidence thesis 
requires showing that the view about evidence we end up with does not itself lead to 
unacceptable consequences. A promising way of challenging the sameness of evidence thesis—
evidential externalism—does lead to counterintuitive consequences when it comes to the issue 
about access and normative requirements. But I said in the introduction that the question of 
what sort of access we have to our normative requirements is the focus of an increasingly 
sophisticated discussion in contemporary epistemology. One advantage of the foregoing 
discussion is that it brings the problem of external world scepticism directly within the scope 
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